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ABSTRACT 
At the end of the 20th century, the constitutionality of school finance systems in 
Vermont and New Hampshire was challenged in courts for the first time. Both states 
initiated dramatic school finance reforms after their school finance systems were ruled as 
unconstitutional. This study aims to evaluate the effect of these school finance reforms on 
per pupil spending. By utilizing a quasi-experimental research design and using school 
districts in Maine and Rhode Island as comparison groups, this study found that the 
school finance reform in Vermont decreased per pupil spending in rich school districts by 
4-10% and increased per pupil spending in poor school districts by 2-5%. The school 
finance reform in New Hampshire decreased per pupil spending in rich school districts by 
5-7% and had no significant effect on per pupil spending in poor school districts. The 
results from this study suggest that restrictions on the use of state aid are needed and 
should be considered in the process of school finance policy design. This study also 
indicates that directly transferring property tax revenue from rich school districts to poor 
school districts is probably not a sustainable way to achieve equity in education spending 
because it stimulates strong opposition from school districts whose tax revenue is 
recaptured.   
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
The system of public education in the United States was founded by local 
financing and local control (Card & Payne, 2002). Local communities historically 
provided most of the funding for the establishment and maintenance of public schools 
through property tax. In 1920, local revenue accounted for 83% of the total revenue for 
education at the national level. Since the 1920s, increase in the variation of local wealth 
resulted in many state governments beginning to assume more responsibility to fund 
public schools (Reschovsky, 1994). The average proportion of state funding in total 
school funding rose from 30% in 1940 to 40% in 1970 (Card & Payne, 2002). In the 
1970s, local revenue was still the largest source of educational revenue. For example, 
local revenue accounted for 52% of total revenue in education in 1970. Since the 1970s, 
due to variation of property tax base among school districts, heavy reliance on local 
revenue led to the fact that property poor school districts could not provide adequate 
education resources to students, and this produced huge inequity in educational spending 
among school districts (Reschovsky, 1994). At the same time, property tax rate in poor 
school districts would be much higher if they wanted to keep the same level of 
educational spending as in rich school districts (Reschovsky, 1994).  
The heavy reliance on local revenue in funding education has resulted in 125 school 
finance litigations in 45 states since the late 1960s (Springer, Liu, & Guthrie, 2009) . 
Plaintiffs in a majority of school finance litigations were taxpayers, students, or/and 
school districts in property poor areas. What they demanded was that state governments 
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should take the responsibility to provide adequate and equitable education to every 
student and reform state education finance systems (Thompson & Crampton, 2002).  
Specifically, these school finance litigations could be divided into three waves 
based on the arguments of plaintiffs (Thro, 1990). The first wave began at the end of the 
1960s. Plaintiffs resorted to the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. 
The legal argument behind these litigations was equity in education expenditure. They 
argued that education expenditure should not be a function of property wealth of school 
districts. This was also called “fiscal neutrality” (Reschovsky, 1994). This wave of 
finance litigations ended with the San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 
(1973) in which the United States Supreme Courts ruled that the state finance system in 
Texas did not violate the United State Constitution. Plaintiffs in the second wave of 
school finance litigations resorted to education and equal protection clause in state 
constitutions. They argued that inequity of educational expenditure among school 
districts violated state constitutions. The third wave began with the Rose v. Council for 
Better Education (1989). In this case, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the whole 
public school finance system in Kentucky was unconstitutional because students in 
property poor school districts received inadequate and inferior educational opportunity. 
The legal argument behind these litigations was adequacy of educational spending. Here, 
adequacy means that each student should be provided adequate educational resources to 
meet minimum standard of proficiency (Springer et al., 2009).  
Since the 1970s, many states reformed their school finance systems either in 
response to court orders as a result of school finance litigations or by the action of 
legislators. For example, from 1970 to 1997, 16 states had court-order reforms, and 21 
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states initiated school finance reforms without court order (Evans, Murray, & Schwab, 
1997). Corresponding to the demands of plaintiffs in school finance litigations, equity in 
educational spending was the main goal in early school finance reforms.  For example, 
the school finance reform in California after Serrano v. Priest (1971) increased the 
foundation grant, which is the amount of funding that state governments decide to spend 
to make sure that each student has at least minimum quality education, and imposed 
limits on expenditure per pupil in rich school districts (Downes, 1992). These measures 
tried to reduce the correlation between educational expenditure and property wealth in 
school districts. Since 1989, school finance reforms started to focus on adequacy of 
educational spending. For example, the school finance reform in Kentucky after the Rose 
v. Council for Better Education (1989) increased the state’s foundation grant and adjusted 
property assessments so that poorer school districts received a larger share of state aid 
(Murray, Evans, & Schwab, 1998).  
Another feature of school finance reforms occurring since the 1970s was that they 
were characterized by the increased role of state governments in controlling and funding 
public education (Loeb, 2001). For example, the state share of school spending increased 
by more than 10% from 1971 to 1983 in five states (California, Wyoming, Washington, 
Connecticut, and New Jersey) (Theobald & Picus, 1991). Evidence from the Common 
Core of Data (CCD) of the U.S. Department of Education's National Center for Education 
Statistics (NCES) shows that six states increased state share of school spending by more 
than 10% after school finance reforms in the 1990s (Kansas, Oregon, Wisconsin, 
Michigan, Vermont, and New Hampshire). After these dramatic school finance reforms 
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in the 1990s, no state experienced this type of dramatic change in the ratio of state 
revenue in total educational revenue. 
Did these school finance reforms affect the level and distribution of education 
expenditure in school districts? This question earned much attention from researchers. 
However, two problems exist in the extant literature. First, studies with national sample 
data treated school finances of states as homogeneous (e.g. David Card & Payne, 2002; 
Murray, Evans, & Schwab, 1998). Considering the vast difference in school finance 
system of states, this is not appropriate. School finance systems are extremely diverse in 
the United States. The diversity comes from three aspects. First, there are 50 distinctive 
school finance systems because the authority to govern and fund public education lies 
with state governments. Second, revenue for education is from federal, state, and local 
governments. In 2009, at the national level, 47% of revenue for public schools was from 
states, 44% was from local governments, and the remaining 10% was from the federal 
government. However, the composition of the three revenue sources varies a lot from 
state to state, for example, the state share was 92% in Vermont while it was 27% in 
Rhode Island in 2009, and other states were in between. Third, school finance systems in 
the United States are interwoven with a variety of tax systems because school revenue 
comes from many kinds of taxes such as income, sale, and property tax.  
Second, the literature on school finance reform of individual states does not 
provide a conclusive answer to the effect of school finance reforms on per pupil spending.  
For instance, Downes (1992) found that the school finance reform in California after the 
Serrano v. Priest (1976) decreased the dependence of education expenditure on local 
wealth. However, total funding of public education fell between 10 and 15% compared to 
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the rest of the United States after the reform because it limited the supplementary funding 
of wealthier school districts (Fernandez & Rogerson, 1999). Michigan took a 
revolutionary school finance reform called Proposal A in 1994.  By using a Difference in 
Difference model Chaudhary (2009) found that Proposal A increased operating 
expenditures of school districts. He also found that the increase in expenditures led to 
higher teacher salaries and smaller class sizes in Michigan. In Massachusetts, after the 
decision of the McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Education (1993), in 
which plaintiffs prevailed, the state passed the Massachusetts Education Reform Act in 
1993. Dee and Levine (2004) found that the reform increased state aid to school districts. 
Total educational revenue increased although local revenue for education decreased. This 
indicated the existence of flypaper effect. In sum, the effect of school finance reforms 
varied among states. One reason for this variation is that the approach that each school 
finance reform took were various (Hoxby, 2001). Thus, it is important to evaluate the 
impact of school finance reforms state by state.  
Statement of the Problem 
Vermont and New Hampshire were the last two states which took dramatic school 
finance reforms in the trend of school finance reforms occurring since the 1970s. School 
finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire are worthwhile to study for three 
reasons. First, the state share of education spending dramatically increased after the 
school finance reforms in both these states. This dramatic change in the state share 
provides a good opportunity to study the effect of the increase of state involvement on 
educational spending. Second, budget decisions in both states were made in a town 
meeting in the form of direct democracy, and there was no limit on local education 
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budget in both states. These two features provide a good opportunity to see how local 
residents respond to school finance reforms. The third reason is related to methodology. 
There is sufficient annual data before and after reform to evaluate the effect of school 
finance reforms in these two states. In the following sections, I will introduce the school 
finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire and describe the objectives of this study. 
Throughout the dissertation, when the school finance reforms in Vermont and New 
Hampshire are mentioned, I mean these two specific school finance reforms that I will 
introduce in the following section, except indicated otherwise.  
Vermont 
In February of 1997, the first year after the Democratic Party controlled both 
houses and governorship, the Vermont state legislature passed the Equal Educational 
Opportunity Act of 1997, also called as Act 60. This Act was a response to the Vermont 
Supreme Court decision in the case of Brigham v. State (1997) that held the state’s 
education finance system unconstitutional. Act 60 established a statewide property tax 
and a two-tier guaranteed yield school finance formula.  The first tier was a power 
equalization program in which the state government decided a statewide property tax rate 
and base block grant that each school district received on the condition that they levied 
the statewide property tax. For the second tier, the state government guaranteed that 
school districts yielded the same tax revenue at the same additional property tax rate 
above the statewide property tax rate. Since the revenue source only came from the 
property tax revenue of school districts that were willing to spend more than the base 
block grant, this proposition means that poor school districts got more funding from the 
state government and rich school districts lost a portion of local property revenue which 
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was redistributed to poor school districts. The reform increased the state share of public 
school funding from 28% to 70% in the first year. It dramatically changed the school 
finance system in Vermont.  
The responses of voters to the reform were mixed and sometimes confrontational. 
It was welcomed by poor school districts because they obtained more state aid. It was 
aggressively opposed by rich school districts through protests, lawsuits, and parents 
sending children to private schools and setting up private foundations to support schools 
that their children attended (Rebell & Metzler, 2002). 
New Hampshire 
In April of 1999, in response to the Claremont v. Governor (1997) decision in 
which the New Hampshire Supreme Court invalidated the state property tax system and 
declared that the New Hampshire school finance system was not adequate, its state 
legislature passed the House Bill 999 (Olabisi, 2006). The Bill established a statewide 
property tax at $6.60 per $1,000 of property value and defined an adequate education 
grant. This grant was calculated based on the cost of schools in which 40 to 60% of third 
and sixth grade students passed statewide-standardized tests. The state government made 
up the difference of the adequate education grant and the statewide property tax revenue 
that each school district produced and held. The portion of the statewide property tax 
revenue more than the adequate education grant in school districts was recaptured into a 
state education fund. This was called the recapture proposition. School districts were 
allowed to levy additional property tax other than the statewide property tax. The school 
finance reform pushed the state share of school spending from 9% up to 55% in the first 
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year. The recapture proposition induced much opposition from rich school districts 
(Olabisi, 2006).  
The school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire were extremely 
controversial because they dramatically changed the incentives and constraints that 
different school districts in these two states faced. To increase education spending in poor 
school districts and decrease inequity in educational spending among school districts 
were the aims of the school finance reforms. There are two potential reasons that these 
aims might not have been achieved. First, recapture provisions can discourage rich school 
districts from spending more money on schools because they lose a portion of local 
property revenue for education to state governments (Hoxby, 2001; Schmidt & Scott, 
2006). Second, the increase of state aid to poor school districts does not necessarily 
increase education spending in these school districts because they might use the increased 
revenue to reduce tax burden of local residents (Card & Payne, 2002; Lutz, 2010). 
Therefore, it is not clear whether the school finance reforms in Vermont and New 
Hampshire increased per pupil spending for school districts. The impact of school finance 
reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire on per pupil spending has not been empirically 
explored. 
Purpose of the Study and Research Questions 
This study aims to evaluate the impact of school finance reforms in Vermont and 
New Hampshire on per pupil spending. Educational spending represents the level of 
educational resource available to students. More educational spending means that school 
districts could reduce class size and teacher-student ratio, and hire higher qualified 
teachers, and improve school facilities (Chaudhary, 2009; Figlio, 1998). The increase of 
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educational spending could also increase student performance (Card & Payne, 2002; 
Chaudhary, 2009). Therefore, it is important to know whether the school finance reforms 
in Vermont and New Hampshire changed educational spending in school districts.  
Further, since the demands of the plaintiffs in the school finance litigations in Vermont 
and New Hampshire were to increase per pupil spending in property poor school districts 
and decrease inequity in education spending, it is worthwhile to know whether the school 
finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire, as a result of the school finance 
litigations in both states, achieved the aims of these plaintiffs.   
The school finance reforms in both states produced different incentives and 
constraints, for example, the power equalization program and recapture proposition 
introduced above, to rich and poor school districts. Besides the effect of the school 
finance reform on all school districts, this study also evaluates their effect on per pupil 
spending in poor and rich school districts. Specifically, the research questions are: 
1. Did the school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire change 
per pupil spending for all school districts?  
2. Did the school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire change 
per pupil spending for poor school districts?  
3. Did the school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire change 
per pupil spending for rich school districts?  
Theoretical Framework 
Since school budgets were decided by local school districts in Vermont and New 
Hampshire, evaluating the impact of school finance reforms in the two states on per pupil 
spending essentially entails examining how local school districts determined their 
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budgets in response to the new school finance systems. The literature on determinants of 
local public spending and the literature on the effect of intergovernmental grants are 
relevant to this study.  This is because education spending is one important part of local 
public spending, and the school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire 
involved the change in intergovernmental grant.  
The prior research on determinants of local public spending tried to find out what 
determines the level of local public spending such as school spending. They derived these 
determinants from the economic theory on consumer behaviors in private consumption 
(Bergstrom & Goodman, 1973). Since price and income are important factors 
determining the consumption of private good and service of individuals, they assumed 
that the distribution of income of local residents and the distribution of tax price that local 
residents pay are important determinant of local public spending, which could be 
understood as the consumption of public service (Bergstrom & Goodman, 1973). Tax 
price refers to how much local school districts need to pay if they want to spend one more 
dollar on public service such as education. 
In order to understand how the distribution of price and income among local 
residents determine the level of public spending in local governments such as school 
districts, median vote theory should be introduced. Median voter theory aims to explain 
and predict the result of public choice. It argues that public choice represents and adopts 
the preference of a median voter if the choice is picked by a simple majority rule and the 
median voter has a single-peaked preference point (D. Black, 1948; Downs, 1957). This 
theory applies to a variety of fields including elections and public policies. Local 
government expenditure is one of these. In considering both median voter theory and the 
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implication from the determinants of individual consumption of private good and service, 
it could be concluded that the tax price and income of median voter could be 
determinants of local public spending. In the area of local education spending, it means 
that the tax price and income that a median voter in school districts has would determine 
the level of education spending. Empirical studies using this theory proved that median 
voter income and tax price in a school district were significantly correlated with school 
spending (Denzau & Grier, 1984; Hoxby, 2001).  
The school finance reform in Vermont changed tax price for school districts. 
Since this change applied to entire school districts, all voters including the median voter 
experienced the change in tax price. Thus, studies on the effect of tax price on local 
public spending are useful for analyzing the effect of the school finance reform in 
Vermont.  Tax price was one for all school districts in Vermont before the school finance 
reform. After reform, tax price changed into less than one for poor school districts, and 
more than one for rich school districts. Thus, only considering the change in tax price, the 
school finance reform in Vermont should have a negative effect on per pupil spending in 
rich school districts and a positive effect on per pupil spending in poor school districts. 
Another relevant theory is the equivalence theory on the effect of 
intergovernmental grants. An intergovernmental grant is the grant that high level 
governments give to low level governments to use it for the provision of public service, 
for example, federal grant given to states for public transportation and state grant given to 
school districts. It is argued that the effect of intergovernmental grant on local public 
spending is equivalent to the effect of income increase of local residents if local budget 
decision reflects the preference of local residents (Bradford & Oates, 1971). The 
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equivalence theory is relevant to this study because both school finance reforms in 
Vermont and New Hampshire involved changes in intergovernmental aid. Further, 
several characteristics of the school finance systems in Vermont and New Hampshire 
provide conditions in which school budget could reflect the preference of local residents. 
First, budget decisions are voted on by local residents instead of representatives in a form 
of direct democracy in a town meeting in a majority of school districts in both states. 
Only a few city school districts pass their education budgets by city councils. Second, no 
limit on educational expenditure or property tax rate in Vermont and New Hampshire 
exists while it exists in some states such as California and Massachusetts. Third, residents 
were highly aware of the school finance reforms as evidenced by fierce debates on school 
finance reform bill in court, legislature, and media before they were passed (Lutz, 2010; 
Schmidt & Scott, 2006). It is highly possible that the budget decision could represent the 
preference of local residents in Vermont and New Hampshire. Therefore, the equivalence 
theory is applicable to the analysis of school finance reforms in Vermont and New 
Hampshire.  
Research Design 
This study utilized a quasi-experimental research design by using school district 
expenditure data derived from the Common Core of Data (CCD) from the National 
Center for Education Statistics (NCES). Specifically, I conducted a Difference in 
Difference (DID) design because it could control for the influence of unknown variables 
on the estimation of the effect of school finance reforms on per pupil spending of school 
districts. This design utilizes a control state in which school districts did not experience 
school finance reforms and is as similar as possible to school districts in a reform state. 
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DID design also uses pre-reform and post-reform data. The difference of pre-reform and 
post-reform per pupil spending of school districts in the reform state is subtracted from 
the difference of pre-reform and post-reform per pupil spending of school districts in the 
comparison state. The difference in difference result could be interpreted as the 
estimation of the effect of school finance reforms (Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Meyer, 
1995). This design can largely control for bias of factors that influenced outcome variable 
of interest in both reform and comparison states at the same time. School district fixed 
effect is also included in the model to control for the influence of time-invariant factors 
among school districts on the estimation of the effect of school finance reforms (Angrist 
& Pischke, 2008). 
Also, because the measures that Vermont and New Hampshire took were different, 
I evaluated the school finance reforms in these two states separately, and examined each 
state as the independent treatment group in the separate DID analyses. Maine and Rhode 
Island were used as their comparison states. The reason for this choice is that the school 
finance systems in Maine and Rhode Island did not change during the same period when 
Vermont and New Hampshire reformed their school finance systems. Also, because these 
two states are neighbor states of Vermont and New Hampshire they share many features 
in their economic status and political systems. For example, school budgets are voted by 
residents in a town meeting in most of school districts in the four states, and there is no 
expenditure and tax rate limit on local education budgets.  
The Significance of the Study 
The results of prior studies on the impact of school finance reforms on per pupil 
spending in individual states are inconsistent (Dee & Levine, 2004; Manwaring & 
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Sheffrin, 1997; Silva & Sonstelie, 1995). This is due to the complexity of school finance 
reforms and the particularity of political structures in each state. The results from this 
study will contribute to the existing literature regarding school finance reforms in two 
aspects. First, there is no research on the effect of school finance reforms including 
recapture propositions in both Vermont and New Hampshire. This study will provide 
suggestive evidence on how these recapture propositions influenced per pupil spending in 
school districts whose revenue was recaptured.  
Second, prior literature has supported the existence of the flypaper effect of 
intergovernmental aid on local public spending (Card & Payne, 2002; Fisher & Papke, 
2000; Hines & Thalar, 1995). The flypaper effect indicates that local residents in 
recipient governments such as school districts would spend more out of these 
intergovernmental grants on a targeted public service such as public education than they 
spend from an equivalent personal income increase. However, recent studies shows that 
the flypaper effect might not exist in some cases (Duggan, 2000; Gordon, 2004; Lutz, 
2010). This study will examine whether the distinctive procedure of budget decision and 
the structure of school finance system played a role in the existence of flypaper effect of 
intergovernmental grants.  
This study also provides valuable implications on school finance policies. First, if 
the increased state aid without restriction of its use did not increase per pupil spending in 
poor school districts in Vermont and New Hampshire, this introduces doubt on the 
efficiency of increasing state aid to poor school districts for increasing educational 
spending in those districts. Thus, legislators might need to take additional measures to 
guarantee that the increased state aid be spent on education if an increase in educational 
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spending is the aim of the policy. Second, if this study shows that the recapture 
proposition, which directly redistributed property revenue from rich school districts to 
poor school districts, did decrease per pupil spending in these recaptured school districts, 
it will provide empirical evidence that explain why the recapture proposition was 
repealed in both Vermont and New Hampshire. This could remind policy makers that the 
recapture proposition might not be a sustainable way to take.  
Definitions of Terms 
Tax price refers to how much local residents need to pay if they want to spend 
one more dollar on public service (Bergstrom & Goodman, 1973). 
Horizontal equity means that equally situated students are treated equally in per 
pupil spending (Springer et al., 2009).   
Vertical equity means that differently situated students are treated differently 
(Springer et al., 2009). For example, the spending for students in special education should 
be more than regular students because it costs more than educating regular students.  
Adequacy means that each student should be provided adequate educational 
resource to meet minimum standards of proficiency (Springer et al., 2009). It is difficult 
to find criterions to decide the amount of adequate educational resource. In practice, 
some states calculate it based on the cost of schools whose students have good 
performance in standardized test. Some states sum up the costs of individual services 
such as teacher salary and transportation. The cost of individual services is usually 
estimated by average cost in one state or estimated by education experts (Reschovsky & 
Imazeki, 2001). 
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School finance litigations refer to litigations in which plaintiffs challenge the 
constitutionality of state school finance formulas. The plaintiffs usually include school 
districts, students, and their parents. The defendants are state governors, state education 
agencies, or/and the state legislature. School finance litigations started since the late 
1960s.  Equal and adequate school spending are the core demands from these plaintiffs. 
The flypaper effect refers to the phenomenon that recipient governments would 
spend more intergovernmental grant on public services than they spend their equivalent 
income increase (Hines & Thalar, 1995). 
Foundation program is a school finance system in which local districts 
contribute to school funding usually through a uniform property tax rate while states 
make up the difference up to the specified amount of foundation grant.  
Power equalization systems are school finance systems in which state 
governments assure that school districts get the same revenue at the same property tax 
rate regardless of their property valuation. School districts determine spending and tax 
rate within state-determined limits, and then state governments match the differences 
between actually raised amount by the tax rate that school districts choose and the 
guaranteed amount at the tax rate that state governments decide. It is also called 
guaranteed yield program. 
Summary 
This chapter provides an introduction of this study. First, it presents the history of 
school finance reforms in the United States. What do school finance systems in the 
United States look like? Why are school finance systems challenged? How are they 
reformed? Then I introduce the school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire. 
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After that, the research questions are presented on the effect of school finance reforms in 
Vermont and New Hampshire. The theoretical framework that this study uses is derived 
from the literature on the determinants of local public spending and the effect of 
intergovernmental grants. A Difference in Difference research design is used in this study 
because it could effectively control for the influence of many confounding variables in 
the estimation of the effect of the school finance system in the Vermont and New 
Hampshire. This study provides empirical evidence on the effect of recapture 
propositions in school finance reforms and shows how institutional characteristics 
influence the effect of intergovernmental grants. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
         Before evaluating school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire, I 
review literature on what is already known about school finance, school finance reforms, 
and the theoretical and empirical evaluation of school finance reforms. This chapter is 
divided into four sections. First, I introduce the school finance system in the United 
States and its history. This provides a big picture of school finance systems in the United 
States, and is helpful to understand the effect of school finance reforms in Vermont and 
New Hampshire. Second, I introduce the history of school finance systems in Vermont 
and New Hampshire and the school finance reforms in these two states that this study 
focuses on. This provides background information to understand the effect of the school 
finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire. Third, I summarize empirical studies 
on school finance reforms. Lastly, I outline the theoretical framework that this study uses 
and present the main hypothesis of this study. 
School Finance in the United States 
 School Finance Systems 
        In the United States, education is not endowed to the federal government in the 
Constitution. Therefore, the federal government has limited authority to manage 
education and bears limited responsibility of funding public education. On the contrary, 
there are education clauses in every state constitution (Figlio, Husted, & Kenny, 2004). 
For example, the California Constitution regulates that “the Legislature shall encourage 
by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural 
improvement”(Article 9, Section 1). The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky 
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regulates that “the General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an 
efficient system of common schools throughout the State”(Section 183). The Constitution 
of the State of New Jersey regulates that “the Legislature shall provide for the 
maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the 
instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years” 
(Article VIII, § IV). As shown in these three examples, the wordings of educational 
clauses are different. This difference plays an important role in the differences of school 
finance system in each state and the school finance litigations that I will introduce later. 
However, one common theme is that funding and administrating public education is a 
state responsibility in the United States.   
Historically, the system of public education was founded by local financing and 
local control in the United States (Card & Payne, 2002). As Figure 1 shows, local 
revenue accounted more than 80% in total educational revenue in the 1920s. From 1930 
to 1950, state share of total revenue for education increased from 17% to 40%. State 
share stayed stable from 1950 to 1970.  From 1970 to 1990, state share increased from 40% 
to 47% since many states reformed their school finance reforms since the 1970s. After 
that, it experienced a small decrease or increase each year. This figure only shows the 
change in the distribution of revenue among federal, states, and local governments at 
national level. Since school finance system in each state experiences a distinctive 
trajectory of development, the composition of the three revenue sources varies a lot from 
state to state (as shown in Figure 2), for example, the state share was 92% in Vermont 
while the state share was 28% in Rhode Island in 2009, and other states were in between. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of Education Revenue From Federal, State, and Local Source 
From 1920-2011 
 
Note. From 1920 to 40, data is available by decades, from 1940 to 1970, data is available every two year, afterwards, data is available 
annually; Beginning in 1980-81, revenue for state education agencies are excluded. Beginning in 1988-89, data reflect new survey 
collection procedures and may not be entirely comparable with figures for earlier years.  
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, 2000, Table 158. 
Revenues for public elementary and secondary schools, by source of funds: 1919-20 to 1997-98. Digest of Education Statistics, 2013，
Table 235.10. Revenues for public elementary and secondary schools, by source of funds: Selected years, 1919-20 through 2010-11. 
 
Figure 2. State Share of Total Educational Revenue of 50 States in 2009 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "National Public 
Education Financial Survey (NPEFS)," fiscal year 2009, Version 1a. 
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Since state governments and local school districts account for most of funding for 
schools, school finance systems in each state mainly focus on two issues: how the 
responsibility of funding education is distributed between state and local governments 
and how state aid for schools is distributed among school districts. Verstegen and Jordan 
(2009) synthesized a comprehensive survey of school finance programs in 50 states 
conducted in 2007. It provided a snapshot of current state school finance systems. They 
found that state finance systems could be categorized into one of four finance formulas: 
(a) foundation program, (b) power equalization system, (c) full-state funding, and (d) flat 
grant. These are prototypical school finance formulas. The actual formula in each state is 
more complicated that these introduced here.  
Foundation program. In a foundation program, state governments guarantee that 
each student attains a basic foundation grant. A foundation grant is the amount of funding 
that state governments decide to spend in order to make sure that each student has at least 
minimum quality education (Verstegen & Jordan, 2009). State governments and local 
school districts both contribute to the grant. There is a minimum property tax rate 
requirement for school districts to get state aid. The amount of state aid is the difference 
between the basic foundation grant and the property tax revenue at the required minimum 
property tax rate. Normally, the foundation grant is less than the actual educational 
expenditure of school districts (Verstegen & Jordan, 2009). School districts are allowed 
to levy property tax other than the required minimum property tax rate. The 
supplementation by extra property tax revenue is unlimited in some states, and capped in 
other states. As of 2009, the foundation program was being used by 40 states and five 
other states combined it with other school finance formulas (Verstegen & Jordan, 2009).  
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In terms of the effect of the foundation program on equity and adequacy in 
educational spending, it depends on many variables in the formula, for example, the 
amount of foundation grant, the required minimum local property tax rate, and whether 
the supplementation of local revenue is capped. If the amount of foundation grant is set as 
at a higher level, that could increase the adequacy in educational expenditure in poor 
school districts. Equity in educational expenditure would be increased if the 
supplementation of property tax revenue by school districts is capped because this limits 
the increase in educational spending in rich school districts. 
Power equalization program. In a power equalization school finance program, 
state governments decide a guaranteed property tax base, and then local school districts 
determine local property tax rate within state-determined limits. The state aid is a product 
of locally decided property tax rate and the difference between the guaranteed property 
tax base and the actual property tax base in school districts (Fernandez & Rogerson, 2003; 
Schmidt & Scott, 2006). There are two important features about this school finance 
formula. One is that it can guarantee that the same property tax rate produces the same 
property tax revenue for school districts. The other is that property poor school districts 
attain more grants from states than rich school districts. In order to make up the 
difference between guaranteed property tax base and actual property tax base in school 
districts, state governments either use general state revenues or recapture excess revenue 
beyond the revenue produced from the amount of the guaranteed property tax base in rich 
school districts. Therefore, power equalization systems could achieve tax equality and 
might improve the inequity in educational expenditure among school districts 
(Reschovsky, 1994). It was reported in 1994 that a third of states in the United State 
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adopted this type of school finance formula (Reschovsky, 1994). A more recent study 
showed that in 2007, three states were using power equalizing systems and five states 
incorporated this formula with other school finance formulas (Verstegen & Jordan, 2009).  
Regarding effectiveness in promoting equity in educational spending of power 
equalization, theoretically, the extent to which power equalization programs could 
decrease the inequity in educational spending depends on the level of guaranteed tax base 
(Reschovsky, 1994). If the guaranteed tax base is higher, it means that state governments 
provide more state aid to property poor school districts. This could decrease the inequity 
in educational expenditure among school districts. However, in this case, state 
governments need to increase revenue by raising certain kinds of state tax rate, which is 
not politically easy to do. Also, the recapture of property revenue from rich school 
districts will also produce strong opposition from voters in rich school districts. 
Reschovsky (1994) argued that the increase in educational expenditure in property poor 
school districts with the power equalization formula depends on the tax rate that local 
school districts choose. Since the tax effort is inelastic with respect to local wealth, the 
tax rate would not change much if local wealth does not change (Reschovsky, 1994). 
Full-state funding. Full-state funding is a fully state centralized school finance 
system. In this system, state governments are responsible for funding schools without 
funding from school districts. This school finance system is only used in Hawaii 
(Verstegen & Jordan, 2009).  
Flat grant system. In a flat grant program, local school districts are responsible 
for funding schools, and state governments distribute state aid to school districts based 
only on the number of students. Flat grant was used in some states in the early stage of 
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20th century in order to decrease the inequity in pure local school finance systems 
(Reschovsky, 1994). In 1976, six states exclusively used flat grant programs to district 
state aid (Card & Payne, 2002). But flat grant system did not effectively solve the 
inequity in education spending (Reschovsky, 1994). At present, it is only used by North 
Carolina (Verstegen & Jordan, 2009).  
Public School Spending 
Public school spending increased rapidly since 1970s in the United States. As 
Figure 3 shows, average per pupil spending increased from $5,019 in 1970 to $8,399 
(2000 equivalent dollar) in 2010. It also shows that average per pupil spending gradually 
increased from 1970 to 2010 except the period of 1977-1981 and the period of 1991-1996 
during which average spending either experienced a small decrease or stayed stable. 
Further, average education spending in the United States varies from state to state. For 
example, in 2009, average per-pupil spending for elementary and secondary education 
was less than $8,000 in Utah, Idaho, Arizona, Oklahoma, and Tennessee while it was 
more than $16,000 in New Jersey, New York, and Washington DC. 
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Figure 3. Current Expenditure per Pupil in Public Elementary and Secondary  
Schools: 1970-2010 
 
Note: Data are converted into 2000 dollar 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, 1989, Table 
145. Total and current expenditure per pupil in public elementary and secondary schools: 1919-1920 to 1988-89; 2002, Digest 
of Education Statistics, 2002, Table 169.Current expenditure per pupil in in fall enrollment in public elementary and secondary 
schools, by state: 1959-60 to 1999-2000; Digest of Education Statistics, 2013, Table 236.65. Current expenditure per pupil in 
fall enrollment in public elementary and secondary schools, by state or jurisdiction: Selected years, 1969-70 through 2010-11. 
 
 Regarding the inequity in education spending, Murray et al., (1998) used every 
five years data on education spending from 1972 to 1992 to measure it. At national level, 
inequality in spending, expressed by coefficient of variation, decreased from 1972 to 
1982, yet increased from 1982 to 1992.  They also found that between-state inequality 
was much larger than within-state inequality during the period. For example, variation 
across states represented 65% of the total variance in per pupil spending at the national 
level. 
 Baird (2008) used a dataset from 1990 to 2000 and calculated the coefficient of 
variation and range ratio to describe the level of inequity in educational revenue among 
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school districts within and across states. The coefficient of variation is the standard 
deviation of total revenue of school districts divided by average level of total revenue of 
school districts. The range ratio is the ratio of per-pupil resources for the 95th and 5th 
percentile school districts. She found that funding disparities within states declined by 
about 8-15%, whereas disparities across states declined by 22-25%. Funding disparities at 
the national level decreased by 19-22%. She also found that federal dollars played 
virtually no role in reducing disparities in education spending. 
Another way to measure the inequity in education resources is to look at the 
relationship between total revenue on education and median household income in school 
districts. Baker and Welner (2010) used this method to study the inequality between 
school districts. The dataset that they used consisted of 10,189 unified public school 
districts from 1990 to 2005. At the national level, the relationship between revenue on 
education and median household income became less positive from 1990 to 2005. This 
indicated that total revenue on education became less dependent on median household 
income. They also found that Illinois actually became more regressive over time because 
educational revenue became more dependent on median household income, while states 
like New Jersey, Massachusetts and Ohio made genuine progress in the equality of school 
funding. They concluded that problems with between-district revenue disparities were 
still not resolved.  
School Finance Litigations 
Local communities historically provided most of the funding for the establishment 
and maintenance of public schools through property tax in the United States. For example, 
local revenue accounted for 83% of total revenue for education at national level in 1920.  
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Since the 1920s, many state governments began to assume more responsibility to fund 
public schools (Reschovsky, 1994). The state share of total school funding rose from 30% 
in 1940 to 40% in 1970 (Card & Payne, 2002). However, local revenue was still the 
largest source of educational revenue in 1970. In 1970, local revenue accounted for 52% 
of total revenue on education. Due to the variation of property base among school 
districts, heavy reliance on local revenue leads to the fact that property poor school 
districts cannot provide adequate education resources to students, and this produces huge 
inequity in educational spending among school districts (Reschovsky, 1994). At the same 
time, property tax rate would be much higher in property poor school districts if they 
wanted to keep the same level of educational spending as in rich school districts 
(Reschovsky, 1994).  
Motivated by lower education spending and higher property tax burden, school 
districts, students and their parents resorted to courts to secure adequate and equitable 
education spending at the end of 1960s. The plaintiffs in these school finance litigations 
challenged the constitutionality of state school finance formulas. The defendants were 
usually state governors, state education agencies, or/and state legislatures. Since the 
responsibility of providing education was dedicated to state government in all states of 
the United States (Figlio et al., 2004; Thro, 1990), these plaintiffs alleged that state 
governments failed to fulfill their responsibility. According to the Education Finance 
Statistics Center, there were 125 school finance litigations from 1970 to 2009. School 
finance systems of 45 states were challenged and 25 were overturned during this period 
(Springer et al., 2009).  
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Based on the characteristics of litigations, Thro (1990) viewed that there were 
three waves of finance litigations. In the first wave of school finance litigations, plaintiffs 
hoped to use equal protection clause in the United States Constitution to secure children 
equal rights to education. The legal argument of these litigations was based on the fiscal 
neutrality theory. This theory argued that the level of education expenditure should not be 
related to the level of local wealth. In the Serrano v. Priest (1971) case, the California 
Supreme Courts accepted the argument based on the equal protection clause in both the 
United Sates Constitution and the California State Constitution. However, the first wave 
of litigations ended with the San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 
(1973). In this case the United States Supreme Court denied the request of the plaintiffs 
and held that education was not a fundamental right according to the United States 
Constitution, and that they could not decide the constitutionality of school funding 
disparity between school districts in states.  
In the second wave, school finance reform advocates started to resort to the state 
supreme courts by using education clause and equal protection in state constitutions 
(Thro, 1990). For example, in the case of  Robinson v. Cahill (1973) the New Jersey 
Supreme Court argued that the state constitution regulated that the state should provide “a 
thorough and efficient system of free public schools”, and the inequality in education 
spending violated the constitutional mandate. What plaintiffs complained about in this 
wave of litigations was the inequality of educational spending in school districts. 
However, the use of the education clause and equal protection clause of state 
constitutions in school finance litigations was not very successful for plaintiffs. There 
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were six cases where plaintiffs prevailed, 15 cases where plaintiffs were defeated (Thro, 
1990). 
The third wave of litigations started with the Rose v. Council for Better Education  
(1989). In this case, the Kentucky Supreme Court ignored the equal protection clause in 
its state constitution, and exclusively relied on the education clause that “the General 
Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system”. By reviewing 
the data on the expenditure of local school districts, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled 
that the whole public school finance system in Kentucky was unconstitutional because 
students in property poor school districts received inadequate and inferior educational 
opportunity. The argument in this case was called adequacy argument. The argument 
maintained that state governments should provide sufficient educational resources to 
support students to achieve a minimum standard of proficiency. This argument was used 
in many later school finance litigations. For example, in the McDuffy v. Secretary of the 
Executive Office of Education (1993), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ordered 
that the school finance system in Massachusetts was unconstitutional because it failed to 
provide adequate education to students. There were twenty states whose school finance 
systems were declared as unconstitutional based on the adequacy argument from 1989 to 
2005 (Springer, Liu, and Guthrie, 2009).  
School Finance Reforms 
Since the 1970s, many states have reformed their school finance systems either in 
response to court orders as a result of school finance litigations or by the action of 
legislators. This began with the school finance reform in California after the Serrano v. 
Priest (1971) decision in which the California Supreme Court ruled that the state school 
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finance system was unconstitutional. Further, Proposition 13, which was passed in 1978, 
limited maximum property tax rate to one percent. This reform transferred much 
authority to levy educational revenue and decide educational budget from school districts 
to state governments (Downes, 1992). From 1970 to 1997, 16 states had court-order 
reforms, and 21 states initiated school finance reforms without court order (Evans et al., 
1997). 
Since the motivation for these school finance reforms was the demand of adequate 
and equitable educational resources of property poor school districts, the trend of school 
finance reforms was characterized by the increase of the involvement of state 
governments. State share of school spending in five states increased by more than 10% 
from 1971 to 1983 (California, Wyoming, Washington, Connecticut, and New Jersey) 
(Theobald & Picus, 1991). Evidence from the Common Core of Data (CCD) of the U.S. 
Department of Education's National Center for Education Statistics shows that six states 
increased the state share of school spending by more than 10% after school finance 
reforms in the 1990s (Kansas, Oregon, Wisconsin, Michigan, Vermont, and New 
Hampshire).  
Another feature of school finance reforms is that they were interwoven with 
property tax system reforms of states. This is because part of school finance reforms is 
related to how to produce new tax revenue and how to share the tax burden. One way to 
improve inequality in educational spending is to limit the spending level in rich school 
districts (Figlio, 1998). Proposition 13 in California mentioned above is this type of 
reform. Other examples are Proposition 2 and ½ in Massachusetts that allowed each city 
and town in Massachusetts to raise property tax for local public services by no more than 
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2 and ½ percent every year (Dee & Levine, 2004) and Measure 5 in Oregon that capped 
property tax rate for all purposes to a specific percentage of assessed values (Figlio, 
1998). This kind of tax reform was also called “local property tax revolt”(Figlio, 1998). 
These reforms limited the ability of local school districts to produce educational revenue. 
Another type of tax reform that was related to school finance reform was the 
establishment of new tax or the increase of certain tax rate. For example, the school 
finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire involved the creation of a new 
statewide property tax. The school finance reform in Michigan in 1993 included the 
increase of income tax (Courant & Loeb, 1997).  
School Finance in Vermont and New Hampshire 
Vermont 
In 1998, Vermont had 290 school districts including 252 town, city and 
incorporated school districts, 32 union school districts, four unified union school districts 
and two interstate school districts (Mathis, 1999). The enrollment in public elementary 
and secondary schools was 99,967 in 1998 while the national enrollment was 42,854,612 
(Snyder & Hoffman, 2001). The expenditure per student was $7,075 in 1998 while the 
national average was $6,189 (Snyder & Hoffman, 2001). In almost all towns and 
municipalities, education budgets must be approved by voters at the annual town meeting 
based on a majority rule. The education budgets in 12 cities and large towns did not have 
to be voted as long as it was below the threshold specified in their special charters.  
School finance system before 1997. Vermont’s school finance system went 
through three changes before the 1990s (Mathis, 1999). From 1964 to 1997, the state 
share of school spending fluctuated between 20% and 37% (Mathis, 1999). In 1969, the 
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state adopted a percentage equalizing formula based on the property wealth of school 
districts. In 1982, a new percentage equalizing formula based on property and income 
wealth measure was created because the state share of education spending decreased 
(Mathis, 1999). After that the state share deteriorated to 20%, and a foundation formula 
was adopted in 1987. As introduced above, in a foundation formula, the state aid is the 
difference of a foundation grant and a product of local property value and state-decided 
minimum property tax rate. Because of the poor economy of the early 1990s in Vermont, 
the state government increased minimum property tax rate. This decreased state aid by 7% 
from 1991 to 1995, and exacerbated the tax burden of local school districts (Mathis, 
1998).  
Because of the variation of property tax base among school districts, property 
poor school districts produced less revenue at higher property tax rate than property rich 
school districts at a lower property tax rate. For example, in December of 1994, the top 5% 
of school districts spent from $5,812 to $7,803 per student while the bottom 5% spent 
from $2720 to $3608 (Brigham v. State, 1997). At the same time, there was a huge 
disparity in property tax rates. For example, on an $85,000 home, the tax in Sherburne 
School District, which was a rich school district, was $247 while it was $2,040 in 
Stannard School District (Brigham v. State, 1997). This created a strong dissatisfaction 
among poor school districts.  In March of 1995, a group of students, taxpayers, and two 
school districts filed a lawsuit against the state of Vermont. Two students claimed that the 
Vermont school finance system deprived them of their right under the Vermont and 
federal constitutions to the same educational opportunities as students who reside in 
wealthier school districts (Brigham v. State, 1997). Several property owners from 
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property poor school districts claimed that the Vermont school finance system compelled 
them to contribute more than their just proportion of money to fund education (Brigham v. 
State, 1997). Two school districts claimed that the Vermont school finance system 
deprived them of the ability to raise sufficient money to provide their students with 
educational opportunities equal to those afforded students in wealthier school districts, 
and compelled them to impose disproportionate tax rates in violation of the United States 
and Vermont Constitutions (Brigham v. State, 1997).  
 The Brigham case was first filed at the Lamoille Superior Court. The trial court 
refused to rule that the school finance system was unconstitutional. They argued that 
education was not a fundamental right based on both the United States and Vermont 
Constitutions, and that inter-district funding disparities were rationally related to the 
legitimate state purpose of fostering local control over education funding and programs. 
Both the plaintiffs and the state appealed to the Vermont Supreme Courts. The Supreme 
Courts first confirmed that wide disparities in student expenditures existed among school 
districts and that these disparities were correlated with taxable property wealth within the 
districts. And then it maintained that students had a right to equal educational opportunity 
based on the Vermont Constitution. Therefore, it ruled that the Vermont school finance 
system was constitutionally deficient because it produced vast funding disparities among 
school districts. 
  Four months later, the Vermont state legislature passed the Equal Educational 
Opportunity Act. Although the Act was a response to the court order, it was not the only 
reason for the passage of the Act. In 1994, a property tax reform bill was passed in the 
Democrat-controlled House of Vermont, but failed in the Republican-controlled Senate. 
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The same thing occurred in 1996 again. After the 1996 election, Vermont Democrats 
controlled both the House and the Senate. Although it was a short period between the 
Brigham decision and the passage of The Equal Educational Opportunity Act, the 
approach to solve the problem of inequity in educational spending and tax burden was 
debated in the Vermont Legislature for a long time.  
        School finance reform in 1997. The new school finance system that Act 60 set 
up in Vermont had a four-year phase-in period so that property rich school districts 
whose tax would increase had time to adjust to the new school finance system (Mathis, 
1998). In the first year Vermont still implemented the old foundation finance system with 
additional general and special education aids. In 1999, the new school finance system 
created by Act 60 was implemented.  
The main part of the school finance system was a two-tier system which 
combined a foundation program and a power equalization program. The first tier was a 
foundation program, the state government provided a block grant of $5,010 per student to 
every school district. The revenue for this was the pre-reform state general aid and the 
newly created statewide property tax. The statewide property tax was levied in 1999. 
Because of the variation of property tax base, property rich school districts produced 
more statewide property tax than property poor school districts. And all the statewide 
property tax was used to fund the first tier block grant. For rich school districts, this 
meant that they lost a portion of property tax revenue. For poor school districts, if the 
statewide property revenue was less than the block grant, this meant that they attained 
state aid.  
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For the second tier, the state government used a power equalization formula. The 
state government guaranteed the same revenue yield for school districts if they were 
willing to levy the same property tax rate above the statewide property tax rate. What was 
unique about the second part of the system was that it was funded only by the property 
tax revenue from school districts which decided to spend more than the block grant of the 
first tier without the input of state revenue. That meant that some school districts lost a 
portion of property revenue while other school districts attained some external revenue 
because property bases were different among school districts. 239 towns voted a budget 
above the block grant amount of $5,010 per pupil in 1999 (Mathis, 1999). In 1999, the 
recaptured revenue was 88.1 million (Mathis, 1999). 
There was a circuit breaker proposition for households with less than $75,000 
income. The property tax was limited at 2% of income for households with less than 
$75,000 income (Mathis, 1999). This proposition was designed to protect households 
with lower income from the higher property tax burden.    
 School finance after 1997 reform. The recapture proposition faced strong 
opposition from the property rich school districts. They sued the state government and set 
up protest (Buzuvis, 2011). In February of 2004, Vermont passed a school finance reform 
bill, also called Act 68. Act 68 reformed the school finance policy in Act 60. It 
maintained the two-tier system adopted in Act 60 but eliminated the recapture proposition. 
Act 68 used an increase in state sale taxes to cover the funding that was recaptured from 
rich school districts before 2004 (Schmidt & Scott, 2006). Act 68 also divided property 
tax into residential and non-residential property (Picus, Odden, Glenn, Griffith, & 
Wolkoff, 2012). The tax rate for residential property was calculated based on the level of 
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budget that each school district chooses. The tax rate for non residential was fixed 
regardless of the level of spending of school districts. Since then, the school finance 
system in Vermont operates under Act 60 and Act 68 (Picus et al., 2012). In order to 
exclude the confounding effect of Act 68, this study focus on school finance system from 
1995 to 2002 in Vermont. 
New Hampshire 
In New Hampshire, 234 cities and towns were organized into 177 school districts 
in 1999 (Michener, 1999). 132 were single town or city school districts, 31 were regional 
school districts which served two or more towns or cities. 14 small school district did not 
operate schools and sent children to nearby districts and paid a per pupil tuition fee. In 
1999, there were 194,250 elementary and secondary students (Snyder & Hoffman, 2002). 
Average expenditure per pupil was $6,433 while the national average was $6,508 in 1999 
(Snyder & Hoffman, 2002). Each year, school boards presented a school budget in a town 
meeting that had the authority to approve, decrease or increase the budget. This process 
was followed by all but 10 city school districts. Budgets in nine city school districts were 
approved by the city council. One city had a fiscally independent school board which had 
the authority to adopt a final school budget.  
        School finance system before 1999. Before the school finance reform in 1999, 
no state in the United States relied on more local revenue to support public schools than 
New Hampshire. Overall, local revenue accounted for about 90% of total school spending, 
7% of spending was from the state government, the remaining 3% was from the federal 
government (Michener, 1999). State aid aimed to cover 8% of total cost of public schools. 
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It was a foundation program which distributed the state aid based on the wealth level of 
school districts (Michener, 1999). 
Heavy reliance on local revenue created huge inequality in the property tax rate 
among school districts. In 1991, five property poor school districts, including the town of 
Claremont, brought a lawsuit to the Merrimack Superior Court and demanded for a 
declaratory judgment. They argued that the school finance system in New Hampshire 
violated the New Hampshire Constitution for the following reason. First, the state failed 
to spread educational opportunities equitably among its students and adequately fund 
education. Second, the foundation aid statutes, which restrained state aid to public 
education by capping state assistance at 8%, was unconstitutional. Third, the heavy 
reliance on property taxes to finance New Hampshire public schools resulted in an 
unreasonable, disproportionate, and burdensome tax. The Superior Courts ruled that the 
New Hampshire Constitution did not impose a duty on the state to support the public 
schools and dismissed the plaintiffs’ demand. The plaintiffs appealed to the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court.  
In 1993, the New Hampshire Supreme Courts decided that the state had a duty to 
provide a constitutionally adequate public education and to guarantee adequate funding, 
and remanded the case to the Merrimack Superior Court. The Merrimack Superior Court 
argued that the school finance system in New Hampshire guaranteed adequate education 
to students in plaintiffs’ school districts, and dismissed plaintiffs’ demand again. The 
plaintiffs appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Courts again. In 1997, the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court ruled that the existing educational finance system was 
unconstitutional because it created inequality of tax burden. For example, the equalized 
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tax rate for the 1994-1995 school year in Pittsfield School District was $25.26 per 
thousand of property value while the rate in Moultonborough School District was $5.56 
per thousand of property value (Claremont v. Governor, 1997). The courts argued that the 
property tax was levied to fulfill the responsibility of state government to fund public 
education. Therefore, property tax for education should be a state tax. According to the 
New Hampshire Constitution, state tax should be uniform. However, the school finance 
system produced huge difference in property tax rate among school districts. The 
Supreme Court gave the governor and state legislature one year to design a school 
finance system to fulfill their responsibility.  
At the beginning, a constitutional amendment was proposed to repeal the decision, 
but it fell far short of support for its passage (Lutz, 2010). Dozens of approaches to 
reform the school finance system in New Hampshire were proposed (Olabisi, 2006).  In 
1999, the New Hampshire state legislature passed the House Bill 999. 
School finance reform in 1999.  The new school finance reform laid out by the 
House Bill 999 was a foundation program. First, the state government established a 
definition of an adequate education cost. The adequate education cost was calculated by 
the following method (Olabisi, 2006). Schools in which 40 to 60 percent of third and 
sixth grade students passed statewide-standardized tests were regarded as schools 
providing adequate education. Dividing these schools’ cost by their number of students 
was identified as the statewide base cost of adequate education. 
In order to guarantee that each student received funding at the amount of the 
adequate cost, New Hampshire established a statewide property tax at $ 6.60 per $1,000 
of property value which produced about half of state revenue for education (Michener, 
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1999). Although the statewide property tax was a state tax, it was collected and retained 
by school districts. However, school districts needed to give the excess property revenue 
to state government if their statewide property tax revenue was more than the adequate 
education cost. In the first year of the new school finance system, 20% of school districts, 
which accounted for 9% of the state population, paid the excess property tax revenue to 
the state (Lutz, 2010). The State government would make up the difference if the 
statewide property tax revenue in property for poor school districts was less than the 
adequate education grant. The revenue for state aid came from two sources. One was the 
former state grant that used to aid school districts. In 2000, this was 131 million. The 
other was the recaptured statewide property tax revenue and increase in business, real 
estate, and car rental tax, and other sources. This was 276 million. Regarding the 
statewide property tax, one feature that should be emphasized is that the locally retained 
portion of property tax revenue was collected and held by school districts. Thus, it was 
essentially a relabeled property tax (Lutz, 2010). However, it became a state tax instead 
of local tax. 
In the new school finance system, school districts were allowed to spending more 
than the adequate education grant by levying additional local property tax. Since all 
school districts spent more than the adequate grants (Hall, 2003), that means that tax 
price for all school districts was still one after the school finance reform.  Tax price for all 
school districts before the school finance reform was also one in New Hampshire. 
Therefore, the school finance reform did not change tax price for school districts. In other 
words, tax price is a marginal price instead of average price. It means that how much do 
voters pay in order to spend one dollar more on education. Although recapture 
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proposition led property rich school districts to lose a portion of property tax revenue, 
this only change average prices instead of marginal price.  
Change after 1999 reform. In 2001, the statewide property tax rate was reduced 
to $5.80 per $1,000 of property value. In June of 2003, the New Hampshire legislature 
adopted HB 608 which reduced the statewide property tax rate from $5.80 to $4.92 for 
fiscal year 2004 and further down to $3.24 for FY 2005. Since 2005, the tax revenue 
from statewide property tax would be fixed at $363 million. Tax rate was calculated by 
dividing the revenue by total property value. In 2005, HB 616 was passed that allowed all 
towns to keep the excess statewide property tax revenue except two towns on the 
condition that the revenue was spent on education. The bill also eliminated the definition 
of adequate education cost. It distributed state aid based on the property value per pupil in 
school districts. In 2006, the new school finance system was ruled as unconstitutional by 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court. However, this study only focuses on school finance 
system from 1996 to 2003 in New Hampshire in order to exclude the influence of the HB 
616. 
Literature on School Finance Reforms 
Studies on the Effect of School Finance Reforms 
        Effects estimated on nationwide data. Decreasing inequality in school spending 
is one of main goals of school finance reforms. Therefore, one criterion to evaluate effect 
of school finance reforms, which occurred since the 1970s, is to see how they affect 
inequity in school spending. Murray, Evans, and Schwab (1998) used school district level 
data on per student expenditure of over 10,000 districts from 46 states. They found that 
court-ordered finance reforms reduced within-state inequality in spending by 19 to 34%. 
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This was achieved by raising spending in the poorest districts while leaving spending in 
the richest districts unchanged. They also found that finance reforms led states to increase 
spending for education and leave spending in other areas, such as health care and 
highways, unchanged, indicating that states funded the additional spending on education 
through higher taxes. Springer et al. (2009) used a similar model as Murray et al., but 
used two new panel data, one from 1972 to 2002 every 5 years, and one from 1990 to 
2000 in each year. Their results conformed to Murray et al.’s conclusion that the court 
decision of unconstitutionality of school funding system decreased the level of inequality 
between school districts at a similar magnitude as the estimation of Murray et al.  
Another criterion to evaluate effect of school finance reforms is to see whether 
they decrease the correlation of school spending and local wealth level. The increase of 
state aid to poor schools is a way to achieve that. Card and Payne (2002) studied the 
effect of school finance reforms on the correlation coefficient between revenue from state 
and median family income of local communities. They estimated that the gap in state aid 
between a poor district and a rich district widened by about $300 per student in states 
where the financing system was found unconstitutional than in other states. This 
indicated that states gave more aid to poor school districts than rich school districts. 
Using school district spending data, they also found that a one-dollar increase in state aid 
increased district education spending by 50-65 cents because school districts may reduce 
local taxes in response to an increase in the revenue from states.  
   One measure for states to achieve equality of school funding is to limit local 
spending of school districts with high property tax base by setting a local revenue cap or 
the requirement of supermajority when passing a request of increase in local property tax. 
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In 2004, there were 14 states that had statutory provisions that required a supermajority 
(SMRs) to adopt new taxes. Of the 14 supermajority states, 12 states also had tax and 
expenditure limitation (TELs) (Jordan, Jordan, & Crawford, 2005). Jordan et al. found 
that states with SMRs had lower rate of increase in average per-pupil expenditure (APPE), 
and that the greatest increases in APPE, average teacher salary, and percentage of funds 
from state sources were in the states with neither TELs nor SMRs. Positive changes in 
funding occurred less in states with constraints than in states without taxation or 
expenditure constraints. Blankenau and Skidmore (2004) studied the effect of court-
ordered reform on educational spending in the presence or absence of TELs. They found 
that court-ordered reform had a negative effect on school funding from local source only 
in the presence of TELs. TELs decreased spending from local source in the absence of 
court-ordered reform, but the effect was less pronounced than when TELs and reforms 
were both present.  
  Manwaring and Sheffrin (1997) tried to identify the mechanisms by which school 
finance litigations and reforms affect educational spending. They identified four 
mechanisms that could influence the effect of finance litigations and reforms. They found 
that the increase in prominence of public school finance issues, as a result of school 
finance litigations or reforms, had a positive effect on educational spending. The increase 
of state share of educational spending and income per capital of state had a negative 
effect on the impact of school finance litigations and reforms on educational spending. 
The stability of state budget had a positive influence on educational spending after 
litigations or reforms. At the national level, school finance litigations and reforms had a 
positive effect on educational spending considering all these four factors. For individual 
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states, they found that school finance reforms had a negative effect in five states and a 
positive effect in sixteen states. Downes and Shah (2006) further found that the variation 
of the effect of school finance litigations or reforms depended on the stringency of 
constraints on local discretion, the characteristics of a state’s population and of that 
state’s schools.  
These studies using national sampling and time-series data are problematic. First, 
the specification of education litigations or reforms in their analytical model is 
problematic. All the studies that I reviewed above used either the same or a modified 
method of operationalizing the variable of school finance litigations or reforms as that 
adopted by Murray et al. (1998). Murray et al. invented a dummy variable for finance 
reforms for each state. A state was assigned to be one in all years after its finance system 
was ruled unconstitutional, 0 for all year before the ruling. All states with no finance 
litigation and no ruling in favor of plaintiffs were coded as 0. This specification is 
problematic for the following reason.  
The court ruling of unconstitutionality of state finance systems does not 
necessarily equate to finance reforms. Some state legislatures did not, or did not fully, or 
did not immediately follow state court rulings. Only five states explicitly changed the 
structure of their financing plans among the 12 states in which the school finance system 
were ruled as unconstitutional between 1976 and 1991 (Card & Payne, 2002). For 
example, the Ohio education finance system was ruled unconstitutional four times in 
1997, 2000, 2001, and 2002. Its school finance reform was passed in 2009. Based on the 
analysis of finance litigations and reforms of 20 states with a court ruling of 
unconstitutionality, I found that Texas and New Hampshire initiated finance reforms six 
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years after court orders.  New York and Arizona took four years. Wyoming took three 
years. North Carolina, New Jersey, Idaho, Connecticut, and California took two years. In 
Washington and Tennessee, state legislatures passed education finance reforms before the 
rulings of their supreme courts were made. At the same time, some states without court 
orders also initiated education finance reforms. Among the 21 states with no court rulings 
between 1970 and 1992, 12 changed the structure of their financing system(Card & 
Payne, 2002). For example, Michigan initiated a comprehensive and radical school 
finance reform without pressure from courts.  This means that the operationalization of 
the reform variable as a dummy variable did not measure what researchers in these 
studies wanted to measure. Further, treating school finance reform as a dummy variable 
in these studies including many states is not appropriate because school finance reforms 
are more variable than these researchers thought. Hoxby (2001) clearly showed that the 
measures that court-ordered states took were various and even contradictory by 
characterizing these reform with four different variables. However, it is appropriate to 
treat school finance reforms as a dummy variable if researchers are able to show that 
school finance reforms in different states are comparable. 
  Since equating successful school finance litigations for plaintiffs with school 
finance reforms and treating school finance reform as homogenous are problematic, I 
think that the studies on the effect of school finance litigations or reforms of individual 
states is more appropriate and meaningful than the studies using national data. 
           Effects estimated on the effect of school finance reform in one state. There has 
been a group of studies that focused on school finance reforms in individual states. For 
instance, In California, after the Serrano v. Priest (1971), the case went into trial court. 
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The state legislature enacted a school finance reforms in 1974 which was claimed 
unconstitutional by the trial court and confirmed by the California Supreme Court in the 
Serrano v. Priest (1976) decision. The state legislature initiated another school finance 
reform in response to the decision. Also, in 1978, California passed Proposition 13 which 
reduced local property tax rate to one percent and forbade any statewide property taxes 
(Fischel, 1989). The state share of total education revenue increased from 37% in 1978 to 
60% in 1979 (Downes, 1992). Downes (1992) found that the school finance reform in 
California after the Serrano v. Priest (1976) decreased the dependence of education 
expenditure on local wealth by comparing the correlation between total expenditure per 
pupil and assessed valuation before and after reform. However, total funding of public 
education fell between 10 and 15% compared to the rest of the United States after the 
reform because it limited the supplementary funding of wealthier school districts 
(Fernandez & Rogerson, 1999).  
School finance reform in Michigan also earned much attention from researchers. 
Without the pressure of court-ordered reform, Michigan took a revolutionary school 
finance reform called Proposal A in 1994.  Proposal A replaced the former local property 
tax system with a centralized state system in Michigan. By using a Difference in 
Difference model Chaudhary (2009) found that Proposal A increased operating 
expenditures of school districts. He also found that the increase in expenditures led to 
higher teacher salaries and smaller class sizes in Michigan. Comparing per student 
spending pre-reform and post-reform, Courant and Loeb (1997) found that the 
beneficiary of Proposal A was small and rural districts because per student spending in 
these districts significantly increased. Zimmer and Jones (2005) found that Michigan’s 
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high-spending school districts had a greater probability of issuing bonds after 
implementation of Proposal A which restricted operational expenditure from local source. 
This indicated that debt financing of capital expenditures might have become a 
mechanism to allow these school districts to circumvent the policy’s intent for greater 
spending equity. 
In Massachusetts, after the decision of the McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive 
Office of Education (1993), in which plaintiffs prevailed, the state passed the 
Massachusetts Education Reform Act in 1993. Dee and Levine (2004) studied the school 
finance reform in Massachusetts and found that the reform increased state aid to school 
districts. Total educational revenue increased although local revenue for education 
decreased. This indicated the existence of flypaper effect. They also found that poor 
school districts spent more increased state aid on education than rich school districts that 
used more state aid to relieve their tax burden. Dee and Levine (2004) used a DID design 
and used Connecticut and Maine as control states of the treatment state Massachusetts.  
In sum, the existing empirical studies reviewed above indicate that the effect of 
school finance reforms varies from state to state. There is no consistent evidence on the 
effect of school finance reforms on per pupil spending. This emphasizes the importance 
of the idiosyncratic features of each state and complicated characteristics of approaches 
to school finance reforms that states took when evaluating school finance reforms. School 
finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire presents several new measures such as 
the establishment of statewide property tax and the recapture proposition. Also, school 
budgets are decided in the form of direct democracy. These new features in school 
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finance reform and the specialty of budget decision procedure might produce different 
effect from the one that occurred in California, Michigan, and Massachusetts. 
Studies on Different School Finance Systems 
School finance reforms usually involved a change in type of school finance 
programs. Prototypical school finance systems include local school finance system, 
centralized state school finance system, foundation finance system, and power 
equalizations system. As describe above, there are variations for foundation finance 
program and power equalization program based on the different specification of these 
programs. Foundation finance systems include ones with limited local supplementation 
and ones with unlimited local supplementation. Power equalizations include ones with 
recapture and ones with recapture. One group of studies in school finance is to evaluate 
what school finance system is optimal in term of the level of per pupil spending and the 
equity in per pupil spending. This group of studies is helpful to this study because the 
school finance reform in Vermont and New Hampshire involved change in the type of 
school finance program. The literature on optimal school finance programs tried to 
characterize several ideal types of school finance reform, and evaluate them. In the 
following part, I introduce several comparison studies of this type (Fernandez & 
Rogerson, 2003; Hoxby, 2001; Loeb, 2001; Manwaring & Sheffrin, 1997). 
Hoxby (1996) argued that foundation and power equalization school finance 
system were inferior to a mandatory spending level combined with categorical aid 
because both finance systems punished school districts that have high property bases. 
Categorical aid is the aid which state governments distribute to local school districts 
based on the characteristics of students such as students in special education and students 
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with limited English proficiency. To a certain extent, high property valuation was the 
result of the capitalization of effective schooling and high demand of education (Hoxby, 
1996). This means that school finance equalization systems could discourage the 
effectiveness and high demand for education. On the contrary, categorical aid can solve 
the limits of ability to produce tax revenue of poor school districts, and do not discourage 
effective school districts and parents’ high demand on education. 
School finance reforms are characterized by an increase in the role of state 
governments in funding education. Loeb (2001) evaluated three types of school finance 
centralization systems by using economic simulation methods based on school finance 
data of Michigan. She found that the system of state grant plus unlimited local 
supplementation provided little cross-district equalization effect. A pure state funding 
system discouraged higher spending of rich school districts although it provided higher 
equalization effect. She argued that a system of state grant with capped local 
supplementation may be a good school finance system which could produce higher state 
grant than a pure state funding system and have more equalization effect than a system of 
state grant plus unlimited supplementation. These findings showed that it was how state 
centralization reform was implemented rather than the increase of state’s role that 
influenced the spending of school districts.  
 Fernandez and Rogerson (2003) used a model calibration method to evaluate five 
different prototypical school finance systems: local system, state system, foundation, 
power equalizing with recapture, and power equalizing without recapture. In terms of 
total resources that each school finance system produced, they found that foundation 
system and power equalizing without recapture stimulated more spending on education 
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than other systems although this was achieved at the expense of equity. In terms of 
spending inequity, pure state school finance system was on the top to decrease inequity in 
educational spending. Based on the overall expected utilities, they argued that power 
equalizing with recapture ranked highest because it brought more resources to education 
than state finance systems and also decreased inequity.  
 The studies from Fernandez and Rogerson (2003) and Loeb (2001) revealed that the 
type of school finance systems could influence the level and distribution of school 
spending among school districts. However, as both studies were built on some simple 
assumptions and arbitrary choice of model parameters, their results should be interpreted 
with caution. Also, they did not reveal the mechanism of how various school finance 
systems function. 
  Hoxby (2001) took a more realistic approach to evaluate different school finance 
systems. She characterized all school finance systems with four variables and evaluated 
the effect of these features on school spending. These four variables were foundation tax 
rate, school-related income rate, foundation grant, and tax prices. Foundation tax rate was 
the property tax rate to produce state funding that was used on education. School-related 
income tax rate was the calculated income tax rate that was needed to produce state 
education funding minus revenue from foundation tax. Foundation grant referred to the 
amount of grant that school districts received from states.  She found that foundation tax 
rate and tax price had negative effects on per pupil spending. The amount of state grant 
had a positive effect on per pupil spending. School-related income tax rate had no 
significant effect on per pupil spending.  
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Theoretical Framework 
Since education budgets were decided by local school districts in Vermont and 
New Hampshire, to evaluate the impact of school finance reforms in both states 
essentially entails examining how local school districts determined its budget under the 
new school finance systems. The theoretical literature on determinants of local 
government spending and the literature on the effect of intergovernmental grants are 
relevant to this study. In the following section I review the two areas and explain how 
they could be used in this study. And then I use the concepts and conclusion in the 
literature to analyze the effect of the school finance reform in Vermont and New 
Hampshire on per pupil spending.  
Theories on Local Public Spending 
         The determinants of local public spending. School spending has attained much 
attention in public finance literature as an important public service of local government 
(Bergstrom, Rubinfeld, & Shapiro, 1982; Romer, Rosenthal, & Munley, 1992; Romer & 
Rosenthal, 1982). Researchers have tried to find out what determines the level of local 
public spending such as school spending. They derived these determinants from the 
economic theory on consumer behaviors in private consumption (Bergstrom & Goodman, 
1973). Since price and income are important factors determining the consumption of 
private good and service of individuals, they assume that the distribution of price and 
income among local residents are important determinant of local public spending which 
could be understood as the consumption of public service (Bergstrom & Goodman, 1973).  
In order to understand how the distribution of price and income among local 
residents determine the level of public spending in local governments such as school 
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districts, median vote theory should be introduced. Median voter theory originated in the 
field of public choice (D. Black, 1948; Downs, 1957). It tries to explain and predict the 
result of public choice. It argues that public choice represents and adopts the preference 
of a median voter if the choice is picked by a simple majority rule and the median voter 
has a single-peaked preference point. This theory applies to a variety of fields including 
elections and public policies. Local government expenditure is one of these. In 
considering both median voter theory and the implication from the determinants of 
individual consumption of private good and service, it could be concluded that the tax 
price and income of median voter could be determinants of local public spending. In the 
area of local education spending, it means that the tax price and income that a median 
voter has would determine the level of education spending. Empirical studies using this 
theory proved that median voter income and tax price in a school district were 
significantly correlated with school spending (Denzau & Grier, 1984; Hoxby, 2001).  
However, Romer and Rosenthal (1979) argued that empirical studies did not 
provide strong evidence for the median voter theory because they failed to show the 
superiority of the model specification using median income and tax share over 
alternatives using the measurement of a portion of median income and tax share. 
Considering this failure, Romer and Rosenthal (1982) provided another theory about 
local school spending. They thought that political structure might play an important role 
in deciding the level of local spending. Regardless of whether the budget plan is voted by 
a referendum or a representative body, voters are often offered one proposal. In the 
process, administrators can take advantage of the process and offer more than the median 
voter’s desired level of school spending.  
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Romer and Rosenthal (1982) empirically showed that local school district boards 
made use of the reversion proposition in Oregon school finance system in the process of 
local school budget decision. The reversion proposition regulated that school districts 
would spend base budget, which was much lower than current budget, if voters failed to 
pass the proposed budget. School district boards could place the threat of lower spending 
on voters by offering more than the median voter desired budget level. They proved that 
the reversion proposition in Oregon significantly increased local school spending level by 
15%. The result from Romer and Rosenthal (1982) is meaningful to this study because it 
highlights the importance of the procedure of budget decision when evaluating the effect 
of school finance reforms on school spending. 
The most debated point in the determinants of local public spending is how to 
identify the median voter. The way of treating a voter with median income as median 
voter is questioned (Romer & Rosenthal, 1982).  However, this problem did not influence 
its application to the evaluation of the effect of the school finance reform in Vermont 
because the school finance reform changed the tax price that different school districts, 
instead of only a median voter, had to bear. In order to understand this, I explain how the 
school finance reform in Vermont changed tax price in the following paragraph. 
There are two important features about the power equalization part of the school 
finance reform in Vermont. First, all funding for this part came from property tax revenue 
that school districts decide to spend more than the foundation grant on education. Second, 
it guaranteed that equal property tax rate produced the same revenue. Thus, if school 
districts with lower property base set up the same property tax rate as school districts 
with higher property base, they would get the same increase in educational spending. 
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This means that the school district with lower property tax rate would get a portion of 
property revenue from the school district with higher property base since the source of 
funding of this part is only from statewide property tax revenue. Therefore, with the same 
increase in education spending, the tax price for school district with lower property tax 
base was less than one because it got a portion of revenue from school districts with 
higher property base, while the tax price for school district with higher property base was 
more than one because it lost a portion of revenue to school districts with lower property 
base.  
Since the transfer of property revenue occurred between school districts instead of 
individuals, all voters including median voter in one school district experienced the 
change in tax price. Thus it is not necessary in this study to pinpoint what tax price a 
median voter faced in school districts in order to predict the effect of the school finance 
reform on per pupil spending. I will show how I utilize the theory in the hypothesis 
section. 
Another often-discussed issue about local public spending is the Tiebout model. 
This model assumes that voters choose a resident location where public spending and tax 
rate meet their preference under several assumptions (Tiebout, 1956). These assumptions 
include voter’s freedom to move, full knowledge of difference in revenue and 
expenditure patterns among communities, and a large number of communities that could 
be chosen (Tiebout, 1956). The result of the Tiebout process is that the preference for 
public spending of local residents in one community becomes so homogeneous that 
residents with the same preference live in the same communities. Several studies showed 
the existence of the Tiebout process(Aaronson, 1999; Hoxby, 2000; Urquiola, 2005). For 
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example, Urquiola (2005) presented that children’s district-and-school level peer groups 
become more homogenous in terms of race and parental education when the availability 
of districts within a metropolitan area increased. Since school finance reforms change the 
revenue-expenditure pattern, it could change the population homogeneity within school 
districts (Aaronson, 1999). 
The Tiebout process is relevant to this study because the change in the way that 
state governments distribute the state aid could change the property value. Hoxby (2001) 
argued that the part of property value was positively related to the demand on education 
of local residents. Residents with lower property value have lower demand on education. 
For instance, Black (1999) showed that parents were willing to pay 2.5% more on houses 
for a 5% percent increase in test spending. If state governments distribute state aid based 
on property value, and give larger portion of state aid to lower property school districts, 
that means that the state aid is given to those who have lower demand on education. Thus, 
school finance reforms based on the property value might decrease average educational 
spending per pupil (Hoxby, 2001).  
The effect of intergovernmental grant. Intergovernmental grant includes two 
categories. One is called lump-sum grant. Recipient governments spend it on certain 
targeted public service such as education without requirement of contribution of local 
contribution. The other one is matching grant. Recipient governments need to contribute 
a certain percentage of increase in spending on targeted areas in order to receive the grant. 
In this study, I only use the conclusion of studies on lump-sum grant. Thus, I only review 
literature on the effect of lump-sum grant. Regarding the effect of lump-sum 
intergovernmental grant on the spending behavior of recipient government, Bradford and 
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Oates (1971) argued that the use of the grant applies to the economic theory of behaviors 
of individuals even though the grant is given to a group of individuals and the spending 
of it is a collective decision. This is true if the structure of political decision-making 
institutions reflects the preference of voters. This assumption indicates that the effect of 
lump-sum intergovernmental grant on public spending is equal to the effect of private 
income increase of local residents in recipient jurisdiction. Bradford and Oates (1971) 
stipulated several conditions on which this assumption holds. These conditions include 
singled value preference, majority rule, and competitive choice (Bradford & Oates, 1971). 
A singled value preference means that every resident has a single preference of spending 
level. The level of public spending should be voted in a majority rule. Competitive choice 
indicates that voters could offer different level of spending to be selected in the voting 
process. This means that budget proposal could be changed by voters in the process of 
voting. For the remainder of the study, I will call this theory as “equivalence theory”. 
The equivalence theory is contradictory with empirical results on the flypaper 
effect of lump-sum state grant on public school. The flypaper effect refers to the fact that 
recipient governments would spend more intergovernmental grant on public services than 
they spend their equivalent income increase (Hines & Thalar, 1995). There is no 
consensus on the reason for the occurrence of flypaper effect. Because of numerous 
studies showing the existence of flypaper effects, the studies on it mainly focused on why 
it occurs (Hines & Thalar, 1995; Wyckoff, 1991). Wyckoff (1991) summarized four 
often-debated reasons: econometric misspecification, omitted variables, voters’ 
misperception of average price and marginal price, and voters’ unawareness of the 
existence of intergovernmental grant. The econometric misspecification refers to the error 
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that certain researchers treated a mix of lump-sum grant and matching grant as lump-sum 
grant. Because many studies used multiple regression analysis, omitted variables could 
produce the bias on the estimation of the effect of lump sum grant. Also lump sum grant 
reduced average price of public service, not marginal price, if voters thought marginal 
price was changed, they tended to spend more (Courant, Gramlich, & Rubinfeld, 1978). 
Last, if voters were unaware of the existence of intergovernmental grant, bureaucrats 
could spend this more on public service (Gramlich & Rubinfeld, 1982). Wyckoff (1991) 
used data on state aid to school districts in Michigan and tested the four explanations and 
found that they could not explain away the flypaper effect. Hines, James R. and Thalar 
(1995) maintained that voters might not see intergovernmental grant equivalent to private 
income because of loss aversion.  
However, there are several recent studies indicating that flypaper effect might not 
exist (Duggan, 2000; Gordon, 2004; Lutz, 2010). Gordon (2004) showed that the increase 
in Title I grant did not increase total revenue for education after three years by using an 
instrumental variable which solved the endogeneity of the variation in Title I grant. Lutz 
(2010) showed that state grant increase as a result of school finance reform in New 
Hampshire did not disproportionately increase local revenue on education because the 
budget decision was made by direct democracy in New Hampshire and voters were very 
familiar with school finance reform.  
School finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire both involved the change 
of intergovernmental grant to different school districts. This study holds that school 
districts in Vermont and New Hampshire spent the same amount out of 
intergovernmental grant as they spent out of residents’ income increase as the 
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equivalence theory predicts. This means that the effect of school finance reform has a 
small positive effect on per pupil spending in school districts which receive more state 
aid than before the reform. The reason for this is that the school finance governance and 
finance system meet the assumptions that the equivalence theory requires (Bradford & 
Oates, 1971).  
First, the school finance reforms in both Vermont and New Hampshire were 
fierecely debated in the court and legislatures. For example,  public polls showed 
property tax reform as the number one issue on peoples' minds before the school finance 
reform in Vermont (Mathis, 1998).The reform in New Hampshire was also highly 
politicized (Lutz, 2010). It is reasonable to assume that voters were aware of the exitence 
of intergovernmental grant. Second, the budget decsion in Vermont and New Hampshire 
were decided by residents in school districts, and they could accept or amend the budget 
as they wanted (Lutz, 2010; Mathis, 1999). Third, there was no limitation on the level of 
educational spending. These features ensured that the school finance budget reflected the 
preference of local residents. Therefore, in the following section analyzing the effect of 
school finance reform, I assume that school districts spend the same portion of state 
grants on education as they spend out of their income increase rather than all the 
intergovernmental grants. Since it is predicted that 5 to 10% of state grant will be spent 
on education (Bradford & Oates, 1971; Hines & Thalar, 1995), that means that that the 
increase of intergovernmental state aid has a small positive effect on educational 
spending.  
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Hypotheses 
Vermont. Post-reform school finance system in Vermont was a combination of a 
foundation program and a power equalization program. For the foundation part, it 
produced a change in state aid to school districts. School districts, whose statewide 
property tax revenue was higher than the first-tier block grant, lost a portion of property 
tax revenue. For school districts whose statewide property tax revenue was lower than the 
first tier block grant, they could attain state aid to make up the balance. It was expected 
that the state grant for these districts was more than the grant that they received before the 
reform because of the input of statewide property tax. Therefore, based on the 
equavalence theory (Bradford & Oates, 1971), per pupil spending would increase by 5 to 
10% in property poor school districts, and per pupil spending would decrease a little in 
property rich school districts because these school districts lost a portion of property tax 
revenue.  
The power equalization part of the new system changed the tax price that voters 
bear. Before the reform, the school finance system in Vermont was a foundation system. 
Almost every school district spent more than the state foundation level. When school 
districts wanted to spend one more dollar on education they needed to levy one dollar of 
local tax revenue. Therefore, tax price for local residents was one. However, the new 
system made tax price vary from district to district. Tax price was less than one if the 
second tier property revenue in school districts was less than the state guaranteed level 
because these school districts got revenue recaptured from other school districts. Tax 
price was more than one for school districts in which the second tier property revenue 
was more than the state guaranteed level because the extra property tax revenue was 
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recaptured. Since tax price is negatively related to school spending (Bergstrom & 
Goodman, 1973; Chandler, 2005; Denzau & Grier, 1984; Hoxby, 2001), school finance 
reform in Vermont would increase per pupil spending for poor school districts, and 
decrease per pupil spending for rich school districts depending on their tax price change, 
other things equal.  
In sum, as Table 2 shows, considering the effects of both foundation part and 
power equalization part of the new school finance system in Vermont, the school finance 
reform should have a negative effect on per pupil spending in property rich school 
districts because of the loss of property tax revenue and the increase of tax price. On the 
contrary, it should have a positive effect for property poor school districts because of the 
increase of state aid and the decrease in tax price. Finally, because of the contradictory 
effects of the school finance reform in Vermont for property rich and poor school districts, 
it is difficult to theoretically predict the overall effect of school finance reform on per 
pupil spending. This is an empirical question that depends on which effect surpasses the 
other effect of opposite direction. 
Table 1: Hypotheses on the Effect of School Finance Reforms in Vermont and New   
Hampshire 
State School  Districts 
Tax Price  Intergovernmental Aid Hypotheses 
Pre-reform  Post-reform  Pre-reform  Post-reform    
Vermont  Poor 1 <1  ↑ + 
Rich 1 >1  ↓ _ 
New 
Hampshire  
Poor 1 1  ↑ + 
Rich 1 1  ↓ _ 
 
New Hampshire. The school finance reform in New Hampshire did not change 
tax price after the reform because school districts were allowed to levy extra revenue 
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above adequate education cost without constraint. Since all school districts spent more 
than the adequate grants (Hall, 2003), that means that tax price for all school districts was 
still one after the school finance reform. But it changed the percentage of state funding of 
total educational spending from 9% to 55% in New Hampshire. About half of the 
increase in state share of educational revenue came from the newly established statewide 
property tax (Olabisi, 2006). The revenue of the other half was from pre-existing 
education aid, and increase in business, real estate, and car rental tax, and other sources 
(Olabisi, 2006). 
The recaptured proposition in the new school finance system of New Hampshire 
increased state aid for property poor school districts and decreased property revenue of 
rich school districts. Since school budget decision was made through a procedure of 
direct vote of local residents in town meeting. I assume that the equivalence theory holds 
in New Hampshire. Thus I hypothesize that the school finance reform in New Hampshire 
had small a positive effect on per pupil spending in poor school districts. On the contrary, 
I hypothesize that the school finance reform had a negative effect on per pupil spending 
in rich school districts because of the loss of local property revenue. Similarly to the 
school finance reform in Vermont, it is hard to predict the overall effect of school finance 
reform on per pupil spending in all school districts. It depends on the balance of the 
negative and positive effect of the school finance reform.  
Summary 
This chapter first introduces the school finance system in the United States. This 
includes the funding source of public education, typical school finance formula, and the 
challenge on the school finance system, and corresponding school finance reforms. The 
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first part of this chapter provides a big picture to understand the school finance reforms in 
Vermont and New Hampshire which this study specifically focuses on. Then school 
finance systems in Vermont and New Hampshire are presented. This includes the history 
of school finance system in both states, the motive and content of the school finance 
reforms, and the reasons why they are worthwhile being studied.  After that, the chapter 
presents empirical studies on the effect of school finance reforms. In the final part of 
theoretical framework, I review the theories on the determinant of local budgets and the 
effect of intergovernmental grants, and then provide the hypotheses on the effect of the 
school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire based on these theories. 
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CHAPTER 3 METHOD 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the impact of the school finance reforms 
in Vermont and New Hampshire on per pupil spending. Specifically, the research 
questions are:  
1. Did the school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire change per 
pupil spending for all school districts?  
2. Did the school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire change per 
pupil spending for poor school districts?  
3. Did the school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire change per 
pupil spending for rich school districts?  
In order to answer these questions, this study utilized a quantitative research 
design by using school district expenditure data derived from the Common Core of Data 
(CCD) of the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). The reason for the choice 
of a quantitative method instead of a qualitative method is that the aim of the study is to 
evaluate the effect of the school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire on per 
pupil spending. The increase of per pupil spending was not only the aim of plaintiffs in 
the Brigham v. State (1997) and Claremont v. Governor (1997), but also the aim of the 
school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire in a response to the two school 
finance litigations. Thus, a quantitative method could provide a comprehensive approach 
to evaluate the effect of the school finance reform on per pupil spending in all school 
districts in Vermont and New Hampshire. Further, a quantitative design provides more 
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generality of the conclusions that this study provides and stronger implications for 
predicting the effect of school finance reform in other similar states.  
Estimation Strategy 
Ideal Strategy 
The naive method to evaluate the effect of the school finance reforms in Vermont 
and New Hampshire on per pupil spending is to compare pre-reform and post-reform per 
pupil spending of school districts. However, this design could suffer from omitted 
variable bias because it is possible that the variation in outcome variable might be 
mistakenly attributed to school finance reforms but is actually due to other unknown 
factors (Meyer, 1995). For example, declining enrollment or change in per capita income 
in the period might cause change in per pupil spending. Another method to evaluate the 
effect of the school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire on per pupil 
spending is to compare per pupil spending in Vermont and New Hampshire and per pupil 
spending in some states which did not have school finance reforms after the school 
finance reform. However, this simple comparison could suffer from the bias of sample 
selection (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). For example, per pupil spending in the comparison 
state was probably higher than in Vermont and New Hampshire before school finance 
reforms.  
The ideal method to solve the omitted variable bias and selection bias is to use an 
experimental design (Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Heckman, 2000). In this design, a group 
of school districts would be randomly selected from all school districts to participate in a 
new school finance system. After the school finance reform takes effect, the difference in  
per pupil spending before and after reform in these school districts is compared to the 
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difference in per pupil spending before and after reform in non-participant school districts 
(Angrist & Pischke, 2009). The result is the estimation of the effect of the school finance 
reform. The random choice of participants could make sure that the estimation of the 
impact of school finance reform is free of selection bias and omitted variable bias. This is 
because random choice of participant school districts assures that nonparticipant group 
and participant group are comparable (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). However, in the field of 
school finance reforms, new school finance reforms usually apply to all school districts in 
one whole state. The situation in which a school finance policy randomly applies to a 
sample of school district is not available to researchers. For example, in the school 
finance reforms of Vermont and New Hampshire, this was not the case. All school 
districts in Vermont and New Hampshire were influenced by the school finance reforms. 
Difference in Difference 
 A Difference in Difference (DID) design is a good way to approximate the 
experiment approach to evaluate the impact of school finance reforms. A DID design 
needs a treatment group and a comparison group with data before and after treatment. 
The difference in the outcome variable of pre-treatment and post-treatment for 
participants in the treatment group is subtracted by the same difference for non-
participants in the comparison group (Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Ashenfelter & Card, 
1984; Card & Krueger, 1993). The final result is the estimation of the effect of the 
treatment if the choice of treatment and comparison group meet several assumptions. 
This method largely rules out bias from factors that occur during the targeted period and 
influence outcome variable in both the treatment and comparison group. The requirement 
for DID design is to make sure that treatment and comparison group are comparable. 
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That is, the characteristics that influence the outcome variable of interest are balanced 
between treatment group and comparison group. Therefore, it is critical to select a good 
comparison group in order to use a DID design (Athey & Imbens, 2006; Meyer, 1995).  
In order to utilize the DID design, three assumptions are needed. First, there is a 
well-defined and exogenous treatment that occurs (Besley & Case, 2000). Second, there 
is a comparison group with no treatment. Third, the trend of outcome variable for 
participants in treatment group would have the same trajectory as those in comparison 
group if they did not experience the treatment (Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005). That means 
that the assignment of treatment is independent on the characteristic of participants. What 
is needed to meet this assumption is that the characteristics of participants in treatment 
and comparison group are balanced. In the following sections, I show how the research 
design of this study meets these assumptions. 
Assumption of exogenous treatment. The school finance reforms in Vermont 
and New Hampshire meet the first assumption because they dramatically changed the 
state share of educational spending and tax price that school districts bore. For example, 
the Vermont school finance reform increased the state share of public school funding 
from 28% to 69% in the first year. The school finance reform in New Hampshire pushed 
the state share of school spending from 9% up to 55% in the first year. Further, the school 
finance reforms in both Vermont and New Hampshire were a response to their state 
supreme court decisions. These court-ordered school finance reforms were regarded as 
exogenous to school finance systems in the school finance literature (Baicker & Gordon, 
2006; Card & Payne, 2002; Murray et al., 1998). For example, Baicker and Gordon (2006) 
regressed the occurrence of a court-ordered school finance reforms on a serial of state-
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year characteristics including constitutional language on education, population, income, 
unemployment, and racial composition. The adjusted R2 of this regression was 0.037. 
This provided strong evidence that the occurrence of court-ordered school finance reform 
was exogenous.  
Comparison state without treatment. The DID design needs a comparison 
group which did not experience treatment, such as a school finance reform in this study, 
in the same period as in treatment states. Vermont implemented its new finance system in 
1999 and New Hampshire implemented its new finance system in 2000. Since I use 6 
years of pre-and post-reform data for the reasons that I will explain later, I need to make 
sure that there was no dramatic finance system reform from 1996 to 2001 for selecting a 
comparison state to Vermont, and from 1997 to 2002 for a comparison to New 
Hampshire. Rhode Island and Maine are good choices as comparison states for Vermont 
as well as New Hampshire for the reasons that I show below. 
Rhode Island. There were no dramatic school finance reforms in Rhode Island 
during the targeted period. Since 1996 the amount of state aid in Rhode Island that each 
school received was based on former year state aid adjusted by Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) (Wong, 2013). The original amount of base state aid that each school district 
received was calculated by the wealth of a school district versus the wealth per student of 
the state as a whole. There was no change in the way of distribution of general state aid 
from 1996 to 2003 although it changed its way of distributing categorical grants1 to 
school districts. It is reasonable to assume that there was no strong effect of this change 
                                                1	  In	  the	  school	  finance	  system	  of	  each	  state,	  there	  is	  a	  portion	  of	  state	  aid	  that	  is	  distributed	  to	  school	  districts	  based	  on	  particular	  characteristics	  of	  the	  school	  districts	  or	  students	  rather	  than	  local	  wealth.	  These	  characteristics	  could	  be	  transportation,	  density	  of	  population,	  special	  education	  students,	  and	  so	  on.	  This	  portion	  of	  state	  aid	  is	  called	  as	  categorical	  aid.	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because categorical grants only accounted for about four percent of total revenue for 
schools (Bilotti, 1999). 
Maine. The school finance system in Maine during this period was a foundation 
system (Dow, Watkins, Leighton, & Cameron, 1999). The state guaranteed foundation 
cost was divided into operating cost, program cost, debt cost and adjustment. Operating 
cost and program cost was calculated by the actual cost of previous year for current year 
school budget. These two costs were funded by both the state government and school 
districts. The share of school districts of these costs depended on local fiscal ability. 
School districts with high property value shared more of the costs than school districts 
with low property value.  Other than the guaranteed foundation amount, school districts 
were allowed to levy additional property tax. In 1997, Maine made a change in measuring 
local fiscal ability, for operating costs only, 85% of local fiscal capacity depended upon 
relative property values, and 15% depended upon relative median household income and 
cost of living. Before 1997, 100% of local fiscal ability depended on relative property 
values. This change did not alter the state share of public school funding and tax price of 
school districts. In 2004, Maine changed its method to calculate the guaranteed 
foundation amount into a program called Essential Program and Service. The state 
government identified essential programs and services that were needed to ensure that all 
students had equitable opportunities to achieve proficiency in state learning standards. 
Overall, there was no big change in the school finance system in Maine before 2004.  
In sum, in terms of the absence of treatment, school districts in Maine and Rhode 
Island meet the second assumption for being comparison groups to school districts in 
Vermont and New Hampshire during targeted period. 
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Assumption of comparability. A DID design requires that the factors affecting 
outcome variable are controlled and balanced in reform states and comparison states. I 
use the following ways to meet this assumption. At first, there are some characteristics of 
school governance and finance system in reform states and control states that could 
influence the effect of school finance reforms. But they are difficult to quantify. To 
control these factors, I limit my choice of comparison states to New England states 
because Vermont and New Hampshire are New England states. Because of historical and 
geographical reasons these states have three similar characteristics in term of education 
governance and finance. First, school districts are coterminous with town or city 
governments. School district finance is part of and dependent on town or city budgets. 
Second, school district budgets are voted by a city council or town meeting. Third, there 
is no expenditure or tax rate limit for school districts in these four states. Massachusetts 
was excluded because the state passed the Massachusetts Education Reform Act in 1993 
after the decision of the McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Education (1993). 
Connecticut was excluded also because its school finance system was reformed in 1997. 
Finally, Rhode Island and Maine were chosen as treatment states.  
However, these similarities do not reduce all the biases from some variables such 
as locality of school districts. In order to reduce the influence of these difference among 
states on the DID estimation, fixed effect of school districts is included in the DID model. 
This could reduce the bias from time-invariant factors of school districts on the 
estimation by including a constant fixed effect of these time-invariant factors for each 
school district on outcome variable (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). 
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Third, I include two important control variables which influence per pupil 
spending. Enrollment of school districts and percentage of students eligible for free lunch 
program were reported to be related to per pupil spending (Denzau & Grier, 1984; 
Manwaring & Sheffrin, 1997). Since the control variables have substantial explanatory 
power on per pupil spending, including them in regression reduces residual variance. 
Thus, this improves the precision of the DID estimation of the effect of school finance 
reforms (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). 
Finally, I combine Maine and Rhode Island together as one comparison group. 
This could help cancel out the particularity of only one comparison state. However, 
caution should be advised that it is possible that the DID estimation of the school finance 
reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire could be biased by the choice of comparison 
state. I will introduce a way to test the liability of using combined comparison states in 
the model validation section. 
 Although the school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire shared 
many similarities such as the increase of state funding and the establishment of statewide 
property tax, the methods of distributing state fund in the two states were totally different. 
Vermont used a combination of foundation program and power equalization program 
while New Hampshire used a foundation program. Therefore, I estimate their impacts 
separately.  
In sum, I combine Maine and Rhode Island into one group and use it as a 
comparison group for Vermont and New Hampshire separately.  
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Data 
Data Sources 
The unit of analysis of this study is school district. The finance data could be 
accessed from the Common Core of Data (CCD) of the U.S. Department of Education's 
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). CCD data is a comprehensive annual 
dataset on school districts from 1990 to 2012. The dataset used in this study for Vermont 
and its comparison states is from 1996 to 2001. The dataset used for New Hampshire and 
its comparison states is from 1997 to 2002.  
The choice of a period of six years of data for Vermont and New Hampshire in 
this study is mainly based on the status of school finance systems in reform and 
comparison states although econometrics literature shows that it is better to include more 
years of data in order to reduce the bias from group error and serial correlation in the DID 
design (Donald & Lang, 2007). The Vermont school finance reform that I study was 
implemented in 1999. In February of 2004, Vermont initiated another school finance 
reform. Thus maximum number of years of post-reform data is six. The New Hampshire 
school finance reform that I study was implemented in 2000.  In June of 2003, the New 
Hampshire legislature reformed its school finance again by reducing the statewide 
property tax rate from $5.80 to $4.92 for fiscal year 2004 and further down to $3.24 for 
FY 2005. Therefore, it is better to only use data from 2000 to 2003 as post-reform data. 
Thus, the maximum number of year of post-reform data is four for New Hampshire. 
However, for pre-reform data, the appropriate data for comparison state Rhode 
Island began in 1996. Since the school finance reform in Vermont was implemented in 
1999, the maximum year of pre-reform data for Vermont is three.  In order to make sure 
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that the number of years of post-reform data at least is balanced with the pre-reform data 
and make the studies on Vermont and New Hampshire comparable, I choose three years 
pre-reform data and three years post-reform data for Vermont and New Hampshire.  
This approach is also consistent with the existing studies on the school finance 
reforms in Oregon (Figlio, 1998), Massachusetts (Dee & Levine, 2004), and Michigan 
(Chaudhary, 2009). These studies also used the DID research design and included six 
years of data in their models. In sum, the dataset for Vermont is from 1996 to 2001. The 
dataset For New Hampshire is from 1997 to 2002. 
Data Preparation 
The data that I use in this study was downloaded from the Elementary/Secondary 
Information System (ELSi) on the NCES website.  The first step in creating the dataset 
for this study was to keep information on school districts. This step excluded the 
institutions like supervisory union administer office, regional educational service agency, 
state or federal agency charged with instruction service, and charter school agency. There 
were 280 school districts in Maine, 177 school districts in New Hampshire, 36 school 
districts in Rhode Island, and 284 school districts in Vermont in the dataset.   
The second step in creating dataset for this study was to keep school districts 
which operate elementary and\or secondary school districts. This means that non-
operating school districts, which sent their children to other school districts, were 
excluded. This type of school districts was excluded because expenditure and revenue 
structure was different between school districts operating schools and not. Another reason 
was that the NCES dataset did not provide information on expenditure and enrollment on 
this type of school districts. In Maine, there were 57 non-operating school districts and 
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one school district without information on whether it operated schools. In New 
Hampshire, there were 14 non-operating school districts and two school districts without 
this information. In Rhode Island, there were no non-operating school districts. In 
Vermont, there were 42 non-operate school districts and seven school districts without 
this information. Further, one school district in New Hampshire without information on 
per pupil spending was also excluded. Altogether, there were 222 school districts in 
Maine, 160 school districts in New Hampshire, 36 school districts in Rhode Island, 235 
school districts in Vermont in the dataset. Information on per pupil spending, enrollment, 
and number of students in free lunch program of school districts was included in the 
dataset.  
Definition of Variables 
Dependent variable. The dependent variable used in this study is “total current 
expenditures for elementary and secondary education per student” (Cornman, Keaton, & 
Glander, 2013, p. A-2). Total current expenditures for elementary and secondary 
education per student are the district's total current expenditures for elementary and 
secondary education divided by the fall membership as reported in the district finance 
survey. The total current expenditures for public elementary and secondary education are 
the expenditures “associated with the day-to-day operations of the school district” 
(Cornman et al., 2013, p. A-2). They exclude long term expenditures (like capital outlays), 
debt service, and expenditures beyond the scope of public, elementary and secondary 
education (Cornman et al., 2013). The total current expenditures are also reduced by 
current expenditures made on behalf of students not included in the fall membership, 
which includes the expenditures for public charter schools and private schools (Cornman 
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et al., 2013). These data were taken from the CCD LEA Finance (F-33) survey. In this 
dissertation, for simplification, I use per pupil spending to indicate total current 
expenditures for elementary and secondary education per student.   
Because per pupil spending represents the level of educational resources available 
to students, it was commonly used in the studies on school finance reforms (Card & 
Payne, 2002; Murray et al., 1998; Springer et al., 2009). Also, this variable was chosen as 
dependent variable in this study because the increase of spending in poor schools was the 
aim of plaintiffs in school finance litigations and school finance reforms in both Vermont 
(Brigham v. State, 1997) and New Hampshire (Claremont v. Governor, 1997). Data on 
per pupil spending was converted into 2000 dollar using Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
Key independent variable. School finance reform is the variable of interest in 
this study. As indicated above, school finance reform is treated as a dummy variable. For 
school districts in treatment state after the reform, the value of the variable is one while 
the value of it is zero otherwise.  School finance reform is a broad concept. It only has 
specific meaning when it refers to a specific school finance reform. In the case of 
Vermont, the school finance reform refers to the change in school finance system which 
was included in the Act 60 of 1997. In New Hampshire, the school finance reform refers 
to the school finance reforms that occurred in 1998. Throughout the dissertation, when 
the school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire are mentioned, I mean these 
two specific school finance reforms, except indicated otherwise.  
Control variables: enrollment. I control for the effect of known factors on per 
pupil spending in analytical models. According to an existing study (Denzau & Grier, 
1984), per pupil spending of each school district was significantly related to total 
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enrollment. Total enrollment of school districts is treated as controlling variables. The 
CCD dataset provides the number of fall membership of students of each school district. I 
convert it into its logarithm because the distribution of enrollment is extremely right 
skewed. 
Control variable: percentage of students in free lunch program. Local wealth 
level is related to per pupil spending (Hoxby, 1998). The percentage of students eligible 
for free lunch program is an indicator of local wealth level because families whose 
children are in free lunch program earn less money (Chaudhary, 2009). Therefore, 
percentage of students in free lunch program is included in my statistical models as a 
control variable. It is calculated by dividing the number of students in free lunch program 
by fall enrollment of school districts. 
Statistical Model 
Difference in Difference Model 
A DID model analyzes variation in the dependent variable by utilizing a control 
group and a comparison with pre-reform and post-reform data. The normal specification 
of DID is a multiple regression model shown as Model 1 (Abadie, 2005; Donald & Lang, 
2007; Meyer, 1995).  
Model 1: 𝑌!"#   = α! + α!𝑅 + α!𝑇 + 𝛽! + ε!"# 
In this study, Yjst is per pupil spending for school district j, in state s and year t.  R 
is a dummy variable for school districts in reform states after school finance reforms. The 
value of the variable is one for school districts in reform states after the reforms while the 
value of is zero otherwise. The coefficient α! of R is the DID estimator of the effect of 
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school finance reform on per pupil spending. It indicates the result of the difference in per 
pupil spending before and after reforms in reform states subtracted by the difference in 
per pupil spending before and after reforms in comparison states. T is a series of dummy 
variable for each year. The coefficient α! accounts for the fixed effect for each year. 
Fixed effect 𝛽! for each school district is included in order to control the effect of time-
invariant variables on the variation of per pupil spending. Standard error ε!"#  is clustered 
at school district level.  
Model 2:  𝑌!"#   = α! + α!𝑅 + α!𝑇 +   γ𝑋!"# + 𝛽! + ε!"# 
In model 2, a series of control variable X are included in this study in order to 
control the influence of other variables on the estimation of coefficient α!. These include 
student enrollment of school districts and percentage of students in free lunch program in 
this study.  
In order to know the effect of school finance reforms on per pupil spending for 
rich and poor school districts, I divide school districts in each state into three groups 
based on per pupil student spending before school finance reforms. The first step is to 
average per pupil spending of three years pre-reform data. Then I categorize school 
districts into three quantiles based on the averaged per pupil spending before reforms 
within each state. The school districts whose average per pupil spending was in the 
lowest quantile are regarded as poor school districts. The school districts whose average 
per pupil spending was in the highest quantile are regarded as rich school districts. 
Because per pupil spending of school districts is close to normal distribution, school 
districts at the top third and lower third in per pupil spending includes school districts 
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with higher spending and lower spending. Also, the method was used in the study of the 
effect of school finance reform in Massachusetts (Dee & Levine, 2004). Dee and Levine 
effectively showed that the school finance reform produced different effect on these three 
groups of school districts. In the following analysis, I first use data on all school districts, 
and then use data on poor and rich school districts to run the statistical model presented 
above.  
Model Validation 
Although I try to meet the requirements of a DID design, because of data 
availability and the complexity of school finance reforms it is possible that some biases in 
estimation might occur. In this section, I identify the potential biases and propose ways to 
check them.  
Combined comparison groups. Whether the treatment and comparison groups 
are comparable is important for DID research design (Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Heckman, 
1997). In this study, school finance system in each state is a complicated system. Each 
year, states might tinker their school finance system. It is difficult to find a perfect state 
whose school finance system did not change at all. A combination of two similar 
comparison groups could reduce the bias from the minor changes that occurred in 
comparison groups (Meyer, 1995). In order to check the effectiveness of this method, I 
use Maine and Rhode Island as comparison state separately in order to check the 
robustness of the estimations derived from the model using a combination of the two 
states. 
Multiple periods of data. For DID design, one choice to make is how many 
years of data after reform the analysis use. If only one year of post-reform data is 
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included, there is not enough time for school districts to fully respond to new reforms 
(Hoxby, 2001).  If a chosen time period is too long, it is difficult to control for the effect 
of changes occurring during the time on the estimation of targeted school finance reforms 
(Dee & Levine, 2004). Therefore, I conduct separate analyses for two and three years of 
pre and post reform data in order to check whether the choice of period influences the 
estimation of the impact of school finance reforms. When I use four years of data, the 
categorization of poor and rich school districts is based on average per pupil spending of 
two years of pre-reform data. 
Serial correlation correction. The DID design could suffer from serial 
correlation problems because it uses several time point pre-and post-reform data (Angrist 
& Pischke, 2008; Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2002; Donald & Lang, 2007). One 
assumption of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation of error term is that the error term 
is not correlated among observations. However, for time-serial data, it is possible that the 
value of outcome variable for an individual at one time point is correlated the value for 
the same unit at later time point.  This is called serial correlation. The violation of the 
assumption for the OLS estimation of standard error leads to the underestimation of the 
standard error of DID estimators. This could mistakenly lead to reject null hypotheses 
when there is no significant difference in outcome variable of interest before and after 
treatment.  
Clustering standard errors within school districts is a common way to correct the 
issue of serial correlation (Donald & Lang, 2007). Donald and Lang (2007) showed that 
the cluster approach might be unreliable when the number of treatment and comparison 
groups was small. However, Brewer, Crossley, and Joyce (2013) showed that an adjusted 
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method  of clustering standard error, which is what Cluster command in statistical 
software STATA does, could provide an efficient estimation even when the number of 
group is small. However, there is no consensus on the way to solve serial correlation 
problems in DID estimation (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). In this study, there are only two 
comparison states and one treatment state. In my analysis, the standard error is estimated 
by clustering standard error at school district level. I use the adjusted way of clustering 
the standard error suggested by Brewer et al. (2013). Bertrand et al. (2004) showed that 
averaging time series data into one time point pre-reform and one time point post- reform 
data could effectively solve the serial correlation problem even when the number of 
groups is small. Following Bertrand et al. (2014), I also average time series data into pre-
and post-reform data to run the analytical model that I present above.  
Summary 
This chapter introduces the methodology that this study uses. This study uses a 
DID research design. First, I provide the rationales behind this design.  In this section, I 
provide evidences that this study meets the three assumptions that a DID research design 
requires. Second, I describe data that this study uses. This includes data source, data 
preparation, and the definition of variables. Third, I present the DID statistical model.  
Finally, I provide several ways to check the robustness of the DID estimation of the effect 
of the school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire. 
  
  79 
CHAPTER 4 RESULTS 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effect of the school finance reforms 
in Vermont and New Hampshire on per pupil spending of school districts. Specifically, 
this study answers the following three questions: 
1. Did the school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire change per 
pupil spending in all school districts? 
2. Did the school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire change per 
pupil spending in poor school districts? 
3. Did the school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire change per 
pupil spending in rich school districts? 
This chapter presents descriptive results and inferential results to address these 
questions. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the school finance reforms in Vermont and New 
Hampshire is evaluated separately. Thus, this chapter includes two sections. In the first 
sections, I present the descriptive results and the DID estimation of the effect of the 
school finance reform in Vermont on per pupil spending. I also include the results of 
robustness checks of the models. In the second section, the results for the school finance 
reform in New Hampshire are presented. This section also includes the descriptive and 
inferential results, and robustness checks for examining the school finance reforms in 
New Hampshire.  
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Vermont 
Descriptive Results 
Depending variable: per pupil spending. Regarding the data on per pupil 
spending of school districts in Vermont, per pupil spending in eight school districts in 
Vermont in 1998 was lower than $3,000 or even $2,000. This was abnormal because per 
pupil spending in these school districts in other years was more than $4,000. Also, per 
pupil spending of each school district in Rhode Island, and Maine in 1998 was more than 
$4,000. The total revenue, local revenue, state revenue, and enrollment in these school 
districts did not have this kind of abrupt change in 1998. Further, 6 out of the 8 school 
districts were in the same supervisory union in which they shared one superintendent. 
Based on these facts, it is high chance that the data for these eight school districts in 
Vermont in 1998 was not correctly reported or input. Thus, I excluded these eight school 
districts in my analysis. However, because I was not sure about this conclusion and 
unable to pinpoint the exact reason for this I also run my analysis by including these eight 
school districts in the robustness check section in order to see the influence of the 
exclusion of these eight school districts.  
Table 2 shows the descriptive results of dependent variable per pupil spending in 
the reform state Vermont and the comparison states Maine and Rhode Island. In Vermont, 
227 school districts were included in this study. Average per pupil spending of school 
districts was $6,623 in 1998, the last year before the implementation of the school finance 
reform. Average per pupil spending of school districts increased by $468 in 1999, by 
$335 in 2000, and by $498 in 2001. As shown in Figure 4, the change rate of per pupil 
spending, as indicated by the slope of the trend line, increased after the reform. All of 
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these results indicate that the average per pupil spending of school districts increased 
after the school finance reform in Vermont.  
Table 2: Descriptive Characteristics of per Pupil Spending in Reform and 
Comparison States: 1996-2001 
  Comparison State: ME/RI Reform State: VT 
year Mean SD Freq Mean SD Freq 
1996 7161 1645 258 6380 1186 227 
1997 7368 1657 258 6574 1099 227 
1998 7679 1860 258 6623 1195 227 
1999 8128 2346 258 7091 1383 226 
2000 8380 2310 258 7426 1260 227 
2001 8803 2306 258 7924 1410 226 
Total 7920 2120 1548 7002 1369 1360 
 
Figure 4. The Trend of per Pupil Spending in Reform and Comparison States: 1996-
2001 
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The comparison group included 222 school districts in Maine and 36 school 
districts in Rhode Island. Average per pupil spending was $7,679 in 1998. As shown in 
Figure 4, it also experienced a gradual increase from 1996 to 2001. However, Maine and 
Rhode Island did not reform their school finance systems as Vermont did in this period.  
Figure 5 shows the change in the distribution of per pupil spending in Vermont. 
The green bar shows the distribution of per pupil spending in 1998 before the school 
finance reform. There exited much variation in per pupil spending among school districts 
in 1998. The lowest per pupil spending was $3,582 in Woodford School District while 
the highest per pupil spending was $10,816 in Guildhall School District. The white bar 
with black border shows that the distribution of per pupil spending in 2001, the third year 
after the school finance reform. As Figure 5 indicates that the variation in per pupil 
spending among school districts did not change much while the mean of per pupil 
spending among school districts increased. Also, Figure 5 shows that the distribution of 
per pupil spending was slightly right skewed. That means that the number of school 
districts spending higher was less than those with lower spending. This was one reason 
that I converted the variable into its logarithm, which was closer to normal distribution as 
shown in Figure 6, in the following regression analysis. 
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Figure 5. The Histogram of per Pupil Spending in Vermont in 1998 and 2001 
 
Figure 6. The Histogram of Logarithm of per Pupil Spending in Vermont in 1998 
and 2001 
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Independent variable: student enrollment of school districts. Table 3 shows 
the trend of enrollment of school districts in the reform state Vermont and the comparison 
states Maine and Rhode Island. The average enrollment of school districts stayed stable 
from 1996 to 2001 in Maine and Rhode Island as shown in Figure 7. For example, the 
average enrollment was 1,408 in 1997, and the average enrollment was 1,412 in 2001.  In 
Vermont, the average enrollment experienced a gradual and small decrease by 2-7 
students in each year from 1996 to 2001. The average enrollment was 428 in 1996 while 
it was 409 in 2001. 
Table 3: Descriptive Characteristics of Enrollment of School Districts in Reform 
and Comparison States: 1996-2001 
  Comparison State: ME/RI Reform State: VT 
Year Mean SD Frequency Mean SD Frequency 
1996 1403 2216 258 428 520 227 
1997 1408 2242 258 425 510 227 
1998 1411 2293 258 423 510 227 
1999 1409 2319 258 421 515 226 
2000 1416 2327 258 416 513 227 
2001 1412 2352 258 409 513 226 
Total 1410 2288 1548 420 513 1407 
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Figure 7. The Trend of Enrollment of School Districts in Reform and Comparison 
States: 1996-2001 
 
Figure 8 shows the distribution of enrollment of school districts in Vermont. The 
green bar shows the distribution of enrollment in 1998. The white bar with black border 
shows the distribution of enrollment in 2001. It presents that there was huge variation in 
enrollment among school districts. For example, the enrollment in Granby School District 
was 11 while the enrollment was 3,751 in Burlington School District. Also, the 
distribution was extremely right skewed. This means that larger number of school 
districts had smaller enrollment. The distribution of student enrollment of school districts 
did not change much from 1998 to 2001 because the distributions of the two years 
overlapped in Figure 8. Since the distribution of enrollment was right skewed, I included 
its logarithm in my analytical models. The logarithm of enrollment was closer to normal 
distribution as shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 8. The Histogram of Enrollment of School Districts in Reform and 
Comparison States in 1998 and 2001 
 
Figure 9. The Histogram of Logarithm of Enrollment of School Districts in Reform 
and Comparison States in 1998 and 2001 
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Independent variable: percentage of students in free lunch program. Table 4 
shows the descriptive characteristics of percentage of students in free lunch program in 
the reform state Vermont and the comparison states Maine and Rhode Island. It shows 
that data on percentage of students in free lunch program was not balanced from 1996 to 
2001. The Total number of school districts included in this study was 227 in Vermont and 
258 in Maine and Rhode Island. Thus, in each year, the number of school districts was 
supposed to 227 for Vermont and 258 for Maine and Rhode Island. As shown in Table 4, 
there were some missing values for the variable in both reform state and comparison 
states. For example, there were 23 missing values in 2000 for the comparison states and 
78 missing value for the reform state in 1998. This indicates that average percentage of 
students in free lunch programs of different year was not comparable because they 
included different size of samples in different years.  
Table 4: Descriptive Characteristics of Percentage of Students in Free Lunch 
Program in Reform and Comparison States: 1996-2001 (Unbalanced) 
  Comparison State: ME/RI Reform State: VT 
Year Mean SD Frequency Mean SD Frequency 
1996 0.255 0.152 245 0.190 0.146 227 
1997 0.256 0.151 244 0.228 0.124 200 
1998 0.256 0.140 241 0.342 0.176 149 
1999 0.248 0.138 245 0.223 0.154 172 
2000 0.231 0.157 235 0.207 0.124 206 
2001 0.215 0.137 236 0.186 0.123 226 
Total 0.244 0.147 1446 0.223 0.148 1180 
 
Table 5 shows that the descriptive characteristics of percentage of students in free 
lunch program in the reform state Vermont and the comparison states Maine and Rhode 
Island when school districts with missing value were excluded. In Vermont, the 
percentage of students in free lunch program was stable from 1996 to 1997. However, 
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there was a dramatic increase in the percentage of students in free lunch program in 1998. 
It increased from 0.228 in 1997 to 0.342 in 1998 (shown in Figure 10). In 1999, it backed 
to the value level in 1997, and experienced a small decrease in 2000 and 2001. Looking 
at the percentage of students in free lunch program in other states, in 1998, Georgia and 
South Dakota experienced the same abrupt up-and-down trend. Wyoming had this up-
and-down trend in percentage of students in free lunch program in 2001. I was not able to 
figure out why this dramatic increase happened. Therefore, I ran separate analytical 
models both with and without the variable to check the influence of the dramatic increase 
in percentage of students in free lunch program in Vermont on the estimation of the effect 
of its school finance reform. In the comparison states, the percentage of students in free 
lunch program did not change much from 1996 to 1998. It decreased by 0.9% in 1999, 
1.6% in 2000, and decreased by 1.7% in 2001. 
Table 5: Descriptive Characteristics of Percentage of Students in Free Lunch 
Program in Reform and Comparison States: 1996-2001 (Balanced) 
  Comparison State: ME/RI Reform State: NH 
Year Mean SD Frequency Mean SD Frequency 
1996 0.257 0.155 228 0.239 0.137 147 
1997 0.257 0.152 228 0.245 0.133 147 
1998 0.257 0.142 228 0.347 0.175 147 
1999 0.248 0.141 228 0.249 0.143 146 
2000 0.232 0.158 228 0.226 0.131 147 
2001 0.215 0.137 228 0.214 0.121 147 
Total 0.244 0.148 1368 0.254 0.147 881 
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Figure 10. The Trend of Percentage of Students in Free Lunch Program in the 
Reform and Comparison State: 1996 to 2001 
 
Correlations of all variables. Table 6 shows the correlations of all variables for 
the analysis of the school finance reform in Vermont. Data included school districts in 
Vermont, Maine, and Rhode Island from 1996 to 2001. The correlation coefficient 
between reform and per pupil spending was -0.007, indicating that the relationship was 
much weak. The correlation coefficient between per pupil spending and percentage of 
students in free lunch program was -.045. This was also a weak relationship. The 
correlation coefficient between per pupil spending and enrollment was -0.143. This was a 
modest negative correlation. It indicates that school districts with larger enrollment spent 
less on education. However, all these correlations were calculated without controlling 
other variables and cannot reveal the true relations among these variables although it 
provided some suggestive relations among these variables. More advanced models were 
needed to understand the relation between school finance reforms and per pupil spending. 
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Table 6: Correlation of All Variables for Vermont 
  Spendinga Freelunchb Enrollmentc Reformd Year 
Spending 1.000     
Freelunch -0.045 1.000    
Enrollment -0.143 -0.146 1.000   
Reform 0.007 -0.114 -0.233 1.000  
Year 0.319 -0.078 -0.005 0.499 1.000 
Note. Data include school districts in Vermont, Maine, and Rhode Island from 1996 to 2001. 
a logarithm of per pupil spending. b percentage of students with free lunch.  
c logarithm of enrollment. d dummy for reform state after reform 
 
Difference in Difference Estimations 
In order to know the causal effect of the school finance reform in Vermont on per 
pupil spending, a DID estimation was used in this study. It utilized a comparison group 
and pre-and post-data to reduce the bias from unknown variables. Year and school district 
fixed effect were also included in models.  To account for the possibility of serial 
correlation in the error term, standard error was clustered at school district level. Also, in 
order to see the influence of control variables on the DID estimation, I ran the models 
with and without control variables. Finally, it should be mentioned that the coefficients of 
independent variables could not be interpreted directly because of the use of logarithm of 
per pupil spending and enrollment in models. I interpret the coefficients by converting 
them into percentage of increase or decrease in per pupil spending. 
The purpose of this study is to know the effect of the school finance reform in 
Vermont on per pupil spending in all school districts, poor, and rich school districts. Thus, 
I present results for all school districts, poor school districts, and rich school districts 
separately.  
All school districts. Table 7 shows the results of the DID estimation of the school 
finance reform in Vermont on per pupil spending for all school districts. Column 1 and 2 
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show the results from four years of data without and with control variables. The 
coefficients of reform variable were 0.008 without control variable and -0.017 with 
control variables. Both coefficients were not statistically significant at the 10% 
significance level. Column 3 and 4 show the results from six years of data without and 
with control variables. The coefficients of reform variable were 0.011 without control 
variable and -0.010 with control variables. Both coefficients were not statistically 
significant at 10% significance level. In sum, the DID estimation indicates that the school 
finance reform in Vermont had no significant effect on average per pupil spending in all 
school districts. 
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Table 7: DID Estimation of the Effect of the School Finance Reform in Vermont on 
per Pupil Spending in All School Districts with Comparison State Maine 
and Rhode Island 
 
The coefficients of the logarithm of enrollment were -0.231 with four years of 
data and -0.236 with six years of data. Both were significant at 1%. This negative relation 
  Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 No Control Control No control Control 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform 0.008 -0.017 0.011 -0.010 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
1997   0.030*** 0.030*** 
   (0.004) (0.003) 
1998 0.023*** 0.033*** 0.054*** 0.063*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
1999 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.107*** 0.109*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
2000 0.118*** 0.129*** 0.147*** 0.157*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
2001   0.204*** 0.208*** 
   (0.008) (0.009) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment 
 -0.231***  -0.236*** 
 (0.050)  (0.041) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students 
 -0.143**  -0.110** 
 (0.071)  (0.052) 
Constant 8.834*** 10.254*** 8.803*** 10.240*** 
 (0.003) (0.308) (0.004) (0.248) 
     
Observations 1,939 1,692 2,908 2,626 
R2 0.314 0.403 0.451 0.533 
Number of id 485 471 485 475 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  93 
indicates that per pupil spending decreased by 0.23%2 or 0.24% if enrollment increased 
by 1%.  The average per pupil spending was $6,623, and the average enrollment was 423 
in 1999 in Vermont. This means that about 4 students increase reduced per pupil 
spending by $15 or $16. 
The coefficients of percentage of students in free lunch program were -0.143 with 
four years of data and -0.110 with six years of data. Both were significant at 5%. This 
negative relation indicates that per pupil spending decreased 0.1%3 if percentage of 
students in free lunch program increased by 1%. Average per pupil spending was $6,623 
in 1999. This means that one percent increase of students in free lunch program students 
reduced per pupil spending by $7.  
Poor school districts. Table 8 shows the results of the DID estimation of the 
school finance reform in Vermont on per pupil spending for poor school districts whose 
average per pupil spending before the reform belonged to the lowest third. Column 1 and 
2 show the results from four years of data without and with control variables. The 
coefficients of the variable reform were 0.032 without control variables and 0.021 with 
control variables. Both coefficients were statistically significant at 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively. The coefficients 0.032 and 0.021 means that the school 
finance reform increased per pupil spending in poor school districts in Vermont by 3.1%4 
                                                2	  Since	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	  logarithm	  of	  per	  pupil	  spending,	  the	  independent	  variable	  enrollment	  is	  also	  in	  its	  logarithm.	  The	  coefficient	  of	  the	  logarithm	  of	  enrollment	  could	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  percentage	  of	  increase	  or	  decrease	  in	  per	  pupil	  spending	  if	  the	  enrollment	  increases	  1%.	  3	  Since	  the	  dependent	  variable	  was	  the	  logarithm	  of	  per	  pupil	  spending,	  this	  number	  was	  calculated	  by	  a	  function	  (𝑒!.!"∗! − 1)	  where	  e	  was	  Euler's	  number,	   was	  the	  coefficient	  of	  the	  percentage	  of	  students	  in	  free	  lunch	  program.	  For the remaining portion of the dissertation, the coefficient of the 
variable percentage of students in free lunch program was converted in the same way as this.	  4	  The dependent variable was the natural logarithm of per pupil spending in this model, the coefficient of 
the variable reform could be converted into the percentage of increase or decrease in per pupil spending by 
a function of 𝑒!! − 1  (e is Euler's number, α1 is the coefficient of the variable reform). For the remaining 
portion of the dissertation, the coefficient of the variable reform was converted in the same way as this.	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and 2.1%. Since the inclusion of control variables could improve the precision of the DID 
estimation, the model with control variable was more trustworthy. Thus, considering that 
per pupil spending in Vermont in 1998 before the school finance reform was $6,233, that 
means that the school finance reform in Vermont increased per pupil spending in poor 
school districts by $132.  
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Table 8: DID Estimation of the Effect of the School Finance Reform in Vermont on 
per Pupil Spending in Poor School Districts with Comparison State Maine 
and Rhode Island 
 
Column 3 and 4 show the results from six years of data without and with control 
variables. The coefficients of the variable reform were 0.041 without control variable, 
and 0.026 with control variables. Both coefficients were statistically significant at 1% and 
5% significance level respectively. The coefficients 0.041 and 0.026 mean that the school 
  Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 No Control Control No Control Control 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform 0.032** 0.021* 0.041*** 0.026** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) 
1997   0.032*** 0.036*** 
   (0.006) (0.006) 
1998 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.072*** 0.078*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) 
1999 0.089*** 0.084*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
2000 0.137*** 0.132*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) 
2001   0.224*** 0.215*** 
   (0.011) (0.011) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment 
 -0.208***  -0.278*** 
 (0.051)  (0.048) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students 
 -0.077  -0.119** 
 (0.053)  (0.054) 
Constant 8.659*** 9.954*** 8.630*** 10.368*** 
 (0.004) (0.309) (0.006) (0.299) 
     
Observations 644 588 966 892 
R2 0.546 0.613 0.652 0.721 
Number of id 161 159 161 159 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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finance reform increased per pupil spending in Vermont by 4.2% and 2.6%. Since the 
inclusion of control variables could improve the precision of the DID estimation, the 
model with control variable was more trustworthy. Thus, given that per pupil spending in 
Vermont in 1998 before the school finance reform was $6,233, this means that the school 
finance reform increased per pupil spending for poor school districts by $164. This result 
indicates that the DID estimation of the effect of the reform from four and six years of 
data did not show much difference. 
The coefficients of the logarithm of enrollment were -0.208 with four years of 
data and -0.278 with six years of data. Both were significant at 1%. This negative relation 
indicates that per pupil spending decreased 0.21% or 0.27% if enrollment increases by 
1%. Based on per pupil spending $6,233 in Vermont and the average enrollment 423 in 
1998, this means that about four students increase reduced per pupil spending in poor 
school districts by $14 or $18. 
The coefficients of percentage of students in free lunch program were -0.007 with 
four years of data and -0.119 with six years of data. Only the one with six years of data 
was significant at 5%. Considering the result from the six years of data, it indicates that 
per pupil spending decreased 0.1% if percentage of students in free lunch program 
increased by 1%. Based on per pupil spending $6,233 in Vermont in 1998 before the 
school finance reform, this means that one percent increase of students in free lunch 
program students reduced per pupil spending in poor school districts by $7.  
Rich school districts. Table 9 shows the results of the DID estimation of the 
school finance reform in Vermont on per pupil spending for rich school districts whose 
average per pupil spending before the reform belonged to the highest third quantile. 
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Column 1 and 2 show the results from four years of data without and with control 
variables. The coefficients of variable reform were -0.015 without control variables and -
0.056 with control variables. Only the latter one was significant at 5%.  The coefficient -
0.056 means that the school finance reform in Vermont decreased per pupil spending in 
rich school districts by 5.4%. Based on per pupil spending $6,233 in Vermont in 1998 
before the school finance reform, that means that the school finance reform decreased per 
pupil spending by $339.  
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Table 9: DID Estimation of the Effect of the School Finance Reform in Vermont on 
per Pupil Spending in Rich School Districts with Comparison State Maine 
and Rhode Island 
  Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 No Control Control No Control Control 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform -0.015 -0.056** -0.011 -0.045* 
 (0.021) (0.025) (0.021) (0.025) 
1997   0.032*** 0.026*** 
   (0.008) (0.007) 
1998 0.008 0.028** 0.039*** 0.050*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
1999 0.076*** 0.083*** 0.103*** 0.102*** 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.018) (0.015) 
2000 0.095*** 0.127*** 0.121*** 0.143*** 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) 
2001   0.178*** 0.197*** 
   (0.018) (0.021) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment 
 -0.247***  -0.218*** 
 (0.086)  (0.076) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students 
 -0.206  -0.121 
 (0.126)  (0.101) 
Constant 9.034*** 10.506*** 9.000*** 10.287*** 
 (0.007) (0.513) (0.009) (0.453) 
     
Observations 640 541 960 839 
R2 0.139 0.248 0.250 0.334 
Number of id 160 152 160 153 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Column 3 and 4 show the results from six years of data without and with control 
variables. The coefficients of reform variable were -0.011 without control variable and -
0.045 with control variables. The one without control variables was not significant while 
the one with control variables was only significant at 10%. The coefficient -0.045 means 
that the school finance reform decreased per pupil spending in Vermont by 4.4%. Based 
  99 
on per pupil spending $6,233 in Vermont in 1998 before the school finance reform, that 
means that the school finance reform decreased per pupil spending by $274. The DID 
estimation of the effect of the reform from six years of data was lower than the one from 
four years of data. 
The coefficients of the logarithm of enrollment were -0.247 with four years of 
data and -0.218 with six years of data. Both were significant at 1%. This negative relation 
indicates that per pupil spending decreased 0.24% or 0.22% if the enrollment increased 
by 1%. Based on per pupil spending $6,233 in Vermont and the average enrollment 423 
in 1998, this means that about 4 students increase reduced per pupil spending by $16 or 
$15.  
The coefficients of percentage of students in free lunch programs are -0.206 with 
four years of data and -0.121 with six year of data. Both were not significant at even 10%.  
Robustness Check 
In this section I present the results for robustness check of the DID estimations of 
the effect of the school finance reform in Vermont presented above. There were four 
robustness checks of these estimations. The first was to average four year and six years 
into two time points of data: pre and post reform data. The second was to use data on 
school districts in Maine and Rhode Island individually instead of combining them. Third, 
I included eight school districts with abnormal per pupil spending in 1998 which were 
excluded in the models that I present in above section. Finally, I show the results without 
control variable percentage of students in free lunch program in order to check the 
influence of its dramatic increase in 1998 on the DID estimation. I present these results 
for all school districts, poor school districts, and rich school districts sequentially. I only 
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interpret the DID estimation of the effect of the school finance reform because it is the 
focus of this study. The coefficient of control variables and the information on sample 
size and R square are shown in Table 1-15 in Appendix 1. Also, I only compare the 
results with control variables because the model with control variables improved the 
precision of the DID estimation.  
All school districts. Table 10 shows the results for robustness check of the DID 
estimation of the effect of the school finance reforms for all school districts in Vermont. 
In order to make comparison, the DID estimations of the effect from the models using 
multiple years data and a combination of comparison states that I show above were 
included in Row 1. Row 2 shows the results from models using averaged data. Row 3 
shows the results when only school districts in Maine were used as a comparison group. 
Row 4 shows the results when only school districts in Rhode Island were used as 
comparison group. Row 5 shows the results when eight school districts with abnormal 
value of per pupil spending in 1998 in Vermont were included. Row 6 shows the results 
when the control variable percentage of students in free lunch program was excluded. 
First, for the results from four years of data (Column 1), the estimated effect of 
the school finance reforms from the models with combined comparison states and 
multiple years data was negative and not significant. The models including eight school 
districts with abnormal data and the models without variable percentage of students in 
free lunch program also show this non-significant and negative effect. However, the 
model with averaged data and the model with Maine as comparison state show that the 
negative effect was significant at 5% confidence level. The coefficients were -0.034 and -
0.025. This means that the school finance reform decreased average per pupil spending of 
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all school districts in Vermont by 3.3% and 2.5%. In sum, the DID estimations from four 
years of data shows some inconsistent results on the effect of the school finance reform in 
Vermont on per pupil spending in all school districts.  
For the models with six year data, the DID estimation from the models with 
combined comparison states and multiple years data show that the school finance reform 
in Vermont had no effect on per pupil spending of school districts. The estimation from 
the models with averaged data, the model including eight school districts with 
problematic value in per pupil spending, and the model without variable of the percentage 
of students in free lunch program were consistent to this result. However, the models with 
individual comparison state Maine and Rhode Island both show that the negative effect 
was significant only at 10%. In sum, the DID estimations from six years of data shows 
that the school finance reform in Vermont had no significant effect on per pupil spending 
in all school districts at the significance level 5%.  
Table 10: The Results of Robustness Check of DID Models for All School Districts 
in Vermont 
Model   Four Years of Data Six Years of Data   (1) (2) 
Multiple year data (1) -0.017 -0.010 (0.011) (0.010) 
Averaged year data (2) -0.034** -0.020 (0.015) (0.013) 
With Maine (3) -0.025** -0.019* (0.011) (0.011) 
With Rhode Island (4) 0.018 0.025* (0.013) (0.014) 
Including eight school 
districts (5) 
-0.003 -0.001 
(0.012) (0.011) 
Without free lunch 
variable (6) 
-0.003 -0.005 
(0.009) (0.010) 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Poor school districts. Table 11 shows the results for robustness check of the DID 
estimation of the effect of the school finance reforms for poor school districts in Vermont. 
For the models using four years of data and with control variables (Column 1), the DID 
estimation of the effect of the school finance reform in Vermont from the model with 
averaged data was 0.033 and significant at 5%. The DID estimation from the models 
without eight school districts with problematic value of per pupil spending was 0.044 and 
significant at 1%. The DID estimation from the model without free lunch variable was 
0.025 and significant at 5%. The DID estimation from the model with individual 
comparison state Rhode Island also shows the significant positive effect (0.049). The 
result from the model with comparison state Maine was also positive, but not significant.  
Table 11: The Results of Robustness Check of DID Models for Poor School Districts 
in Vermont 
Model   
Six Years of Data Six Years of Data 
  (1) (2) 
Multiple year data (1) 0.021* 0.026** (0.011) (0.012) 
Averaged year data (2) 0.033** 0.034** (0.016) (0.015) 
With Maine (3) 0.014 0.020 (0.012) (0.013) 
With Rhode Island (4) 0.049*** 0.033 (0.014) (0.025) 
Including eight school 
districts (5) 
0.044*** 0.037*** 
(0.016) (0.014) 
Without free lunch variable (6) 0.025** 0.028** (0.012) (0.013) 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
For the models using six years of data and without control variable (Column 2), 
the DID estimation from the models with averaged data, the models without eight school 
districts with problematic value of per pupil spending, and the model without free lunch 
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variable were 0.034, 0.037, and 0.028. All of the three are significant at either 5% or 1%. 
The DID estimations from the model with individual state Maine or Rhode Island were 
positive but not significant. 
Overall, based on the results from four years of data and six year, it could be said 
that the positive effect of the school finance reform in Vermont on per pupil spending in 
poor school districts was not sensitive to the problematic data on per pupil spending in 
eight school districts in 1998 and the dramatic increase in percentage of students in free 
lunch program. The consistency of results from multiple years of data and averaged data 
also shows that the estimation of standard error faces less doubt caused by serial 
correlation problem. The range of the DID estimation was from 0.021 to 0.049. That 
means that the school finance reform increased per pupil spending in poor school districts 
by from 2.1% to 4.7%. However, these results were sensitive to the choice of 
comparative states. When using either Maine or Rhode Island as a comparison state, the 
significance of positive effects disappeared.   
Rich school districts. Table 12 shows the results for robustness check of the 
estimation of the effect of the school finance reforms for rich school districts in Vermont. 
Row 2 shows the results from models using averaged data. The DID estimations of the 
effect of the school finance reform in Vermont were -0.109 for the model with four years 
of data and -0.080 for the model with six years of data. The former coefficient was 
statistically significant at 1% significance level, and the latter coefficient was significant 
at 5% significance level.  
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Table 12: The Results of Robustness Check of DID Models for Rich School Districts 
in Vermont 
Model   
Six Years of Data Six Years of Data 
  (1) (2) 
Multiple year data (1) -0.056** -0.045* (0.025) (0.025) 
Averaged year data (2) -0.109*** -0.080** (0.034) (0.034) 
With Maine (3) -0.063** -0.056** (0.026) (0.027) 
With Rhode Island (4) -0.014 0.009 (0.032) (0.028) 
Including eight school 
districts (5) 
-0.056** -0.046* 
(0.024) (0.024) 
Without free lunch 
variable (6) 
-0.034 -0.040* 
(0.021) (0.022) 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Row 3 shows the results when only school districts in Maine were used as a 
comparison group. The direction and significance were the same as the model using a 
combination of school districts in Maine and Rhode Island. The effect size was bigger (-
0.063 for four years of data, -0.056 for six years of data) from the models with one 
comparison state Maine than the ones from the models with combined comparison states 
(-0.056 for four years of data, -0.045 for six years of data). Row 4 shows the results when 
only school districts in Rhode Island were used as comparison group. These results from 
both four and six years of data were not significant. The possible reason for the non-
significance is that the sample size of comparison state Rhode was small. There were 12 
rich school districts in Rhode Island while there were 76 rich school districts in Vermont.  
Row 5 shows the results from the model including eight school districts with 
abnormal value in per pupil spending in 1998 was almost identical to the results from the 
model without these school districts. This indicates that the eight school districts with 
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abnormal value in per pupil spending in 1998 did not pose a problem on the DID 
estimation of the effect of the school finance reform on per pupil spending in rich school 
districts. 
Row 6 shows the results from the model without control variable percentage of 
free lunch students. The model with six years of data provided similar results (-0.040) 
with the model including the control variable. The model with four years of data changes 
the negative effect from significance in the model with the variable to non-significance. 
This highlights the importance of the inclusion of the variable of percentage of students 
in free lunch program. 
Overall, it could be said that the school finance reform in Vermont decreased per 
pupil spending in rich school districts by 4.4% to 10.3%. This result was not sensitive to 
the use of multiple year data or averaged data. However, there are two challenges to this 
conclusion. When the number of school districts in comparison group was small, the 
negative effect became not significant, for example, in the case of using Rhode Island, 
where there were only 12 rich school districts, as only comparison state. Second, the 
result was sensitive to the inclusion of the variable of the percentage of free lunch 
students. The potential challenge to it is that the exclusion of the variable percentage of 
students in free lunch program might influence the significance of the negative effect. 
Further evidence is needed to pinpoint the reason for the dramatic increase in percentage 
of students in free lunch program in 1998. At this point, I take this data as valid. The 
result from the model using this variable shows that the school finance reform in 
Vermont had significant and negative effect on per pupil spending in rich school districts. 
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New Hampshire  
Descriptive Results 
Dependent variable: per pupil spending. Table 13 shows the descriptive results 
of per pupil spending in the reform state New Hampshire and the comparison states 
Maine and Rhode Island. In New Hampshire, 160 school districts were included in this 
study. Average per pupil spending of school districts was $7,207 in 1999, the last year 
before the implementation of the school finance reform. Average per pupil spending of 
school districts increased by $213 in 2000, by $266 in 2001, and by $544 in 2002. As 
shown in Figure 11, the change rate of per pupil spending, as indicated by the slope of the 
trend line, increased after the school finance reform. All these results indicate that 
average per pupil spending of school districts increased after the school finance reform in 
New Hampshire. 
Table 13: Descriptive Characteristics of per Pupil Spending in Reform and 
Comparison States: 1997-2002 
  Comparison State: ME/RI Reform State: NH 
Year Mean SD Frequency Mean SD Frequency 
1997 7368 1657 258 6911 1780 160 
1998 7679 1860 258 7031 1507 160 
1999 8128 2346 258 7207 1444 160 
2000 8380 2310 258 7420 1500 160 
2001 8803 2306 258 7686 1712 160 
2002 8924 2200 258 8230 1968 160 
Total 8214 2199 1548 7414 1716 960 
 
The comparison group included 222 school districts in Maine and 36 school 
districts in Rhode Island. Average per pupil spending was $8,128 in 1999. As shown in 
Figure 11, it also experienced a gradual increase from 1997 to 2002. However, Maine and 
Rhode Island did not reform their school finance systems as New Hampshire did during 
the period.  
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Figure 11. The Trend of per Pupil Spending in Reform and Comparison States: 
1997-2002 
 
Figure 12 shows the change in the distribution of per pupil spending in New 
Hampshire. The green bar shows the distribution of per pupil spending in 1999 before the 
school finance reform. There existed much variation in per pupil spending among school 
districts. The lowest per pupil spending was $4,613 in Milan School District while the 
highest per pupil spending was $14,242 in Waterville Valley School District. The white 
bar shows that the distribution of per pupil spending in 2002, the third year after the 
school finance reform. As Figure 12 indicates, the variation in per pupil spending among 
school districts did not change much while the mean of per pupil spending among school 
districts increased. Also, Figure 12 shows that the distribution of per pupil spending was 
slightly right skewed. That means that the number of school districts spending higher was 
less than those with lower spending. This was the reason that I converted the variable into 
its logarithm in the following regression analysis, which was closer to normal distribution 
as shown in Figure 13. 
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Figure 12. The Histogram of per Pupil Spending in New Hampshire in 1999 and 
2002 
 
Figure 13. The Histogram of Logarithm of per Pupil Spending in New Hampshire in 
1999 and 2002 
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states of Maine and Rhode Island from 1997 to 2002. The Average enrollment of school 
districts stayed stable from 1997 to 2002 in Maine and Rhode Island as shown in Figure 
14. For example, the average enrollment was 1,408 in 1997, and the average enrollment 
was 1,410 in 2002.  In New Hampshire, the average enrollment increased by 48 in 1999, 
21 in 2000, 20 in 2001, and decreased 5 in 2002.  
Table 14: Descriptive Characteristics of Enrollment of School Districts in Reform 
and Comparison States: 1997-2002 
  Comparison State: ME/RI Reform State: NH 
Year Mean SD Frequency Mean SD Frequency 
1997 1408 2242 258 1199 1910 160 
1998 1411 2293 258 1204 1932 160 
1999 1409 2319 258 1231 1980 160 
2000 1416 2327 258 1242 2001 160 
2001 1412 2352 258 1253 2021 160 
2002 1407 2362 258 1242 2016 160 
Total 1410 2312 1548 1229 1972 960 
 
Figure 15 shows the distribution of enrollment of school districts in New 
Hampshire. The green bar shows the distribution of enrollment in 1999. The white bar 
with black border shows the distribution of enrollment in 2002. It shows that there was 
huge variation in enrollment among school districts. For example, the enrollment in 
Landaff School District was 20 while it was 16,932 in Manchester School District. Also, 
the distribution was extremely right skewed. This means that a larger number of school 
districts had smaller enrollment. The distribution of enrollment of school districts did not 
change much from 1999 to 2002 because the distributions of the two years overlap in 
Figure 15. Since the distribution of enrollment was right skewed, I included its logarithm 
in my analytical models. The logarithm of enrollment was close to normally distributed 
as shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 14. The Trend of Enrollment of School Districts in Reform and Comparison 
States: 1997-2002 
 
Figure 15. The Histogram of Enrollment of School Districts in New Hampshire in 
1999 and 2002 
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Figure 16. The Histogram of Logarithm of Enrollment of School Districts in New 
Hampshire in 1999 and 2002 
 
 
Independent variable: percentage of students in free lunch program. Table 15 
shows the descriptive characteristics of percentage of students in free lunch program in 
the reform state of New Hampshire and the comparison states of Maine and Rhode Island 
from 1997 to 2002. Table 4 shows that data on percentage of students in free lunch 
program was not balanced among years. The total number of school districts was 160 in 
New Hampshire, 258 in Maine and Rhode Island. There were some missing values for 
the variable in both reform state and comparison states. For example, there were 23 
missing values for comparison states in 2000, and 45 missing values for reform state in 
1999. This indicates that average percentage of students in free lunch program was not 
comparable across years, because they included different samples in different years. 
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Table 15: Descriptive Characteristics of Percentage of Students in Free Lunch 
Program in Reform and Comparison States: 1997-2002 (Unbalanced) 
  Comparison State: ME/RI Reform State: NH 
Year Mean SD Frequency Mean SD Frequency 
1997 0.256 0.151 244 0.119 0.090 141 
1998 0.256 0.140 241 0.118 0.096 147 
1999 0.248 0.138 245 0.118 0.100 115 
2000 0.231 0.157 235 0.115 0.082 160 
2001 0.215 0.137 236 0.103 0.076 134 
2002 0.224 0.148 251 0.100 0.078 157 
Total 0.238 0.146 1452 0.112 0.087 854 
 
Table 16 shows the descriptive characteristics of percentage of students in free 
lunch program in reform state New Hampshire and comparison states Maine and Rhode 
Island when school districts with missing value were excluded. In New Hampshire, the 
percentage of students in free lunch program was stable from 1997 to 1999 as shown in 
Figure 17. It began to decrease in 2000. It decreased by 0.8% from 2000 to 2001. In 
comparison states, percentage of students in free lunch program also did not change much 
from 1997 to 1999. It decreased by 1.7% in 2000, 1.6% in 2001, yet increased by 0.9% in 
2002. 
Table 16: Descriptive Characteristics of Percentage of Students in Free Lunch 
Program in Reform and Comparison States: 1997-2002 (Balanced) 
  Comparison State: ME/RI Reform State: NH 
Year Mean SD Frequency Mean SD Frequency 
1997 0.257 0.152 228 0.125 0.092 104 
1998 0.257 0.142 228 0.118 0.096 104 
1999 0.248 0.141 228 0.117 0.096 104 
2000 0.232 0.158 228 0.112 0.076 104 
2001 0.215 0.137 228 0.099 0.071 104 
2002 0.223 0.146 228 0.095 0.074 104 
Total 0.239 0.147 1368 0.111 0.085 624 
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Figure 17. The Trend of Percentage of Students in Free Lunch Program in Reform 
and Comparison States: 1997-2002 
 
Correlation of all variables. Table 17 shows the correlations of all variables for 
the analysis of the New Hampshire school finance reform. Data included school districts 
in New Hampshire, Maine, and Rhode Island from 1997 to 2002. The correlation 
coefficient between reform and per pupil spending was -0.024, and the relationship was 
weak. The correlation coefficient between per pupil spending and percentage of students 
in free lunch program was -.005. This was also a weak relationship. The correlation 
coefficient between per pupil spending and enrollment was -0.347. This was a modest 
negative correlation. It indicates that school districts with larger enrollments spent less on 
education. However, all these correlations were calculated without controlling for other 
variables, it cannot reveal true relations among these variable while it provided some 
suggestive relations among these variables. More advanced modeling was needed to 
understand the relation between school finance reforms and per pupil spending. 
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Table 17: Correlation of All Variables for New Hampshire 
  Spendinga Freelunchb Enrollmentc Reformd Year 
Spending 1.000     
Freelunch -0.005 1.000    
Enrollment -0.347 -0.114 1.000   
Reform -0.024 -0.298 -0.024 1.000  
Year 0.260 -0.090 0.013 0.421 1.000 
Note. Data included school districts in New Hampshire, Maine, and Rhode Island from 1997 to 2002. 
a logarithm of per pupil spending. b percentage of students with free lunch.  
c logarithm of enrollment. d dummy for reform state after reform 
 
Difference in Difference Estimations 
In order to know the causal effect of the school finance reform in New Hampshire 
on per pupil spending, a DID estimation was used in this study. It utilized a comparison 
group and pre-and post-data to reduce the bias from unknown variables. Year and school 
district fixed effect were also included in this model.  To account for the possibility of 
serial correlation in the error term, standard errors were clustered at school district level. 
Also, in order to examine the effect of control variables, I ran separate models without 
and with control variables. Finally, it should be mentioned that the coefficient of 
independent variables in the following tables could not be interpreted directly because of 
the use of logarithm of per pupil spending, I interpret the coefficients by converting them 
into the percentage of increase or decrease in per pupil spending in following explanation. 
The research questions of this study is to know the effect of the school finance 
reform in New Hampshire on per pupil spending in all school districts, poor, and rich 
school districts. Thus, I present results for all school districts, poor school districts, and 
rich school districts separately.  
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All school districts. Table 18 shows the DID estimations of the effect of the 
school finance reform in New Hampshire on per pupil spending for all school districts. 
Column 1 and 2 show the results from four years of data without and with control 
variables. The coefficients of the variable reform were -0.024 without control variables 
and -0.034 with control variables. Both coefficients were statistically significant at 1% 
significance level. The coefficient -0.024 and -0.034 means that the school finance 
reform decreased per pupil spending in New Hampshire by 2.4%5 and 3.3%.  Since the 
inclusion of control variables could improve the precision of the DID estimation, the 
model with control variable was more trustworthy. Thus, considering that per pupil 
spending in New Hampshire in 1999 before the reform was $7,207, the school finance 
reform in New Hampshire decreased per pupil spending by $241 based on the estimation 
from four years of data.  
  
                                                5	  The dependent variable was the natural logarithm of per pupil spending in this model, the coefficient of 
the variable reform could be converted into the percentage of increase or decrease in per pupil spending by 
a function of 𝑒!! − 1  (e is Euler's number, α1 is the coefficient of the variable reform). For the remaining 
portion of the dissertation, the coefficient of the variable reform was converted in the same way as this.	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Table 18: DID Estimation of the Effect of the School Finance Reform in New 
Hampshire on per Pupil Spending in All School Districts with 
Comparison State Maine and Rhode Island 
  Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 No Control Control No Control Control 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Reform -0.024*** -0.034*** -0.021** -0.032*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
1998.year   0.032*** 0.031*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
1999.year 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.074*** 0.069*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
2000.year 0.081*** 0.091*** 0.112*** 0.124*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
2001.year 0.125*** 0.130*** 0.156*** 0.161*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
2002.year   0.192*** 0.192*** 
   (0.009) (0.008) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment 
 -0.174***  -0.247*** 
 (0.044)  (0.037) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students 
 -0.174**  -0.237*** 
 (0.081)  (0.078) 
Constant 8.890*** 10.032*** 8.858*** 10.482*** 
 (0.003) (0.283) (0.004) (0.243) 
     
Observations 1,672 1,513 2,508 2,306 
R2 0.309 0.381 0.395 0.481 
Number of id 418 407 418 411 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Column 3 and 4 show the DID estimation from six years of data without and with 
control variables. The coefficients of variable reform were -0.021 without control 
variables and -0.032 with control variables. Both coefficients were statistically significant 
at 5% and 1% significance level respectively. The coefficient -0.021 and -0.032 mean 
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that the school finance reform decreased per pupil spending in New Hampshire by 2.1% 
and 3.2%. Also, since the inclusion of control variables could improve the precision of 
the DID estimations, the model with control variables was more trustworthy. Thus, 
considering that per pupil spending in New Hampshire in 1999 before the reform was 
$7,207, the school finance reform in New Hampshire decreased per pupil spending by 
$227 based on the estimation from six years of data. This result also indicates that the 
DID estimations of the effect of the reform from four and six years of data did not show 
much difference. 
The coefficients of the logarithm of enrollment were -0.174 with four years of 
data and -0.247 with six years of data. Both were significant at 1%. This negative relation 
indicates that per pupil spending decreased 0.17% or 0.25% if enrollment increased by 
1%. Average per pupil spending was $7,207 in 1999, and average enrollment was 1,231 
in 1999. This means that about 12 students increase reduced per pupil spending by $12 or 
$18. 
The coefficients of the percentage of students in free lunch program were -0.174 
with four years of data and -0.237 with six years of data. Both were significant at 5% and 
1%, respectively. This negative relation indicates that per pupil spending decreased 
0.17%6 or 0.23% if percentage of students in free lunch program increased by 1%. 
Average per pupil spending was $7,207 in 1999 in New Hampshire. This means that one 
percent increase of students in free lunch program students reduced per pupil spending by 
$13 or $17.  
                                                
6 Since the dependent variable is logarithm of per pupil spending, this number is calculated by a 
function  (𝑒!.!"∗! − 1)	  where e is Euler's number,  is the coefficient of the percentage of students in free 
lunch program. For the remaining portion of the dissertation, the coefficient of the variable percentage of 
students in free lunch program was converted in the same way as this. 
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Poor school districts. Table 19 shows the DID estimation of the school finance 
reform in New Hampshire on per pupil spending for poor school districts whose average 
per pupil spending before the school finance reform belonged to the lowest third quantile. 
Column 1 and 2 show the results from four years of data without and with control 
variables. The coefficients of the variable reform were -0.014 without control variables 
and -0.012 with control variables. However, both coefficients were not statistically 
significant at even 10% significance level. Column 3 and 4 shows the results from six 
years of data without and with control variables. The coefficients of reform variable were 
-0.012 without control variable and -0.004 with control variables. Both coefficients were 
also not statistically significant at 10% significance level.  This indicates that the school 
finance reform did not have a significant effect on per pupil spending in poor school 
districts. 
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Table 19: DID Estimation of the Effect of the School Finance Reform in New 
Hampshire on per Pupil Spending in Poor School Districts with 
Comparison State Maine and Rhode Island 
  Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 No Control Control No Control Control 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform -0.014 -0.012 -0.012 -0.004 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) 
1998   0.031*** 0.032*** 
   (0.005) (0.005) 
1999 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.081*** 0.077*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
2000 0.095*** 0.092*** 0.123*** 0.118*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
2001 0.150*** 0.144*** 0.175*** 0.165*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
2002   0.241*** 0.223*** 
   (0.014) (0.011) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment 
 -0.142**  -0.213*** 
 (0.057)  (0.053) 
Percentage of 
free lunch 
students 
 -0.110  -0.202** 
 (0.066)  (0.079) 
Constant 8.708*** 9.659*** 8.677*** 10.130*** 
 (0.006) (0.373) (0.006) (0.351) 
     
Observations 560 502 840 766 
R2 0.509 0.550 0.596 0.677 
Number of id 140 138 140 139 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The coefficients of the logarithm of enrollment were -0.142 with four years of 
data and -0.213 with six years of data. Both were significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
This negative relation indicates that per pupil spending decreased 0.14% or 0.21% if 
enrollment increased by 1%. Average per pupil spending was $7,207, and average 
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enrollment was 1,231 in 1999 in New Hampshire. This means that about 12 students 
increase reduced per pupil spending by $10 or $15. 
The coefficients of percentage of students in free lunch program were -0.110 with 
four years of data and -0.202 with six years of data. Only the one with six years of data 
was significant at 5%. Considering the result from six years of data, it indicates that per 
pupil spending decreased by 0.2% if percentage of students in free lunch program 
increased by 1%. Since the average per pupil spending was $7,207 in 1999, this means 
that one percent increase of students in free lunch program students reduced per pupil 
spending by $14.  
Rich School Districts. Table 20 shows the results of the DID estimation of the 
school finance reform in New Hampshire on per pupil spending for rich school districts 
whose average per pupil spending before the school finance reform belonged to the 
highest one third. Column 1 and 2 show the results from four years of data without and 
with control variables. The coefficients of the variable reform were -0.034 without 
control variable and -0.063 with control variables. The former coefficient was only 
significant at 10 % significance level while the latter one was significant at 1%.  The 
coefficient -0.034 and -0.063 means that the school finance reform decreased per pupil 
spending in rich school districts in New Hampshire by 3.3% and 6.1%. Since the 
inclusion of control variables could improve the precision of the DID estimation, the 
model with control variable was more trustworthy. Thus, considering that per pupil 
spending in New Hampshire in 1999 before the reform was $7,207, the school finance 
reform in New Hampshire decreased per pupil spending by $440 based on the estimation 
from four years of data.  
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Table 20: DID Estimation of the Effect of the School Finance Reform in New 
Hampshire on per Pupil Spending in Rich School Districts with 
Comparison State Maine and Rhode Island 
  Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 No Control Control No Control Control 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform -0.034* -0.063*** -0.024 -0.066*** 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.024) 
1998   0.033*** 0.030*** 
   (0.008) (0.007) 
1999 0.033*** 0.028*** 0.069*** 0.062*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) 
2000 0.068*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.139*** 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.022) 
2001 0.108*** 0.129*** 0.133*** 0.162*** 
 (0.014) (0.020) (0.016) (0.023) 
2002   0.124*** 0.148*** 
   (0.017) (0.023) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment 
 -0.235***  -0.279*** 
 (0.071)  (0.067) 
Percentage of 
free lunch 
students 
 -0.346**  -0.272* 
 (0.167)  (0.147) 
Constant 9.103*** 10.572*** 9.075*** 10.766*** 
 (0.007) (0.435) (0.009) (0.404) 
     
Observations 556 510 834 765 
R2 0.160 0.296 0.166 0.281 
Number of id 139 134 139 134 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Column 3 and 4 show the results from six years of data without and with control 
variables. The coefficients of variable reform were -0.024 without control variables and -
0.066 with control variables. The former coefficient was not significant while the latter 
one was significant at 1%. The coefficient -0.066 means that the school finance reform 
decreased per pupil spending in New Hampshire by 6.4%. Based on per pupil spending 
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$7,207 in New Hampshire in 1999 before the reform, that means that the school finance 
reform decreased per pupil spending in rich school districts by $460. This result indicates 
that the DID estimation of the effect of the reform from four and six years of data did not 
show much difference. 
The coefficients of the logarithm of enrollment were -0.235 with four years of 
data and -0.279 with six years of data. Both were significant at significance level 1%. 
This negative relation indicates that per pupil spending decreased 0.24% or 0.28% if 
enrollment increased by 1%. Average per pupil spending was $7,207, and average 
enrollment was 1,231 in 1999 in New Hampshire. This means that about 12 students 
increase reduced per pupil spending in rich school districts by $17 or $20. 
The coefficients of percentage of students in free lunch program were -0.346 with 
four years of data and -0.272 with six years of data. The coefficient with four years of 
data was significant at 5%. The one with six years of data was significant at 10%. 
Considering the result from the four years of data, it indicates that per pupil spending 
decreased 0.3% if percentage of students in free lunch program increased by 1%. 
Average per pupil spending was $7,207 in 1999. This means that one percent increase of 
students in free lunch program students reduced per pupil spending in rich school districts 
by $22.  
Robustness Check 
In this section I present the results for robustness checks of the DID estimations of 
the effect of the school finance reform in New Hampshire. There were two robustness 
checks. The first was to average four year and six years into two time point data: pre- and 
post-reform data. The second was to use data on school districts in Maine and Rhode 
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Island individually instead of combining them.  I show these results in the sequence of all 
school districts, poor school districts, and rich school districts. I only interpret the DID 
estimation of the effect of the school finance reform. The coefficient of control variables 
and information on R square and sample size are shown in Table 1-9 in Appendix 2. 
All school districts. Table 21 shows the results for robustness check of the 
estimation of the effect of the school finance reforms on per pupil spending for all school 
districts in New Hampshire. In order to make comparison, the DID estimations of the 
effect of the school finance from the model using multiple years data and a combination 
of comparison states that I show above are included in Row 1.  
Table 21: The Results of Robustness Check of DID Models for All School Districts 
in New Hampshire 
Model 
  Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
  (1) (2) 
Multiple year data (1) -0.032*** -0.034*** (0.010) (0.009) 
Averaged year 
data (2) 
-0.028*** -0.020* 
(0.010) (0.011) 
With Maine (3) -0.039*** -0.039*** 
(0.009) (0.011) 
With Rhode 
Island (4) 
-0.005 0.011 
(0.010) (0.012) 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Row 2 shows the results from the models using averaged four-year data. The DID 
estimations of the effect of the school finance reform in New Hampshire were -0.024 
without control variables and - 0.0208 with control variables. Both coefficients were 
statistically significant at 1%. For the models with six years of data, the DID estimations 
of the effect of the school finance reform in New Hampshire were -0.020 without and 
with control variables. The one without control variables was statistically significant at 1% 
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significance level while the one with control variables was only significant at 10% 
significance level. Since the inclusion of control variables could improve the precision of 
the DID estimation, the model with control variable was more trustworthy. Comparing to 
the results from the model with multiple years data, the result from averaged four years of 
data (-0.028) was a little smaller than the effect estimated by using multiple four years (-
0.032). For six years of data, the effect size estimated by averaged data (-0.020) was 
smaller than the one from multiple year data (-0.034). The significance level was also 
weaker for the model with averaged data (10%) than the model with multiple year data 
(1%).  
Row 3 shows the results when only school districts in Maine were used as a 
comparison group. The direction and significance of the DID estimation were the same as 
the model using a combination of school districts in Maine and Rhode Island. The effect 
size was a little bigger (-0.039, for four years of data, -0.039 for six years of data) for the 
models with one comparison state Maine than the ones for the models with combined 
comparison states (-0.034, for four years of data, -0.032 for six years of data). Row 4 
shows the results when only school districts in Rhode Island were used as a comparison 
group. These results from both four and six years of data were not statistically significant. 
The possible reason for the non-significance was that the sample size of the comparison 
state Rhode Island was small. There were 36 school districts in Rhode Island while there 
were 160 school districts in New Hampshire.  
In sum, the results of the models with multiple years data and a combination of 
two comparison states were robust to the averaged data models and the models with one 
comparison state in which the number of school districts was not small. With different 
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models, The DID estimation was from 0.020 to 0.039. That means that the school finance 
reform in New Hampshire decreased per pupil spending in all school districts by 2.0% to 
3.8%.  
Poor school districts. Table 22 shows the results for robustness check of the DID 
estimation of the effect of the school finance reform in New Hampshire on per pupil 
spending for poor school districts. With control variables, both the models with averaged 
data and the models with individual comparison state reveal that the school finance 
reform in New Hampshire had no significant effect on per pupil spending in poor school 
districts. These results were consistent with the results from the models with multiple 
years of data and a combination of two comparison states.  
Table 22: The Results of Robustness Check of DID Models for Poor School Districts 
in New Hampshire 
Model   
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
  (1) (2) 
Multiple year data (1) -0.012 -0.004 (0.015) (0.016) 
Averaged year data (2) -0.017 -0.005 (0.015) (0.019) 
With Maine (3) -0.018 -0.012 (0.016) (0.016) 
With Rhode Island (4)  0.016  0.034 
(0.018) (0.021) 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Rich school districts. Table 23 shows the results for robustness check of the 
estimation of the effect of the school finance reforms for rich school districts in New 
Hampshire. Row 2 shows the results from the models using averaged data. For the 
models with four years of data, the DID estimations of the effect of the school finance 
reform in New Hampshire were -0.031 without control variables and - 0.063 with control 
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variables. The former coefficient was statistically significant at 10% level, and the latter 
coefficient was only significant at 1% significance level. For the models with six years of 
data, the DID estimations of the effect of the school finance reform in New Hampshire 
were -0.018 without control variables and - 0.047 with control variables. The former 
coefficient was not statistically significant at 10% level, and the latter coefficient was 
only significant at 1% significance level. Since the inclusion of control variables could 
improve the precision of the DID estimation, the model with control variable was more 
trustworthy. Comparing to the results from the model with multiple years data, the results 
from averaged four years of data (-0.063) was the same as the effect estimated by using 
multiple four years (-0.063). For six years of data, the effect size estimated by averaged 
data (-0.047) was smaller than the one from multiple years data (-0.066). The significance 
was weaker for the model with averaged data (10%) than the model with multiple year 
data (1%).  
Table 23: The Results of Robustness Check of DID Models for Rich School Districts 
in New Hampshire 
Model 
  Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
  (1) (2) 
Multiple year 
data (1) 
-0.063*** -0.066*** 
(0.019) (0.024) 
Averaged 
year data (2) 
-0.063*** -0.047* 
(0.022) (0.026) 
With Maine (3) -0.068*** -0.073*** 
(0.023) (0.027) 
With Rhode 
Island (4) 
-0.024 -0.011 
(0.020) (0.024) 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Row 3 shows the results when only school districts in Maine were used as a 
comparison group. The direction and significance of the estimation of the effect of the 
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reform were the same as the model using a combination of school districts in Maine and 
Rhode Island. The effect size was a little bigger (-0.068 for four years of data, -0.073 for 
six years of data) from the models with one comparison state Maine than those from the 
models with combined comparison states (-0.063 for four years of data, -0.066 for six 
years of data). Row 4 shows the results when only school districts in Rhode Island were 
used as a comparison group. These results from both four and six years of data were not 
statistically significant. The possible reason for the non-significance was that the sample 
size of comparison state Rhode was small. There were 12 school districts in Rhode Island 
while there were 53 school districts in New Hampshire.  
Overall, the results of the models with multiple years of data and a combination of 
two comparison states for rich school districts were robust to the models with averaged 
data and the models with one comparison state in which the number of school districts 
was not small. The DID coefficient was from -0.047 to -0.073. This indicates that the 
school finance reform in New Hampshire decreased per pupil spending by 4.6% to 7.0%. 
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     CHAPTER 5 
Introduction 
In this chapter I first overview the research questions, objectives, theoretical 
framework, and research design of this study. Second, I answer the research questions by 
interpreting the empirical results reported in Chapter 4. Third, I describe contributions of 
this study to school finance studies and policy. Forth, the limitations of this study and 
implications for further studies are presented. Lastly, I summarize conclusions of this 
study.  
Overview of This Study 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effect of the school finance reforms 
in Vermont and New Hampshire on per pupil spending, addressing the following three 
research questions: 
1. Did the school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire change 
per pupil spending in all school districts? 
2. Did the school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire change 
per pupil spending in poor school districts? 
3. Did the school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire change 
per pupil spending in rich school districts? 
Two reasons motivated me to conduct this study. First, the school finance reforms 
in both Vermont and New Hampshire involved state governments recapturing local 
property revenue from rich school districts and distributing it to poor school districts in 
order to achieve equity in educational spending. This measure was politically unpopular 
because it induced strong opposition from rich school districts (Reschovsky, 1994). It is 
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unclear on whether rich school districts decreased spending on education or increased tax 
effort to substitute the loss. Second, the school finance reforms in Vermont and New 
Hampshire included the measure of increasing state aid to poor school districts. The form 
of direct democracy in budget decision procedure in Vermont and New Hampshire and 
the lack of the restraint on the use of state aid might not guarantee the increase in per 
pupil spending of poor school districts since they could use this aid for other purposes 
such as relief of property tax burden (Bradford & Oates, 1971; Card & Payne, 2002; 
Fisher & Papke, 2000). 
By utilizing the concept of tax price in public finance literature and the economic 
theory on the effect of intergovernmental grant (Bergstrom & Goodman, 1973; Bradford 
& Oates, 1971; Denzau & Grier, 1984; Hoxby, 2001), this study hypothesizes that the 
school finance reform in Vermont had a negative effect on per pupil spending in rich 
school districts because of the increase of tax price and the loss of local property tax 
revenue. On the contrary, it had a positive effect on per pupil spending in poor school 
districts because of the decrease in tax price for them. Similarly, the school finance 
reform in New Hampshire would also have a negative effect on per pupil spending in rich 
school districts because of the loss of local property revenue while it had no significant 
effect on per pupil spending in poor school districts because there was no restraint on the 
use of the state aid although state aid to poor school districts increased.  
Methodologically, this study utilizes a Difference in Difference (DID) model to 
analyze school district level expenditure data derived from the Common Core of Data 
(CCD) from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). By using comparison 
state Maine and Rhode Island and pre-and-post reform data, the DID design could reduce 
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the bias from factors that occurred during the targeted period and influenced per pupil 
spending in both treatment and comparison group. In order to control the influence of 
time invariant factors of school districts on the estimation of the effect of school finance 
reforms, fixed effect of school districts was included in the statistical models that this 
study uses. The dependent variable was per pupil spending of school districts. The key 
variable of this study was a dummy variable that indicates whether school districts went 
through the reformed school finance systems. The enrollment and percentage of students 
in free lunch program were included in the models as control variables. 
Although the school finance reforms of both Vermont and New Hampshire shared 
many commonalities such as the establishment of statewide property tax and the 
recapture proposition, the finance formula that they adopted were different. School 
finance system in Vermont was a combination of foundation system and power 
equalizing system. School finance system in New Hampshire was a foundation system. 
Therefore, this study evaluated the effect of school finance reform in both states 
separately. Finally, alternative specifications of statistical models were tested in order to 
check the robustness of the statistical strategies that this study uses. 
Discussion of Research Findings 
Research Question One 
The first research question of this study is whether the school finance reforms in 
Vermont and New Hampshire changed average per pupil spending in all school districts. 
The results from this study show that the school finance reform in Vermont did not 
increase average per pupil spending of all school districts. The DID estimation shows that 
the school finance reform in New Hampshire decreased average per pupil spending in all 
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school districts by 2% to 4%. Why did the school finance reform in Vermont not increase 
per pupil spending while the school finance reform in New Hampshire decreased per 
pupil spending? The results of the estimation of the effect of the school finance reforms 
in Vermont and New Hampshire on per pupil spending in school districts with different 
spending level provides clues to answer this question. This study shows that the school 
finance reform decreased per pupil spending in rich school districts and increased per 
pupil spending in poor school districts. It is reasonable that the school finance reform in 
Vermont did not increase average per pupil spending in all school districts. This study 
also shows that the school finance reform in New Hampshire had no effect on per pupil 
spending in poor school districts and decreased per pupil spending in rich school districts. 
This was the reason that the school finance reform in New Hampshire decreased average 
per pupil spending in all school districts. 
These results add up further evidence to the literature that school finance reforms 
could either level down or level up per pupil spending depending on the different 
measures that the reforms took. Since 1970s, many states initiated school finance reforms 
characterized by the increased role of state government in deciding school budgets (Loeb, 
2001; Murray et al., 1998), the school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire 
also increased state share of total education revenue. There is no consensus regarding the 
effect of these reforms. For example, the school finance reform in California in 1978 and 
the finance reform in Washington in 1977 decreased average per pupil spending while the 
school finance reform in Michigan in 1994 and the reform in Massachusetts in 1994 
increased average per pupil spending (Chaudhary, 2009; Dee & Levine, 2004; Downes, 
1992; Manwaring & Sheffrin, 1997). However, since the motivation of this trend of 
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school finance reforms was to increase per pupil spending in poor school district and 
decrease the inequity in per pupil spending among school districts, instead of focusing on 
the average per pupil spending of all school districts, it is more important to know the 
effect of school finance reforms on per pupil spending for school districts with different 
spending levels. These are discussed in the following section. 
Research Question Two 
The second research question is whether the school finance reforms in Vermont 
and New Hampshire changed per pupil spending in poor school districts.  In comparison 
to school districts of Maine and Rhode where there was no school finance reform in the 
same period, the results from this study show that the school finance reform in Vermont 
increased per pupil spending in poor school districts by from 2% to 5%, and the school 
finance reform in New Hampshire had no effect on per pupil spending in poor school 
districts. It is important to analyze the important measures in these two school finance 
reforms into order to explain the results.  
The school finance reform in New Hampshire increased state aid to poor school 
districts because of the input of new state general revenue and recaptured property tax 
revenue from rich school districts. Why did this increased state aid not increase per pupil 
spending? Two potential mechanisms could explain the results. First, poor school 
districts spent the increased aid on education, yet reduced their property tax efforts as 
they should if there were no school finance reform. Second, poor school districts kept the 
same level of property tax effort, but they spent a portion of the increased aid on other 
public services such as transportation or police if they did not spend it on education and 
tax relief. 
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 In Lutz's (2010) study of the relationship between state aid and local revenue in 
New Hampshire after the school finance reform, she found that approximately ninety 
cents per grant dollar were spent on tax reduction in New Hampshire after the school 
finance reform. This empirical evidence also confirms the equivalence assumption in 
economic theory. The equivalence assumption indicates that local residents treat state aid 
the same as their personal income increase if local budget decision could represent the 
preference of local residents (Bradford & Oates, 1971). Thus local residents spend only a 
small portion of the grant aid on education as they spend their personal income increase 
on education. This equivalence assumption is applicable to the school finance reform in 
New Hampshire because the budget decision procedure represented the preference of 
local residents in New Hampshire. Budget proposal was annually decided in a town 
meeting in most of school districts in New Hampshire. Also, there was no limit on tax 
rate or spending limit on education in New Hampshire. School districts were free to use 
state grant. Therefore, the school finance in New Hampshire did not increase per pupil 
spending in poor school districts because local residents used the increased state aid to 
relieve their property tax burden instead of increasing educational expenditure.  
The school finance reform in Vermont increased the state share of public school 
funding from 28% to 69%. Since the part of the increase was due to the renaming of 
previous local property tax as the statewide property tax, the increased ratio of state aid 
did not certainly indicate the increase of state aid. However, it did increase the state aid to 
poor school districts for the following reason. The new school finance system in Vermont 
was a combination of foundation system and power equalizing system. Each student 
received the same amount of foundation grants on the condition that school districts levy 
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a state property tax at the uniform rate. Since property tax base in rich school districts 
was higher than in poor school districts, the foundation part was actually a way of the 
distribution of a portion of property tax revenue from rich school districts to poor school 
districts. Compared to state aid before the reform, total state aid for poor school districts 
increased because the external funding from rich school districts was input and total pro-
reform state aid did not decrease.  
For power equalizing part of Vermont school finance system, if school districts 
were willing to spend more than the amount of foundation block grant they had to levy 
local property tax for its extra spending. The power equalizing system guaranteed that 
equal tax rate produced equal revenue. The guaranteed revenue was exclusively from the 
excess property revenue of all school districts which were willing to spend more than the 
amount of foundation grant. This means that property poor school districts could get 
external funding from property rich school districts if they decided to spend more on 
education than the foundation grant. In term of tax price, this means that the tax price for 
poor school districts decreased into less than one. The decrease of tax price could provide 
incentive for poor school districts to spend more on education. Therefore, either the 
increase of state aid or the decrease in tax price could be a reason for the increase in per 
pupil spending in poor school districts.  
Which one of the changes led to the increase in per pupil spending in poor school 
districts in Vermont?  The specification of this study cannot answer this question. 
However, the result on the effect of the school the finance reform in New Hampshire 
might provide a clue to answer this question, the reform in New Hampshire also 
increased state aid to poor school districts. But the increased state aid did not increase per 
  135 
pupil spending in poor school districts. School districts used the increased state aid to 
relieve local property tax burden because the budget decision procedure could represent 
the preference of local residents in New Hampshire (Lutz, 2010). The budget decision 
procedure in Vermont was similar to the one in New Hampshire. Both states did not have 
tax rate or expenditure limit. They were free to use the increased aid. Therefore, it is 
possible that the increased state aid in Vermont also did not increase per pupil spending. 
Thus, the increase in per pupil spending in poor school district in Vermont is probably 
due to the decrease in tax price. Also, many studies show that tax price was negatively 
related to local public spending (Denzau & Grier, 1984), or specifically, education 
spending (Hoxby, 2001). However, this is one hypothesis that needs further empirical 
evidence. 
Research Question Three 
The third question of this study is whether the school finance reform in Vermont 
and New Hampshire changed per pupil spending in rich school districts. The DID 
estimation shows that the school finance reform in Vermont decreased per pupil spending 
in rich school districts by 4% to 10%, and the school finance reform in New Hampshire 
decreased per pupil spending in rich school districts by 5% to 7%. What caused the 
decrease in per pupil spending in rich school districts in both Vermont and New 
Hampshire? I provide some explanations in the following section by analyzing the 
change in the school finance system in both states. 
  The school finance reform in Vermont produced two changes for rich school 
districts. First, because of the establishment of statewide property tax they lost a portion 
of property tax revenue, the loss of property tax revenue could be one reason for the 
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decrease in per pupil spending in rich school districts. Second, tax price for rich school 
districts changed from one into more than one after the school finance reform. They need 
to levy more than one dollar if they want to spend one more dollar on education than the 
foundation block grant. Schmidt and Scott (2006) analyzed tax price for each school 
district after the school finance reform in Vermont and found that 125 out of 253 towns 
paid more than $1 to increase local education spending by $1. Tax price in 37 towns was 
more than $2. Tax price in nine towns exceeded $5. School districts with high tax price 
indicate that they were also school districts with high spending. 76 school districts whose 
spending was at the top third of all school districts in Vermont were included as rich 
school districts in this study. Therefore, the tax price in these school districts was more 
than one.  
The economic theory predicts that the increase in tax price could discourage the 
demand of public service such as education (Bergstrom & Goodman, 1973; Hoxby, 2001; 
Olmsted, Denzau, & Roberts, 1993). Thus, it is probable that both the loss of the property 
tax revenue and the increase of tax price for rich school districts made contribution to the 
decrease in per pupil spending in rich school districts. No wonder that Vermont changed 
the power equalization part of its finance system, instead of recapturing the property tax 
revenue from rich school districts, the state used an increase in sales tax to guarantee that 
equal property tax rate produce equal revenue in 2004. 
The reason for the decrease in per pupil spending in New Hampshire is 
straightforward because of the recapture proposition in the school finance reform. This 
proposition recaptured the difference of the statewide property tax revenue and the 
amount of adequate grant determined by the state. This result explains the motivation of 
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the strong opposition to the new school finance system, especially the recapture 
proposition, and the later development of the school finance system in New Hampshire. 
In 2001, the second year after the 1999 school finance reform, the statewide property tax 
rate was reduced to $5.80 per $1,000 from $6.60 per $1,000 of property value. In 2003, 
the New Hampshire legislature adopted HB 608 which reduced the statewide property tax 
rate from $5.80 to $4.92 for fiscal year 2004 and further down to $3.24 for FY 2005.  
The reason for the gradual decrease in statewide property tax rate is that the 
statewide property tax rate was related to the amount of recaptured local property revenue. 
The amount of recaptured property revenue was the difference of a production of 
statewide property tax rate and local property value and the state decided adequate grant. 
The less the statewide property tax rate was, the less the amount of recaptured property 
revenue was. Finally, in 2005, the HB 616 was passed that allowed all towns to keep the 
excess statewide property tax revenue on the condition that the revenue was spent on 
education. There were only two towns whose excess statewide property tax revenue was 
still recaptured.  
The reformed school finance system in Vermont and New Hampshire were 
different. For Vermont, rich school districts not only lost a portion of property tax 
revenue if the property revenue at statewide property tax rate was more than a state 
decided foundation grant, but also lost a portion of property tax revenue if they want to 
spend more than the foundation grant. The first portion was decided by the state 
government because the amount of the foundation grant and the statewide property tax 
rate was decided by state government. The second part depended on whether they were 
willing to spending more than the foundation grant. On the contrary, for New Hampshire, 
  138 
the school finance reform was a foundation program. Rich school districts only gave a 
difference of property tax revenue at statewide property tax rate and the adequate grant. 
They would not lose more if they want to spend more than the adequate grant.  
However, the school finance reforms in both Vermont and New Hampshire 
produce the similar negative effect on per pupil spending in rich school districts.  This 
indicates that the difference in measures of school finance reform in Vermont and New 
Hampshire did not have different effect on per pupil spending in rich school districts. 
This is probably because rich school districts in both state lost a portion of property tax 
revenue. However, there is a difference in the way how this policy worked between 
Vermont and New Hampshire. Rich school districts in Vermont spent less not only 
because they lost a portion of property tax revenue but also if they spent more they would 
lose more. Rich school districts in New Hampshire spent less only because they lost a 
portion of property tax revenue that would be used on education. 
Implications for Studies on School Finance and Reform 
Contribution to Studies on School Finance 
First, this study highlights the importance of the conclusion that school finance 
reforms had different effects on per pupil spending in school districts with different 
spending levels.  The school finance reform in Vermont did not increase average per 
pupil spending of all school districts, but it increased per pupil spending in school 
districts with lower pre-reform spending. Also, the school finance reform in New 
Hampshire decreased average per pupil spending of all school districts while it did not 
change per pupil spending in school districts with low pre-reform spending.  
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The heterogeneity of the effect of school finance reform on different school 
districts was noticed by some existing studies. For example, by using state level data, 
Murray et al., (1998) showed that the school finance reform increase spending of poor 
school districts with spending at 5 percentile, and did not change spending of rich school 
district with spending at 95 percentile. By including an interaction term of the variable 
school finance reform and median income of school districts, Manwaring and Sheffrin 
(1997) showed that school finance reforms increased per pupil spending less for school 
district with higher income than school districts with lower income. Dee and Levine 
(2004) also showed that the school finance reform in Massachusetts increased per pupil 
spending more for poor school districts and rich school districts.  Thus, this study with 
other studies placed some questions on the studies which assumed that school finance 
reform have a homogenous effect on all school districts (e.g. Chaudhary, 2009). The 
heterogeneity of the effect of school finance reform on different school districts 
contributed to our understanding school finance litigations and reforms. On surface, the 
school finance litigations are the conflicts between school districts and state governments, 
and conflicts between judicial branch and legislature branch in state government. 
However, the school finance reform is always about the inequity of income of residents. 
The nature of school finance reforms is to adjust the influence of income inequity on 
education spending among school districts. 
Second, regarding the effect of lump sum intergovernmental grant on local public 
spending such as education spending, there is an inconsistency between theoretical 
prediction and empirical evidence. In theory, the effect of lump sum intergovernmental 
grant on local public spending is equivalent to income increase of voters in local 
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jurisdiction (Bradford & Oates, 1971). Since voters usually spend 5 to 10% of their 
income increase on education (Hines & Thalar, 1995; Romer & Rosenthal, 1982), it was 
expected that lump sum grant would produce the same magnitude of increase in local 
public service such as education spending. However, many empirical studies showed that 
school districts spent more out of intergovernmental grant on education than the theory 
predicted (Fisher & Papke, 2000; Hines & Thalar, 1995). This was called flypaper effect. 
The explanations for this included voter’s misperception and the bureaucratic 
manipulation (Fisher, 1982). Hines and Thalar (1995) argued for the behavioral 
explanation, for example, voter might treat intergovernmental grant not the same as 
private income increase because of loss aversion. However, several recent study showed 
that the flypaper effect of the intergovernmental grant did not exist when considering the 
procedure of budget decision and using more rigorous research methods (Duggan, 2000; 
Gordon, 2004; Lutz, 2010).  
This study also shows that the increased aid did not increase per pupil spending in 
poor school districts in New Hampshire. This echoes Lutz’s conclusion that local 
residents spent more than 90 cents out of one dollar increase in state aid on property tax 
reduction. The main reason for this was that the budget procedure in New Hampshire met 
the assumption that Bradford and Oates (1971) laid out. Voters were aware of the reform 
and could freely amended budget proposals. There was no regulation such as reversion 
proposition in Oregon which provides chance to bureaucrats to manipulate the budget 
procedure (Romer & Rosenthal, 1982). 
One aim of school finance reform since the 1970s was to decrease inequity in per 
pupil spending among school districts. Normally, state government either increases 
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education spending in poor school districts or limits the spending level in rich school 
districts. For example, in 2004, 12 states had tax or/and expenditure limitation (Jordan et 
al., 2005). Blankenau and Skidmore (2004) showed that court-ordered school finance 
reforms had a negative effect on education revenue from local source only in the presence 
of the tax or/and expenditure limitation. What was radical about the school finance 
reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire was that state government directly took away 
the property tax revenue from rich school districts although they did not impose the 
limitation on the spending and property tax rate. The recapture proposition, which 
directly transfer property tax revenue from rich school districts to poor school districts, 
was extremely unpopular in the approach to achieve the educational equity because it 
meant the loss of property tax revenue for these rich school districts (Reschovsky, 1994). 
Are these school districts willing to increase their tax effort to substitute the loss or do 
they just decrease expenditure on education? There is no empirical study on this question 
before this study. This study suggests that at least in Vermont and New Hampshire that 
the school districts losing property revenue chose to decrease their educational spending. 
Policy Implications 
This study provides three implications for school finance policy. First, if the 
increase of per pupil spending in poor school districts is the aim of school finance 
reforms, the increase of state aid without restriction of its use is not likely to achieve its 
goal because local residents are likely to use this aid to relieve their tax burden. This 
study shows that the increased state aid did not increase per pupil spending in poor school 
districts in New Hampshire. This is probably because budget procedure could represent 
the preference of local voters in New Hampshire. Thus, this study indicates that the 
  142 
restrictions on the use of state aid are needed and should be considered in the process of 
policy design. For example, the power equalization part of the school finance system in 
Vermont, which changed the tax price for poor school districts, stimulated them spending 
more on education. Also, Hoxby (1996) argued that foundation and power equalization 
school finance system were inferior to a mandatory spending level combined with 
categorical aid. The increase of categorical aid instead of general aid to poor school 
districts might prevent them from using it to relieve their tax burden. 
Second, the recapture proposition aimed to decrease the inequality in education 
spending among school districts by redistributing local property tax revenue in rich 
school districts to poor school districts. This study shows that the recapture decreased per 
pupil spending in rich school district, but did not increase per pupil spending in poor 
school districts in New Hampshire. This indicates that the school finance reform 
decreased inequity in spending between rich and poor school districts. Also, the school 
finance reform in Vermont, which included a recapture proposition, increased per pupil 
spending in poor school districts and decreased per pupil spending in rich school districts. 
This also indicated that the school finance reform decreased inequity in per pupil 
spending, and the capture might play an important role in it.  
However, is this measure a sustainable way to achieve equity in education 
spending? The direct recapture of property tax revenue from rich school districts and 
distributing to poor school districts resulted in strong opposition from rich school districts. 
They attempted to invent measures, such as the increase of private fundraising 
organizations after the school finance reform in Vermont, to circumvent the policy 
(Steinman, 2005). Also, residents in these school districts tried to repeal this kind of 
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dramatic school finance reform measure in state legislature. For example, in February of 
2004, Vermont passed Act 68 that reformed the school finance policy in Act 60. Act 68 
maintained the two-tier system adopted in the Act 60, but eliminated the recapture 
proposition. In 2005, the New Hampshire legislature adopted HB 616 that allowed all 
towns to keep the excess statewide property tax revenue except two towns on the 
condition that the revenue was spent on education. Therefore, the approach to achieve 
equality in educational expenditure by direct redistribution of property tax revenue from 
rich school districts to poor school districts was not sustainable at least in Vermont and 
New Hampshire.  
What measure could achieve equity in education spending? In 2004, although 
Vermont eliminated recapture proposition by Act 68, it maintained the two-tier system. It 
used an increase in state sale taxes to cover the funding that was recaptured from rich 
school districts before 2004 (Schmidt & Scott, 2006). This indicates that it is better to use 
general state revenue such as sale taxes or income tax to balance the inequity of 
education spending among school districts than direct transfer of property tax revenue 
from rich school districts to poor school districts. 
Third, this study provided implication to understand true motivations of plaintiffs 
in school finance litigations. The plaintiffs in the case of Brigham v. State (1997) 
demanded the same educational opportunities as students who resided in wealthier school 
districts and complained about disproportionate tax rate burden they bore. The plaintiffs 
in the Claremont v. Governor (1997) case alleged that New Hampshire state government 
failed to spread educational opportunities equitably among its students and adequately 
fund education, and that the heavy reliance on property taxes to finance New Hampshire 
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public schools resulted in an unreasonable, disproportionate, and burdensome tax. The 
lower spending level and higher property tax were the two complaints that these plaintiffs 
had. Both school finance reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire were promoted by 
successful school finance litigations for plaintiffs. The corresponding school finance 
reforms did increase the state aid to these school districts with lower spending. However, 
this study shows that they did not spend the increased state aid on education at least in 
New Hampshire (Lutz, 2010). This indicates that lower educational spending was more 
tolerable than higher property tax rate for poor school districts. 
Limitation of This Study and Implication for Further Research 
Although several attempts to increase the robustness of the analytical models in 
this study were made, data availability places some limitations on this study. First, the 
control variables included in the study were limited. For example, the variables 
representing the wealth level of school districts such as median house value or per capita 
income were not available. To some extent, percentage of students in free lunch program, 
which was included in this study, could be a proxy of wealth level of school districts, but 
it is not accurate because poor family may not apply for free lunch program, or rich 
families have higher level of wealth although the percentage of students in free lunch 
program is high. This could produce bias on the estimation of the school finance reform 
on per pupil spending (Denzau & Grier, 1984). Temporal variation in wealth level of 
school districts could dilute the effect of school finance reforms although the fixed effect 
analysis could control for the difference in wealth level among school districts. Therefore, 
future studies should take advantage of more recent data to increase the robustness of 
models in estimating the effect of school finance reforms. 
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Second, as this study shows, the choice of comparison state plays an important 
role in the DID design. In this study, models with comparison states such as Rhode Island, 
in which the number of school districts was small, produced unstable results for the 
estimation of school finance reforms on per pupil spending. Caution should be advised 
when interpreting the results from the study. 
Third, the advantage of DID estimation is that it could control the influence of 
unobservable variables that influences outcome variable in both reform and comparison 
states. The disadvantage of this strategy is that it only estimates the effect of whole 
package of the school finance reform. It could not identify specific measure that produced 
the effect. For example, the school finance reform in Vermont decreased per pupil 
spending in rich school districts. It reduced the property tax revenue and increased tax 
price for rich school districts. It is not possible for this study to conclude that which one 
or both are the reason for the decreased per pupil spending in rich school districts. 
Conclusions 
At the end of the 20th century, the constitutionality of school finance systems in 
both Vermont and New Hampshire was challenged in courts for the first time. Both states 
initiated dramatic school finance reforms after their school finance systems were ruled as 
unconstitutional. This included the establishment of new statewide property tax and the 
controversial recapture proposition. This study aimed to evaluate the effect of these 
school finance reforms on per pupil spending.  
By utilizing the DID research design and using school districts in Maine and 
Rhode Island as comparison group, this study found that the school finance reform in 
Vermont had a negative effect on per pupil spending in rich school districts and a positive 
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effect on poor school districts. By analyzing the measures of the reformed school finance 
system, it could be said that the change in the tax price were significantly related to how 
school districts decide school budget. School finance reform in New Hampshire had a 
negative effect on per pupil spending in rich school districts and no significant effect on 
per pupil spending in poor school districts. This indicates that increasing state aid to poor 
school districts without restraint on its use might not increase per pupil spending. It also 
indicates that the recapture of property revenue from rich school districts did decrease the 
spending level in these school districts.  
This study makes three important contributions to the literature on school finance. 
First, it shows that it is important to evaluate the different effect of school finance 
reforms on school districts in different spending level. This study provides strong 
evidence that school finance reform could produce contradictory effect on educational 
expenditure in poor and rich school districts. Second, this study shows that the recapture 
proposition used in school finance reforms did decrease per pupil spending in those 
school districts whose local revenue was recaptured. No wonder that the recapture 
propositions were repealed in both Vermont and New Hampshire after they took effect 
for several years. This places a question on the sustainability of this approach to increase 
educational equity. Third, this study shows that the increased state aid to school districts 
did not increase per pupil spending in these school districts if local residents were free to 
decide the use of these grants. This result is consistent to several recent studies which 
shows that the flypaper of intergovernmental grant might not exist(Duggan, 2000; 
Gordon, 2004; Lutz, 2010).  This is important to policy makers 
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the increase of state grant with no restraint on its use might not be an effective way to 
increase education spending in recipient school districts.   
Data availability places some limits on this study. The lack of annual property 
value of school districts might influence the estimation of the effect of the school finance 
reforms in Vermont and New Hampshire. Future studies need try to use new data to 
improve the estimation strategy. Also, the estimation could produce some inconsistency 
results when the comparison state just includes one state, especially when the state has a 
small number of school districts. Future studies should try to use more comparison states 
in order to utilize the DID research design. Third, the case of estimation the effect of 
school finance reform in Vermont, the approach to use school finance reform as a dummy 
variable could not answer what specific measure in the reform produced the effect of the 
reform. It is not possible to decide whether the increase in per pupil spending in poor 
school districts in Vermont was due to the increased state aid or the decrease of tax price. 
More empirical studies are needed to answer this question.  
  
  148 
REFERENCES 
Aaronson, D. (1999). The effect of school finance reform on population heterogeneity. 
National Tax Journal, 52(1), 5–29. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41789373 
Abadie, A. (2005). Semiparametric difference-in-differences estimators. The Review of 
Economic Studies, 72(1), 1–19. Retrieved from 
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/content/72/1/1.short 
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2008). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist’s 
companion. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Ashenfelter, O., & Card, D. (1984). Using the longitudinal structure of earnings to 
estimate the effect of training programs. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
67(4), 648–660. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/1924810 
Athey, S., & Imbens, G. (2006). Identification and inference in nonlinear 
difference‐in‐differences models. Econometrica, 74(2), 431–497. Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org/papers/t0280 
Baicker, K., & Gordon, N. (2006). The effect of state education finance reform on total 
local resources. Journal of Public Economics, 90(8-9), 1519–1535. 
doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.01.003 
Baird, K. E. (2008). Federal direct expenditures and school funding disparities, 1990-
2000. Journal of Education Finance, 33(3), 297–310. Retrieved from 
http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/recordDetail?accno=EJ781684 
Baker, B. D., & Welner, K. G. (2010). Premature celebrations: The persistence of inter-
district funding disparities. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 18(9), 1–30. 
Retrieved from http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/view/718 
Bergstrom, T. C., & Goodman, R. P. (1973). Private demands for public goods. The 
American Economic Review, 63(3), 280–296. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/1914361 
Bergstrom, T. C., Rubinfeld, D. L., & Shapiro, P. (1982). Micro-based estimates of 
demand functions for local school expenditures. Econometrica, 50(5), 1183–1205. 
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/1911869 
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2002). How much should we trust 
differences-in-differences estimates? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 
249–275. Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w8841 
  149 
Besley, T., & Case, A. (2000). Unnatural experiments? Estimating the incidence of 
endogenous policies. The Economic Journal, 110, 672–694. Retrieved from 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-0297.00578/abstract 
Bilotti, C. P. (1999). Public school finance programs of the United States and Canada: 
1998-99 Rhode Island, 1–14. Retrieved from 
http://nces.ed.gov/edfin/state_financing.asp 
Black, D. (1948). On the rationale of group decision-making. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 56(1), 23–34. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/1825026 
Black, S. E. (1999). Do better schools matter? Parental valuation of elementary education. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(2), 577–599. Retrieved from 
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/114/2/577.short 
Blankenau, W. F., & Skidmore, M. L. (2004). School finance litigation, tax and 
expenditure limitations, and education spending. Contemporary Economic Policy, 
22(1), 127–143. doi:10.1093/cep/byh010 
Bradford, D. F., & Oates, W. E. (1971). The analysis of revenue sharing in a new 
approach to collective fiscal decisions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 85(3), 
416–439. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1885931 
Brewer, M., Crossley, T. F., & Joyce, R. (2013). Inference with difference-in-differences 
revisited (pp. 1–25). Retrieved from http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/3211/ 
Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (1997). 
Buzuvis, E. (2011). “A”for effort: Evaluating recent state education reform in response to 
judicial demands for equity and adequacy. Cornell Law Review, 86, 646–689. 
Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1974942 
Card, D., & Krueger, A. (1993). Minimum wages and employment: A case study of the 
fast food industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. American Economic Review, 
84(4), 772–793. Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w4509 
Card, D., & Payne, A. A. (2002). School finance reform, the distribution of school 
spending, and the distribution of student test scores. Journal of Public Economics, 
83(1), 49–82. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272700001778 
Chandler, M. (2005). The median voter model versus the bureaucracy model of school 
finance equalization aid. Public Finance Review, 33(1), 62–83. 
doi:10.1177/1091142104270909 
  150 
Chaudhary, L. (2009). Education inputs, student performance and school finance reform 
in Michigan. Economics of Education Review, 28(1), 90–98. 
doi:10.1016/j.econedurev.2007.11.004 
Claremont v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (1997). 
Cornman, S. Q., Keaton, P., & Glander, M. (2013). Revenues and Expenditures for 
Public Elementary and Secondary School Districts  : School Year 2010–11 (Fiscal 
Year 2011) (Vol. 11). Washington, DC. Retrieved from 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/ 
Courant, P., Gramlich, E., & Rubinfeld, D. (1978). The stimulative effects of 
intergovernmental grants: Or why money sticks where it hits. In P. Mieszkowski & 
W. H. Oakland (Eds.), Fiscal federalism and grants-in-aid (pp. 5–21). Retrieved 
from 
http://www.warreninstitute.berkeley.edu/faculty/rubinfeldd/Profile/publications/stim
ulative_effects.pdf 
Courant, P., & Loeb, S. (1997). Centralization of school finance in Michigan. Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management, 16(1), 114–136. Retrieved from 
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/34833 
Dee, T., & Levine, J. (2004). The fate of new funding: Evidence from Massachusetts’ 
education finance reforms. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 26(3), 199–
215. Retrieved from http://epa.sagepub.com/content/26/3/199.short 
Denzau, A., & Grier, K. (1984). Determinants of local school spending: Some consistent 
estimates. Public Choice, 44(2), 375–383. Retrieved from 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00118770 
Donald, S. G., & Lang, K. (2007). Inference with difference-in-differences and other 
panel data. Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(2), 221–233. 
doi:10.1162/rest.89.2.221 
Dow, P., Watkins, J., Leighton, G., & Cameron, S. (1999). Public school finance 
programs of the United States and Canada: 1998-99 Maine, 1–28. Retrieved from 
http://nces.ed.gov/edfin/state_financing.asp 
Downes, T. A. (1992). Evaluating the impact of school finance reform on the provision of 
public education: The California case. National Tax Journal, 45(4), 405–419. 
Downes, T. A., & Shah, M. P. (2006). The effect of school finance reforms on the level 
and growth of per-pupil expenditures. Peabody Journal of Education, 81(3), 1–38. 
Retrieved from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15327930pje8103_1 
  151 
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of political action in a democracy. The Journal of 
Political Economy, 65(2), 135–150. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/1827369 
Duggan, M. (2000). Hospital ownership and public medical spending. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 115(4), 1343–1373. Retrieved from 
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/115/4/1343.short 
Evans, W. N., Murray, S. E., & Schwab, R. M. (1997). Schoolhouses, courthouses, and 
statehouses after Serrano. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 16(1), 10–31. 
Fernandez, R., & Rogerson, R. (1999). Education finance reform and investment in 
human capital: Lessons from California. Journal of Public Economics, 74, 327–350. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272799000468 
Fernandez, R., & Rogerson, R. (2003). Equity and resources: An analysis of education 
finance systems. Journal of Political Economy, 111(4), 858–897. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/375381 
Figlio, D. N. (1998). Short-term effects of a 1990s-era property tax limit: Panel evidence 
on oregon’s measure. National Tax Journal, (1981), 55–70. 
Figlio, D. N., Husted, T. a., & Kenny, L. W. (2004). Political economy of the inequality 
in school spending. Journal of Urban Economics, 55(2), 338–349. 
doi:10.1016/j.jue.2003.10.006 
Fischel, W. A. (1989). Did Serrano cause proposition 13? National Tax Journal, 42(4), 
465–473. 
Fisher, R. (1982). Income and grant effect on local public expenditure the flypaper effect 
and other difficulties. Journal of Urban Economics, 12, 324–345. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0094119082900213 
Fisher, R., & Papke, L. (2000). Local government responses to education grants. National 
Tax Journal, 53(1), 153–168. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/41789446 
Gordon, N. (2004). Do federal grants boost school spending? Evidence from Title I. 
Journal of Public Economics, 88(9-10), 1771–1792. 
doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.09.002 
Gramlich, E. M., & Rubinfeld, D. L. (1982). Micro estimates of public spending demand 
functions and tests of the tiebout and median-voter hypotheses. Journal of Political 
Economy, 90(3), 536–560. doi:10.1086/261073 
Hall, D. (2003). School finance reform: Trends and unintended consequences. 
  152 
Heckman, J. (1997). Matching as an econometric evaluation estimator: Evidence from 
evaluating a job training programme. The Review of Economic Studies, 64(4), 605–
654. Retrieved from http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/content/64/4/605.short 
Heckman, J. (2000). Causal parameters and policy analysis in economics: A twentieth 
century retrospective. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(1), 45–97. 
Retrieved from http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/115/1/45.short 
Heckman, J., & Vytlacil, E. (2005). Structural equations, treatment effects and 
econometric policy evaluation. Econometrica, 73(3), 669–738. Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11259 
Hines, J. R. J., & Thalar, R. H. (1995). Anomalies: The flypaper effect. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 9(4), 217–226. Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14579 
Hoxby, C. M. (1996). Are efficiency and equity in school finance substitutes or 
complements? The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(4), 51–72. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2138554 
Hoxby, C. M. (1998). How much does school spending depend on family income? The 
historical origins of the current school finance dilemma. The American Economic 
Review, 88(2), 309–315. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/116939 
Hoxby, C. M. (2000). Does competition among public schools benefit students and 
taxpayers? The American Economic Review, 90(5), 1209–1238. Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w4979 
Hoxby, C. M. (2001). All school finance equalizations are not created equal. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(4), 1189–1231. Retrieved from 
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/116/4/1189.short 
Jordan, T. S., Jordan, K. F., & Crawford, J. (2005). The interaction between tax and 
expenditure limitations, supermajority requirements, and school finance litigation. 
Journal of Education Finance, 31(2), 125–145. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/40704256 
Loeb, S. (2001). Estimating the effects of school finance reform: a framework for a 
federalist system. Journal of Public Economics, 80(2), 225–247. 
doi:10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00083-9 
Lutz, B. (2010). Taxation with representation: Intergovernmental grants in a plebiscite 
democracy. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(2), 316–332. Retrieved 
from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=899536 
  153 
Manwaring, R., & Sheffrin, S. M. (1997). Litigation, school finance reform, and 
aggregate educational spending. International Tax and Public Finance, 4(2), 107–
127. Retrieved from http://www.springerlink.com/index/m72577600g8r3746.pdf 
Mathis, W. J. (1998). Finance reform in Vermont: The legislature responds to the 
Brigham Supreme Court decision. Retrieved from 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED425505.pdf 
Mathis, W. J. (1999). Public school finance programs of the United States and Canada: 
1998-99 Vermont, 1–24. Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/edfin/state_financing.asp 
McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Education, 415 Mass. 545, 615 N.E.2d 
516 (1993). 
Meyer, B. (1995). Natural and quasi-experiments in economics. Journal of Business & 
Economic Statistics, 13(2), 151–161. doi:10.2307/1392369 
Michener, R. D. (1999). Public School Finance Programs of the United States and 
Canada: 1998-99 New hampshire, 1–13. Retrieved from 
http://nces.ed.gov/edfin/state_financing.asp 
Murray, S., Evans, W., & Schwab, R. M. (1998). Education-finance reform and the 
distribution of education resources. American Economic Review, 88(4), 789–812. 
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/117006 
Olabisi, O. (2006). New Hampshire’s quest for a constitutionally adequate education (pp. 
1–14). 
Olmsted, G., Denzau, A., & Roberts, J. (1993). We voted for this Institutions and 
educational spending. Journal of Public Economics, 52, 363–376. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/004727279390040Z 
Picus, L., Odden, A., Glenn, W., Griffith, M., & Wolkoff, M. (2012). An evaluation of 
Vermont’s education finance system. Retrieved from 
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/JFO/Education RFP Page/Picus and Assoc VT Finance 
Study 1-18-2012.pdf 
Rebell, M., & Metzler, J. (2002). Rapid response, radical reform: The story of school 
finance litigation in Vermont. Journal of Law & Education, 31(3), 167–190. 
Retrieved from http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-
bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/jle31&section=21 
Reschovsky, A. (1994). Fiscal equalization and school finance. National Tax Journal, 
47(1), 185–197. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/41789060 
  154 
Reschovsky, A., & Imazeki, J. (2001). Achieving educational adequacy through school 
finance reform. Journal of Education Finance, (October). Retrieved from 
http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-
bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/urban12&section=49 
Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973). 
Romer, T., & Rosenthal, H. (1979a). Bureaucrats versus voters: On the political economy 
of resource allocation by direct democracy. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
93(4), 563–587. Retrieved from http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/93/4/563.short 
Romer, T., & Rosenthal, H. (1979b). The elusive median voter. Journal of Public 
Economics, 12, 143–170. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0047272779900100 
Romer, T., & Rosenthal, H. (1982). Median voters or budget maximizers: Evidence from 
school expenditure referenda. Economic Inquiry, 20, 556–578. Retrieved from 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1982.tb00366.x/abstract 
Romer, T., Rosenthal, H., & Munley, V. G. (1992). Economic incentives and political 
institutions: Spending and voting in school budget referenda. Journal of Public 
Economics, 49(1), 1–33. doi:10.1016/0047-2727(92)90061-J 
Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790 S.W.2d 186, (1989). 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
Schmidt, S. J., & Scott, K. (2006). Reforming reforms: Changing incentives in education 
finance in Vermont. Education Finance and Policy, 1(4), 441–464. 
doi:10.1162/edfp.2006.1.4.441 
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal.3d 728 (1976). 
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584 (1971). 
Silva, F., & Sonstelie, J. (1995). Did Serrano cause a decline in school spending? 
National Tax Journal, 48(2), 199–215. Retrieved from 
http://www.freepatentsonline.com/article/National-Tax-Journal/17227920.html 
Snyder, T. D., & Hoffman, C. M. (2001). Digest of Education Statistics 2000. 
Washington, DC. 
Snyder, T. D., & Hoffman, C. M. (2002). Digest of Education Statistics 2001. 
Washington, DC. 
  155 
Springer, M. G., Liu, K., & Guthrie, J. W. (2009). The impact of school finance litigation 
on resource distribution: A comparison of court-mandated equity and adequacy 
reforms. Education Economics, 17(4), 421–444. doi:10.1080/09645290802069269 
Steinman, J. (2005). Alternative Revenue Generation in Vermont Public Schools (pp. 1–
76). Retrieved from 
http://ase.tufts.edu/econ/research/documents/2005/thesisSteinman.pdf 
Theobald, N., & Picus, L. (1991). Living with equal amounts of less: Experiences of 
states with primarily state-funded school systems. Journal of Education Finance, 
17(1), 1–6. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/41575622 
Thompson, D., & Crampton, F. (2002). The impact of school finance litigation: A long 
view. Journal of Education Finance, 27, 783–816. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/40704161 
Thro, W. E. (1990). Third wave: The impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas 
decisions on the future of public school finance reform litigation. Journal Law and 
Education, 19, 219–250. Retrieved from http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-
bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/jle19&amp;section=19 
Tiebout, C. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 64(5), 416–424. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/1826343 
Urquiola, M. (2005). Does school choice lead to sorting? Evidence from Tiebout 
variation. American Economic Review, 95(4), 1310–1326. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/4132718 
Verstegen, D., & Jordan, T. S. (2009). A fifty-state survey of school finance policies and 
programs: An overview. Journal of Education Finance, 34(3), 213–230. Retrieved 
from http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/recordDetail?accno=EJ865038 
Wong, K. (2013). The design of the Rhode Island school funding formula: Developing 
new strategies on equity and accountability. Peabody Journal of Education, 88(1), 
37–47. doi:10.1080/0161956X.2013.752638 
Wyckoff, P. (1991). The elusive flypaper effect. Journal of Urban Economics, 30, 310–
328. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0094119091900529 
Zimmer, R., & Jones, J. T. (2005). Unintended consequence of centralized public school 
funding in Michigan education. Southern Economic Journal, 71(3), 534. 
doi:10.2307/20062058 
  
  156 
APPENDIX 
Appendix One: Robustness Check of the DID Estimations for Vermont 
 
 
  
Table 1: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in Vermont with Comparison 
State Maine and Rhode Island on per Pupil Spending in All School Districts 
(Averaged Data) 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform -0.006 -0.034** 0.002 -0.020 
 
(0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013) 
Time 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.126*** 0.122*** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment (6years)    
-0.134*** 
   
(0.051) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students 
(6years) 
   
-0.257** 
   
(0.104) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment (4years)  
-0.193*** 
  
 
(0.057) 
  Percentage of free 
lunch students 
(4years) 
 
-0.300** 
  
 
(0.122) 
  Constant 8.849*** 10.087*** 8.834*** 9.701*** 
 
(0.003) (0.354) (0.002) (0.314) 
     Observations 985 786 985 784 
R-squared 0.359 0.418 0.571 0.586 
Number of id 493 410 493 409 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in Vermont with 
Comparison State Maine on per Pupil Spending in All School 
Districts 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform 0.001 -0.025** 0.002 -0.019* 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
1997.year 
  
0.030*** 0.030*** 
   
(0.004) (0.004) 
1998.year 0.024*** 0.035*** 0.055*** 0.064*** 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
1999.year 0.086*** 0.088*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
2000.year 0.126*** 0.137*** 0.155*** 0.167*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
2001.year 
  
0.214*** 0.219*** 
   
(0.008) (0.009) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment  
-0.230*** 
 
-0.234*** 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.041) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students  
-0.146** 
 
-0.104** 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.052) 
Constant 8.823*** 10.196*** 8.792*** 10.175*** 
 
(0.003) (0.299) (0.004) (0.241) 
     Observations 1,795 1,548 2,692 2,410 
R-squared 0.320 0.413 0.459 0.545 
Number of id 449 435 449 439 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in Vermont with 
Comparison State Rhode Island on per Pupil Spending in All School 
Districts 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform 0.052*** 0.018 0.065*** 0.025* 
 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
1997.year 
  
0.032*** 0.031*** 
   
(0.005) (0.005) 
1998.year 0.006 0.007 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
1999.year 0.021** 0.036*** 0.042*** 0.065*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) 
2000.year 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.090*** 0.105*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) 
2001.year 
  
0.149*** 0.150*** 
   
(0.014) (0.014) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment  
-0.738*** 
 
-0.667*** 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.075) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students  
0.035 
 
0.066 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.051) 
Constant 8.804*** 13.132*** 8.772*** 12.667*** 
 
(0.005) (0.320) (0.006) (0.439) 
     Observations 1,051 871 1,576 1,396 
R-squared 0.294 0.524 0.438 0.657 
Number of id 263 259 263 263 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in Vermont with 
Comparison State Maine and Rhode Island on per Pupil Spending in 
All School Districts (Without Free Lunch Variable) 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform 0.008 -0.003 0.011 -0.005 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
1997.year 
  
0.030*** 0.029*** 
   
(0.004) (0.003) 
1998.year 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.054*** 0.050*** 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
1999.year 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
2000.year 0.118*** 0.127*** 0.147*** 0.157*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
2001.year 
  
0.204*** 0.209*** 
   
(0.008) (0.008) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment  
-0.259*** 
 
-0.258*** 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.037) 
Constant 8.834*** 10.375*** 8.803*** 10.342*** 
 
(0.003) (0.245) (0.004) (0.219) 
     Observations 1,939 1,939 2,908 2,908 
R-squared 0.314 0.404 0.451 0.521 
Number of id 485 485 485 485 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in Vermont with 
Comparison State Maine and Rhode Island on per Pupil Spending in 
All School Districts (Including Eight School Districts) 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform 0.025** -0.003 0.023** -0.001 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) 
1997.year 
  
0.030*** 0.030*** 
   
(0.004) (0.003) 
1998.year 0.007 0.019** 0.037*** 0.049*** 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
1999.year 0.070*** 0.073*** 0.101*** 0.104*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
2000.year 0.110*** 0.122*** 0.141*** 0.153*** 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
2001.year 
  
0.199*** 0.204*** 
   
(0.008) (0.009) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment  
-0.236*** 
 
-0.242*** 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.040) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students  
-0.146** 
 
-0.116** 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.050) 
Constant 8.830*** 10.280*** 8.800*** 10.274*** 
 
(0.004) (0.307) (0.004) (0.246) 
     Observations 1,970 1,718 2,955 2,668 
R-squared 0.246 0.311 0.388 0.471 
Number of id 493 479 493 483 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in Vermont with 
Comparison State Maine and Rhode Island on per Pupil Spending in Poor 
School Districts (Averaged Data) 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform 0.035*** 0.033** 0.045*** 0.034** 
 
(0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) 
Time 0.093*** 0.087*** 0.129*** 0.122*** 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment (6years)    
-0.192** 
   
(0.075) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students 
(6years) 
   
-0.097 
   
(0.147) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment (4years)  
-0.188** 
  
 
(0.092) 
  Percentage of free 
lunch students 
(4years) 
 
-0.019 
  
 
(0.147) 
  Constant 8.671*** 9.852*** 8.662*** 9.888*** 
 
(0.003) (0.576) (0.003) (0.479) 
     Observations 329 274 330 271 
R-squared 0.637 0.687 0.761 0.798 
Number of id 165 143 165 142 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in Vermont with 
Comparison State Maine on per Pupil Spending in Poor School Districts 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform 0.024* 0.014 0.034** 0.020 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) 
1997.year 
  
0.029*** 0.032*** 
   
(0.006) (0.005) 
1998.year 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.071*** 0.077*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
1999.year 0.097*** 0.092*** 0.119*** 0.117*** 
 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) 
2000.year 0.147*** 0.142*** 0.169*** 0.168*** 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
2001.year 
  
0.231*** 0.221*** 
   
(0.010) (0.010) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment  
-0.201*** 
 
-0.269*** 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.048) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students  
-0.078 
 
-0.111** 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.053) 
Constant 8.642*** 9.866*** 8.617*** 10.259*** 
 
(0.005) (0.299) (0.006) (0.289) 
     Observations 596 540 894 820 
R-squared 0.560 0.626 0.672 0.744 
Number of id 149 147 149 147 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in Vermont with 
Comparison State Rhode Island on per Pupil Spending in Poor School 
Districts 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform 0.083*** 0.049*** 0.081*** 0.033 
 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.028) (0.025) 
1997.year 
  
0.039*** 0.043*** 
   
(0.009) (0.009) 
1998.year 0.040*** 0.027*** 0.073*** 0.069*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.015) 
1999.year 0.030** 0.041*** 0.069** 0.092*** 
 
(0.013) (0.011) (0.029) (0.027) 
2000.year 0.089*** 0.088*** 0.132*** 0.142*** 
 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.030) (0.028) 
2001.year 
  
0.189*** 0.181*** 
   
(0.030) (0.028) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment  
-0.658*** 
 
-0.692*** 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.080) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students  
0.073 
 
-0.009 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.076) 
Constant 8.640*** 12.464*** 8.605*** 12.670*** 
 
(0.006) (0.336) (0.010) (0.471) 
     Observations 348 310 522 479 
R-squared 0.549 0.705 0.637 0.772 
Number of id 87 87 87 87 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in Vermont with 
Comparison State Maine and Rhode Island on per Pupil Spending 
in Poor School Districts (Without Free Lunch Variable) 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform 0.032** 0.025** 0.041*** 0.028** 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) 
1997.year 
  
0.032*** 0.031*** 
   
(0.006) (0.006) 
1998.year 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.072*** 0.069*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) 
1999.year 0.089*** 0.086*** 0.115*** 0.111*** 
 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) 
2000.year 0.137*** 0.136*** 0.164*** 0.163*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
2001.year 
  
0.224*** 0.217*** 
   
(0.011) (0.010) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment  
-0.226*** 
 
-0.271*** 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.047) 
Constant 8.659*** 10.035*** 8.630*** 10.293*** 
 
(0.004) (0.350) (0.006) (0.289) 
     Observations 644 644 966 966 
R-squared 0.546 0.601 0.652 0.709 
Number of id 161 161 161 161 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in Vermont with 
Comparison State Maine and Rhode Island on per Pupil Spending in 
Poor  School Districts (Including Eight School Districts) 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform 0.070*** 0.044*** 0.058*** 0.037*** 
 
(0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) 
1997.year 
  
0.031*** 0.036*** 
   
(0.006) (0.006) 
1998.year 0.001 0.017 0.035** 0.049*** 
 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) 
1999.year 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.101*** 0.103*** 
 
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
2000.year 0.117*** 0.119*** 0.150*** 0.153*** 
 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
2001.year 
  
0.214*** 0.207*** 
   
(0.011) (0.012) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment  
-0.219*** 
 
-0.294*** 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.050) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students  
-0.075 
 
-0.135** 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.054) 
Constant 8.655*** 10.012*** 8.626*** 10.459*** 
 
(0.006) (0.336) (0.007) (0.307) 
     Observations 655 594 983 908 
R-squared 0.317 0.375 0.486 0.566 
Number of id 164 162 164 162 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in Vermont with Comparison 
State Maine and Rhode Island on per Pupil Spending in Rich School Districts 
(Averaged Data) 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform -0.062*** -0.109*** -0.049** -0.080** 
 
(0.024) (0.034) (0.021) (0.034) 
Time 0.090*** 0.087*** 0.130*** 0.117*** 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment (6years)    
-0.051 
   
(0.094) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students 
(6years) 
   
-0.228 
   
(0.158) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment (4years)  
-0.155* 
  
 
(0.093) 
  Percentage of free 
lunch students 
(4years) 
 
-0.369** 
  
 
(0.172) 
  Constant 9.051*** 10.013*** 9.029*** 9.385*** 
 
(0.006) (0.534) (0.005) (0.541) 
     Observations 328 251 328 250 
R-squared 0.174 0.267 0.395 0.397 
Number of id 164 131 164 130 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in Vermont with 
Comparison State Maine on per Pupil Spending in Rich School Districts 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform -0.021 -0.063** -0.018 -0.056** 
 
(0.023) (0.026) (0.022) (0.027) 
1997.year 
  
0.000 0.027*** 
   
(0.000) (0.008) 
1998.year 0.008 0.031** 0.035*** 0.054*** 
 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) 
1999.year 0.083*** 0.092*** 0.042*** 0.113*** 
 
(0.018) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) 
2000.year 0.098*** 0.135*** 0.113*** 0.155*** 
 
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) 
2001.year 
  
0.128*** 0.213*** 
   
(0.019) (0.024) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment  
-0.247*** 0.189*** -0.224*** 
 
(0.086) (0.019) (0.077) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students  
-0.209* 
 
-0.113 
 
(0.124) 
 
(0.100) 
Constant 9.030*** 10.440*** 8.993*** 10.261*** 
 
(0.008) (0.494) (0.010) (0.439) 
     Observations 592 493 888 767 
R-squared 0.140 0.253 0.254 0.344 
Number of id 148 140 148 141 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in Vermont with 
Comparison State Rhode Island on per Pupil Spending in Rich School 
Districts 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform 0.016 -0.014 0.034 0.009 
 
(0.029) (0.032) (0.027) (0.028) 
1997.year 
   
0.016 
    
(0.010) 
1998.year -0.025 -0.003 -0.023 0.011 
 
(0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020) 
1999.year 0.024 0.040* 0.012 0.044* 
 
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
2000.year 0.051* 0.067** 0.037 0.066** 
 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) 
2001.year 
  
0.097*** 0.118*** 
   
(0.023) (0.025) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment  
-0.719*** 
 
-0.640*** 
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.162) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students  
0.002 
 
0.106 
 
(0.119) 
 
(0.104) 
Constant 8.978*** 13.208*** 8.977*** 12.721*** 
 
(0.010) (0.544) (0.010) (0.956) 
     Observations 344 267 430 437 
R-squared 0.116 0.334 0.242 0.491 
Number of id 86 83 86 86 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in Vermont with 
Comparison State Maine and Rhode Island on per Pupil Spending in 
Rich School Districts (Without Free Lunch Variable) 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform -0.015 -0.034 -0.011 -0.040* 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
1997.year 
  
0.032*** 0.028*** 
   
(0.008) (0.007) 
1998.year 0.008 0.006 0.039*** 0.035*** 
 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) 
1999.year 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.103*** 0.106*** 
 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.016) 
2000.year 0.095*** 0.127*** 0.121*** 0.153*** 
 
(0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) 
2001.year 
  
0.178*** 0.205*** 
   
(0.018) (0.021) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment  
-0.282*** 
 
-0.261*** 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.069) 
Constant 9.034*** 10.634*** 9.000*** 10.486*** 
 
(0.007) (0.401) (0.009) (0.393) 
     Observations 640 640 960 960 
R-squared 0.139 0.252 0.250 0.333 
Number of id 160 160 160 160 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in Vermont with 
Comparison State Maine and Rhode Island on per Pupil Spending 
in Rich School Districts (Including Eight School Districts) 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform -0.012 -0.056** -0.012 -0.046* 
 
(0.021) (0.024) (0.021) (0.024) 
1997.year 
  
0.031*** 0.025*** 
   
(0.008) (0.007) 
1998.year 0.007 0.028** 0.039*** 0.050*** 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
1999.year 0.075*** 0.082*** 0.102*** 0.101*** 
 
(0.016) (0.013) (0.018) (0.015) 
2000.year 0.095*** 0.128*** 0.120*** 0.143*** 
 
(0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) 
2001.year 
  
0.178*** 0.197*** 
   
(0.017) (0.021) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment  
-0.250*** 
 
-0.223*** 
 
(0.085) 
 
(0.075) 
Percentage of 
free lunch 
students 
 
-0.211* 
 
-0.130 
 
(0.124) 
 
(0.098) 
Constant 9.030*** 10.521*** 8.998*** 10.308*** 
 
(0.007) (0.508) (0.009) (0.442) 
     Observations 652 547 978 854 
R-squared 0.144 0.250 0.249 0.337 
Number of id 163 155 163 156 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Two: Robustness Check of the DID Estimations for New Hampshire 
Table 1: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in New Hampshire with 
Comparison State Maine and Rhode Island on per Pupil Spending in All School 
Districts (Averaged Data) 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.020** -0.020* 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Time 0.083*** 0.088*** 0.119*** 0.124*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment (6years)    
-0.113** 
   
(0.044) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students (6years)    
-0.011 
   
(0.176) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment (4years)  
-0.071* 
  
 
(0.037) 
  Percentage of free 
lunch students (4years)  
-0.010 
  
 
(0.113) 
  Constant 8.912*** 9.368*** 8.895*** 9.618*** 
 
(0.002) (0.236) (0.002) (0.306) 
Observations 836 720 836 713 
R-squared 0.420 0.434 0.549 0.579 
Number of id 418 383 418 381 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table2: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in New Hampshire with 
Comparison State Maine on per Pupil Spending in All School Districts 
 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform -0.027*** -0.039*** -0.026** -0.039*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
1998.year   0.034*** 0.033*** 
 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
1999.year 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.078*** 0.073*** 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
2000.year 0.085*** 0.096*** 0.119*** 0.132*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
2001.year 0.130*** 0.137*** 0.164*** 0.171*** 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
2002.year   0.201*** 0.201*** 
   
(0.010) (0.009) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment  
-0.174***  -0.247*** 
 (0.044)  (0.037) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students  
-0.170**  -0.231*** 
 (0.081)  (0.078) 
Constant 8.882*** 9.996*** 8.847*** 10.428*** 
 
(0.004) (0.277) (0.004) (0.238) 
Observations 1,528 1,369 2,292 2,090 
R-squared 0.306 0.381 0.396 0.484 
Number of id 382 371 382 375 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in New Hampshire with 
Comparison State Rhode Island on per Pupil Spending in All School 
Districts 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform 0.023 0.016 0.047** 0.034 
 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.023) (0.021) 
1998.year 
  
0.023*** 0.031*** 
   
(0.006) (0.006) 
1999.year 0.039*** 0.050*** 0.061*** 0.082*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) 
2000.year 0.053*** 0.072*** 0.060*** 0.091*** 
 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.021) (0.019) 
2001.year 0.106*** 0.125*** 0.106*** 0.139*** 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020) 
2002.year 
  
0.171*** 0.189*** 
   
(0.023) (0.021) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment  
-0.717*** 
 
-0.690*** 
 
(0.147) 
 
(0.101) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students  
0.198 
 
0.109 
 
(0.218) 
 
(0.167) 
Constant 8.695*** 13.401*** 8.668*** 13.280*** 
 
(0.008) (0.968) (0.010) (0.677) 
Observations 264 233 396 357 
R-squared 0.418 0.609 0.550 0.719 
Number of id 66 66 66 66 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in New Hampshire with 
Comparison State Maine and Rhode Island on per Pupil Spending in 
Poor School Districts (Averaged Data) 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform -0.023* -0.017 -0.020 -0.005 
 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) 
Time 0.093*** 0.090*** 0.140*** 0.132*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment (6years)    
-0.039 
   
(0.080) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students 
(6years) 
   
-0.092 
   
(0.221) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment (4years)  
0.015 
  
 
(0.048) 
  Percentage of free 
lunch students 
(4years) 
 
0.053 
  
 
(0.093) 
  Constant 8.724*** 8.613*** 8.711*** 8.996*** 
 
(0.003) (0.342) (0.004) (0.578) 
Observations 280 238 280 236 
R-squared 0.598 0.633 0.679 0.751 
Number of id 140 129 140 128 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in New Hampshire with 
Comparison State Maine on per Pupil Spending in Poor School Districts 
  Poor School Districts 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform -0.020 -0.018 -0.021 -0.012 
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
1998.year 
  
0.033*** 0.034*** 
   
(0.005) (0.005) 
1999.year 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.085*** 0.082*** 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
2000.year 0.102*** 0.099*** 0.132*** 0.126*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
2001.year 0.159*** 0.153*** 0.186*** 0.175*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
2002.year 
  
0.257*** 0.236*** 
   
(0.015) (0.012) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment  
-0.137** 
 
-0.201*** 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.051) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students  
-0.100 
 
-0.186** 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.074) 
Constant 8.691*** 9.591*** 8.659*** 10.004*** 
 
(0.006) (0.365) (0.007) (0.336) 
Observations 512 454 768 694 
R-squared 0.515 0.557 0.610 0.688 
Number of id 128 126 128 127 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in New Hampshire with 
Comparison State Rhode Island on per Pupil Spending in Poor School 
Districts 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform 0.023 0.016 0.047** 0.034 
 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.023) (0.021) 
1998.year 
  
0.023*** 0.031*** 
   
(0.006) (0.006) 
1999.year 0.039*** 0.050*** 0.061*** 0.082*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) 
2000.year 0.053*** 0.072*** 0.060*** 0.091*** 
 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.021) (0.019) 
2001.year 0.106*** 0.125*** 0.106*** 0.139*** 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020) 
2002.year 
  
0.171*** 0.189*** 
   
(0.023) (0.021) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment  
-0.717*** 
 
-0.690*** 
 
(0.147) 
 
(0.101) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students  
0.198 
 
0.109 
 
(0.218) 
 
(0.167) 
Constant 8.695*** 13.401*** 8.668*** 13.280*** 
 
(0.008) (0.968) (0.010) (0.677) 
Observations 264 233 396 357 
R-squared 0.418 0.609 0.550 0.719 
Number of id 66 66 66 66 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in New Hampshire with 
Comparison State Maine and Rhode Island on per Pupil Spending in 
Rich School Districts (Averaged Data) 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform -0.031* -0.063*** -0.018 -0.047* 
 
(0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.026) 
Time 0.072*** 0.099*** 0.090*** 0.117*** 
 
(0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.022) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment 
(6years) 
   
-0.080 
   
(0.071) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students 
(6years) 
   
0.174 
   
(0.218) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment 
(4years) 
 
-0.081 
  
 
(0.058) 
  Percentage of free 
lunch students 
(4years) 
 
0.122 
  
 
(0.206) 
  Constant 9.134*** 9.570*** 9.115*** 9.533*** 
 
(0.005) (0.323) (0.005) (0.429) 
Observations 278 244 278 242 
R-squared 0.244 0.277 0.336 0.351 
Number of id 139 127 139 127 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in New Hampshire with 
Comparison State Maine on per Pupil Spending in Rich School 
Districts 
 
Rich School Districts 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform -0.032* -0.068*** -0.023 -0.073*** 
 
(0.018) (0.023) (0.021) (0.027) 
1998.year 
  
0.035*** 0.032*** 
   
(0.009) (0.008) 
1999.year 0.036*** 0.030*** 0.074*** 0.066*** 
 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.014) (0.010) 
2000.year 0.067*** 0.105*** 0.101*** 0.148*** 
 
(0.016) (0.023) (0.017) (0.026) 
2001.year 0.109*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.173*** 
 
(0.016) (0.025) (0.018) (0.027) 
2002.year 
  
0.123*** 0.155*** 
   
(0.019) (0.026) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment  
-0.240*** 
 
-0.285*** 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.069) 
Percentage of free 
lunch students  
-0.344** 
 
-0.272* 
 
(0.173) 
 
(0.149) 
Constant 9.103*** 10.545*** 9.073*** 10.737*** 
 
(0.007) (0.433) (0.009) (0.399) 
Observations 508 462 762 693 
R-squared 0.152 0.294 0.159 0.279 
Number of id 127 122 127 122 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: DID Estimation of the School Finance Reform in New Hampshire 
with Comparison State Rhode Island on per Pupil Spending in Rich 
School Districts 
 
Four Years of Data Six Years of Data 
 
No Control Control No Control Control 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform -0.042 -0.024 -0.030 -0.011 
 
(0.027) (0.020) (0.034) (0.024) 
1998.year 
  
0.009 0.020** 
   
(0.010) (0.009) 
1999.year 0.004 0.023*** 0.021 0.050*** 
 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.012) 
2000.year 0.069** 0.076*** 0.077** 0.092*** 
 
(0.028) (0.023) (0.034) (0.027) 
2001.year 0.094*** 0.089*** 0.091*** 0.104*** 
 
(0.024) (0.019) (0.030) (0.023) 
2002.year 
  
0.133*** 0.140*** 
   
(0.034) (0.028) 
Logarithm of 
enrollment  
-0.718*** 
 
-0.834*** 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.060) 
Percentage of 
free lunch 
students 
 
-0.159 
 
0.347** 
 
(0.199) 
 
(0.163) 
Constant 9.047*** 13.737*** 9.048*** 14.205*** 
 
(0.008) (0.378) (0.011) (0.372) 
Observations 260 237 390 354 
R-squared 0.167 0.600 0.168 0.586 
Number of id 65 65 65 65 
Note. School district level fixed effect is included in each model above. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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